

PREPAREDNESS AND AMERICA'S INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM

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**Preparedness
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International Program**

Edited by MICHAEL G. S. ANTHONY, Secretary of Political and Social Sciences of the
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FOREWORD

The decision to devote the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Academy to a discussion of America's International Program was reached after long and careful deliberation. In reaching this decision the Committee on Annual Meeting was influenced by the fact that the opportunity was offered the Academy to perform an important national service in guiding public opinion in a matter of vital importance to the future of our country.

The agitation for adequate preparedness has been carried on with but little reference to the question,—“For what are we preparing?” It is evident, in other words, that the nature and extent of “preparedness” depend to a very large degree on the specific foreign policy which the United States is going to pursue. To make a fetish of preparedness without reference to the principles for which we are going to stand in international relations is to invite disaster. The purpose which the Annual Meeting Committee had in mind was to make clear to the people of the country the relation between foreign policy and preparedness. The papers presented throw a flood of light on this vital question, and indicate clearly that a turning point has been reached in our national history. Upon the decisions of the next few years will depend to a very large extent whether the United States is to be a disturbing factor in world politics or whether we are to stand for a policy of international coöperation with all that goes therewith.

It is a tribute to the patriotism and spirit of service of the eminent men and women who participated in the Twentieth Annual Meeting that they were willing to make the sacrifice necessary to attend the sessions. The Academy is under deep obligations to them and herewith wishes to express its appreciation and thanks. Our thanks are also due to the various committees that contributed so much toward the success of the sessions.

The Annual Meeting on so large a scale was made possible through the generosity of a group of friends of the Academy who contributed toward a special Annual Meeting Fund. To each and

every one of these generous donors the officers of the Academy desire to express their sincere thanks.

The Academy also desires to express its thanks to the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce for the privilege of using the hall of the association for the morning sessions. An expression of appreciation is also due to the University Club, the Union League Club, Manufacturers' Club, City Club and the Acorn Club for privileges extended to the guests of the Academy during the period of the meeting.

L. S. ROWE,
President.

THE BASIS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

BY S. N. PATTEN, PH.D.,

Of the University of Pennsylvania.

All America is united by common interests which are clearly defined and distinct from that of other nations. While we all recognize this fact, the principles involved are so imperfectly worked out that we fail to see either the grandeur of our culture or its defects. The traditional, the tribal and the battle cries of particular epochs get an emphasis out of all proportion to their importance. They cause us to submerge general principles and lofty ideals under the chaff and débris of fresh emotional outbursts.

This culture is not a homogeneous growth based on home experience, but is the product of foreign thought consciously imported and yet made vital to us by our own experience. We are thus prevented from seeing the essence of these importations and thus separating its husk from its kernel. Our early culture came in the form of Christianity, whose basal concepts are brother love, sacrifice, conscience and charity. There are, however, two varieties of Christianity—the pure and the composite. Organized Christianity has through the centuries received impure currents of thought from outside influences; as a result it is possible to give an interpretation of it that makes the foreign elements overshadow the real essence of our culture. The old and the foreign have not been displaced even by the radical reformer. We find, therefore, a political admixture that becomes dominant whenever state needs dominate over spiritual ends. Peace in the one sense is meek docility or the absence of the spirit of rebellion. In a pure Christianity peace is a state of mind, a freedom from external coercion. In its secondary sense it means a harmonious life coupled with a perfect adjustment to vironal conditions. Force and peace are contrasts, the one being the essence of political domination; the other is a rule of conscience, a flow of feeling and the joy of adjustment.

Discipline as a political concept means a subordination of interest and life to some superior: to those accepting the pure Christian view it means a unity of action for common ends with

nothing of the docility aristocracies have forced on the world. Courage is a tribal impetus to kill and hate or it is the will to resist aggression thus making conscience and duty controlling motives. No group have met death more courageously than have the Christian martyrs of all ages. They die not for party or clan but that "all may live and have life more abundantly." Such is the essence of our religious inheritance and the conflict that rages within it between the discipline of love and of war. It is the rule of oriental despots over against the freedom of emotion and conscience.

As in religion, so in government we find a composite view contending with pure concepts that are the outcome of our racial experience. Representative government is our great contribution to the thought of the world. Our victories have been those of thought over force and yet the advocates of brutal suppression are always present and in times of danger force measures on a reluctant people that their better judgment opposes. We are too close on the arrogant suppression of the South during the Reconstruction epoch or similar atrocities committed by England in Ireland to be blind to what forceful methods do when race or party passion gets the upper hand. Yet no American would point to this epoch nor is there any Englishman who would declare that similar deeds in Ireland represented the flower of our civilization. We do not always rise to the full height of our possibilities, but the trend of our civilization is against the suppression of thought and freedom. It is this record and its benefits that our excited martial friends, yearning for a return of old methods, would have us repudiate. Force, they think, must be used when persuasion fails to bring immediate results.

Before discussing the need of thus reversing our cherished notions a third element in our cultural advance should be formulated. Here we find a principle scarcely recognized which must in time become the corner-stone of democratic culture. Home Rule is a term we apply to Ireland and as states rights has had a place in American thought yet these notable instances are but examples of the new way of making public decisions and of securing popular control of our diverse activities. As the state grows it takes on economic functions; these must be distributed between the nation and locality in a way that narrows the scope of national domination and broadens that of local control. The community is the old

tribe revived under new conditions which should be given a chance to develop and bear its legitimate fruit. Local uniformity differs from national coercion in that the person can choose his group; when among the like-minded he can intensify its feeling and attain his cherished ends without thwarting the like desires and aims of other persons. The freedom of the person is not the freedom of anarchy but a freedom in choosing his residence. His town, his trade, his cultural institutions dominate him not through force but through their attractive power.

These are the maxims of the new patriotism, the flower of democratic advance. It means that every region has its common interests and the right to advance them by group action. The doctrine of state rights is a crude expression of a great principle partially seen and often wrongly applied. Our larger states are dwarfed nations that use coercion with as little restraint as an Eastern potentate. Their minor powers should be given to the locality and the broader economic functions given over to the nation. Then we might with truth claim to be a democracy and inaugurate a rule of love instead of force. The nation's power would then be limited to fields where our interests evoke our assent while each locality would be a group of like-minded persons among whom a common culture could be attained by the growth of higher motives. It is these ideals that our supermen, our incipient aristocracy, our military enthusiasts would destroy or at least contend that they will fail to carry us safely through the present world crisis.

Nor are the advocates of controlled peace in a better position although their philosophical errors come from another source. The real victory that our culture has won is different from what they assume. We have progressed not as majorities enforce their mandates at the expense of minorities but in proportion as rights are accorded to such minorities. It is the dominant who yield in each new elevation of culture. We change from a material control to a spiritual control as majorities cease to impose their will on their opponents. The real victory of the North in our Civil War was not when Lee surrendered but when Northern soldiers were withdrawn from the South to permit the former rebels to control their local governments. In the Boer war the victory was in the restoration of the Boers to power and not in their forced submission. The Catholic emancipation and Irish Home Rule marks epochs of prog-

ress that overtop the defeat of Napoleon. It is not enforced peace, but enforced restraints of majority action that is our glory. We are rightly proud of our bills of rights and constitutions but what are they but restraints on majority actions. Shall we violate this glorious record by imposing our ideas and political mechanisms on unwilling nations or shall we permit them to solve their own problems in their own way?

It is an essential thought in all peace propaganda that tribal animosities should be displaced and that groupal emotions should be reorganized around new centers. These emotions find a fitting outlet in home and city life where their full expression is in harmony with the larger units with which they should coöperate. Groupal feelings thus have their direction altered, but the ultimates of human nature that lie back of them are unaltered even if unfelt. In emergencies their force is unabated, essentially sound and protective. The most fundamental of these is self-protection. In a crisis the instinct of self-preservation rightfully dominates and its decisions are not adverse to peace but its best mainstay. What I do because I must, always excites admiration and never distrust or animosity. It is the premeditated injury that is resented and becomes the basis of indignation if personal, and of race feuds if national.

Every man and nation must at times exercise instinctive defense which must be judged by the momentary situation and is highly moral if the motive is self-protection. It is one thing instinctively to resent an insult to wife or child and quite another to carry arms for fear they may be insulted. If everyone carries arms to avenge insults or to uphold honor, more people would be killed in useless disputes and for imaginary insults than would be saved from real injury. Consciously to prepare is to degrade social life to the level of a border town. With nations also it is they who go fully armed that invite trouble, not those who rely on instinctive protection. The present war is a good illustration of how preparedness adds fuel to passions and makes conflict inevitable. Vigorous instinctive self-defense is moral and righteous. Often bold and seeming arbitrary decisions must be made and severe penalties must be enforced. But the decision and the enforcement must be instinctive coming from an aroused spirit of humanity and not from musty codes or antiquated precedents. The case is given away as

soon as argument or threat begins. Such cases, however, will be few. The mainstay of peaceful measures lies in the opposite plan of a thorough understanding and of a conscious yielding of many legitimate rights so as to gain the most essential ends. Even our wrong opponent has himself been wronged and these wrongs must be righted before we seek to impose a penalty.

+ In primitive communities isolated from each other and without industrial intercourse the conflicts are over favorite areas or arise from race hatreds. The antagonisms between tribes and nations are thus fierce and frequent while the social bonds are weak or non-existent. Defense is therefore urgent; an appeal to common ideals impossible. That religion and morality under these conditions should become tribal is perhaps necessary. It was inevitable that martial ideas should become mixed with the real tenets of our religion and this gives an historical basis for a militant church. But this justification has lost its basis. Commerce and industry have bound the world into a homogeneous unit. Economics can be trusted to uphold universal peace and give it a better basis than martial ideals. The real protection of each nation is the interest other nations have in its welfare. Thought is now based on universal premises that all accept and on policies tested by recent experience. When to these are added the influences an enlightened self-interest imposes, we have a basis of peace that only some fierce revival of tribal emotions can break. Steadily these new forces are gaining the upper hand and so modify our emotions that morality and culture make a common appeal and buttress each other in the suppression of primitive passions. Religion can thus free itself from the gospel of hate and purify itself from the dross of martial concepts.

We must not, however, go too far or too fast. There are negative factors that demand consideration in the formation of a national policy which if neglected make more trouble than if consciously faced. The most persistent of these is fear which is all the more dangerous when without any basis. America today may not be in danger of invasion and yet a panic of fear may be fanned into active existence by a sensational press from vague rumors. A vivid description of how New York may be captured can upset the nerves of the nation without a single foe being in sight. Just as locking doors at night makes one feel safe even if it is no guarantee of safety,

so national defense is necessary, not so much to ward off danger as to suppress our inherited timidity. The problem of national defense thus becomes a legitimate one even to one who feels no danger and who believes that religious, moral and economic forces are our best safeguards.

The difference between a pacifist and an emotional patriot is not in the fact of defense but in the bases on which it should rest. Two of these bases are sound even in most advanced nations: first, the best defence is an instinctive defense based on our primary reactions and not on premeditated plans. The prepared nations will get into trouble oftener, do more bluffing and suffer more in the end than they who act only when they see some wrong is committed. Be sure there is some clearly defined cause and then act quickly at any cost until the end is attained. The action of the North in our Civil War is a good example of the virtues and failures of instinctive defense. No one would deny that this action was wiser and more democratic than would have been any amount of conscious military preparation. But something is involved in instinctive defense which most people overlook when the principle is applied to national affairs. No preconceived restraints, no traditional policy, no antique notion of law or right should check the alertness or vigor of effective national protection. Any real danger must be instantaneously guarded against not merely by negative measures but by positive attack.

The second principle is that for America, a naval defense is much cheaper and more effective than is a military defense. A serious mistake is made when military and naval defense are assumed to involve the same principles. A naval war could be carried to a successful conclusion without any disturbance of industrial life. We need submarines and fast cruisers, not battleships. If we had the fastest cruisers no fleet could approach our shore. It is the transports in the rear and not the battleships in the front that are the real danger. How could a foreign army be transported across the sea if our ships were fast and our submarines efficient? The popular picture of a naval fight is that of two groups of battleships struggling for the mastery. But why should we submit to such a test? To fight effectively is to make the ocean dangerous and not to use up all our strength in one naval battle. A discussion between two admirals as to the tactics of a recent naval review illustrates this

principle. The umpire decided against the fleet defending our coast on the ground that its commander divided his fleet to gain the rear of the invader instead of fighting an open battle for the mastery of the sea. The difference between the "stand up and fight" policy and a Fabian policy is as old as warfare. Which of the two is superior can be determined only by the actual conditions in a given case. It is important, however, to notice that the "stand up and fight" policy, noble as it seems, would cost the country billions of dollars, and if its one glorious battle went against us would expose us to tremendous losses. The other policy would not prevent some small city from being destroyed but would prevent any serious invasion. An umpire of the sort in command of a battleship might do himself honor, but the naval defense of America ought to be entrusted to other hands. The real fighting should be done a thousand miles from our shore by single ships that can strike unexpected blows and successfully escape if faced by a superior force. Such a defense would not be costly. Less men and money would be demanded than we now pay. But to be effective, naval action must not be hampered by technicalities that make instinctive defense impossible. The evil of the rules of naval warfare that our President seeks to establish is that they would take from us our most effective means of defense when a real danger arises and make a large army necessary to protect our harbors. If unhampered, our present naval budget would give protection against every nation but England. It is not our own shores that are costly to defend, but our outlying possessions and their defense demands a change of policy rather than more expenditure.

Two policies are open to the United States. We may give up the Monroe Doctrine and yield our outlying possessions. Then our defense by fast cruisers and submarines is simple, effective, and not burdensome. But if we wish to retain the Monroe Doctrine, defend the Philippines and influence China or adopt any other aggressive policy, our problem becomes the same as that of England and demands a joint control of all oceans. England's supremacy at sea has not been questioned during the present war nor has she been in any real danger of invasion. It is only her entangling alliances on the continent that cause her present troubles and have brought out her deficiencies. A joint control of the ocean by Britain and America means no increase of present naval expenses and would permit

a large decrease of army expenditure. Such a policy would mean the dividing the world into two parts, one of which would be under Anglo American control. This would include the British Isles, America, Africa, India and Australasia. All these can be made safe by a control of the sea. They form a natural unit where democratic ideals have ample scope for expansion. If we put the defense of our ideals above our material needs an alliance with Britain is the only logical procedure. Their defense and ours must run along the same lines and demand a full control of the seas. He is an enemy to our liberty who contests this control and his schemes must be thwarted without delay.

To restate this thought in more general terms there are three fundamental psychological reactions that statesmen neglect at their peril. They are instinctive defense, instinctive fear and the instinctive yearning for groupal relations. Our political philosophy tries to make us think of ourselves as individuals, but it is a defective philosophy at best and mere intellectual dilettantism in its ordinary forms. From this philosophy we are breaking and natural groups, home, church, school, trade, locality, and nation are being formed that dominate the individual in spite of himself. For the same reason any cosmopolitan scheme is without any vital force and would be disregarded when groupal interests oppose its formulas. In culture, language and institutions our groupal feelings bind us to England and it will be easy to form the adjustment, political and economic, that will give this groupal feeling full play. But a controlled peace for the whole world is a paper scheme based on false principles. It would involve us in difficulties instead of avoiding them. But if we act groupally our defense must be instinctive, safe and practical. We cannot be a Don Quixote defending small nations or antiquated political concepts. Nor can we be controlled by a maudlin sentimentality that prevents effective defense or makes it costly. We need to guard our culture, our liberty and our institutions as effectively as do the Germans and have the same lofty ideal of the subordination of the person to the state. But we want an Anglo American state free from the taint of military domination.

The principle of national preservation is not different from, but is in essence the same as, that of individual self-defense. It is supreme in moments of peril and to it for the time all else is to be

subordinated. What we need is not its denial but its stern application to our present perils and needs. Shall we, aroused by sentimental emotions, try to protect a few excursionists whose curiosity leads them into the war zone, or shall we say that the control of the sea is as vital to our liberty as is the control of land to Germany and give warning to all nations that we do not mean to remain passive if a hostile nation threatens our integrity? Where does the defense of America begin—three miles from our own coast or three miles from the Japanese, German or any other coast from which a national peril may loom? Shall we go to antiquated principles of international law for the basis of our defense, or to the instinctive reactions that nature has planted in our heredity? Shall our defense conform to our psychological inheritance or to our paper philosophies? Any foreign policy is wrong that conflicts with ultimate realities and seeks to put up barriers that in the hour of national peril we would be forced to repudiate. It is only fair that we give others the same right of instinctive defense that we will demand for our own defense. Present yielding will give future stability. Better a temporary loss than the establishment of false principles.

The vital point in this position turns on the difference between military and naval defense. The one is a useless extravagance, a menace to national liberty, and would be a blot on our culture. To impose a military discipline on the American people would be to imitate the worst features of German civilization, with all the evils we deplore. The docility of the trained conscript is the real danger. We have enough of this personal humility and servility without enforcing it by a national discipline. Naval defense does not involve these dangers. The expense need not be above our present expenditure if the cost of the army is kept within proper bounds. Should England and America unite in a common defense, large sums could be saved. It is not our defense but the attempted control of other civilizations that would debase our ideals and in the end lead to bankruptcy.

The essence of this position is that our culture rests on five distinct principles which often conflict but yet have in time been blended into a harmonious whole. These are Instinctive Defense, Brother Love, Representative Government, Home Rule and Economic Interests. Thinkers and writers arrive at different conclusions as they give emphasis to some of these principles at the expense

of others. The main distinction, however, is between those whose thought is purely a result of national experience or of older thought verified by recent events, and those whose minds are so cramped by book knowledge that actual experience seems but a defective guide. The hybrid thinker knows much of Greece, Rome, Germany, France and Russia and goes to them for his ultimate catagories. Or, he accepts a view that elevates English thought to a dogmatic eminence and thus neglects the vital reactions of the American people. While akin to the English, our view and experience is really saner than theirs, because less disturbed by abnormal conditions and antiquated traditions.

Our ultimate choices are therefore simple and make only one of two alternatives sane and rational. We must either emphasize Brotherly Love and rely on its winning power or we must take Instinctive Defense and Economic Interests as our guides. With love as a dominating principle, we can remain in isolation, relying on Good Will and International Brotherhood for our protection. Should these fail or seem likely to be insufficient, an alliance with England is the only practical defense open to us. Her problems are the same as ours; her culture is our culture and her defense involves the same measures which we must adopt. Together we could defend one half of the world without any resort to a military discipline that would be destructive to liberty and economic prosperity. The world would be then divided into three economic zones, Anglo American, Continental Europe and Eastern Asia. There could thus arise three isolated civilizations with economic interests that would not seriously collide. It is only when we seek to stretch our control over antagonistic races or seek to dispute their ascendancy on their own territory that we evoke formidable opposition and thus force on ourselves the need of a military organization more destructive to ourselves than to our foes. The great evil in the world is not war but the docility that martial discipline imposes. It is better to be free than to be dominant, even if the latter has the glitter of world uniformity.

This new patriotism I would define as *National Pacifism*. The contrast is a triple one in which the brooding alarmist is at one pole and the international socialist at the other. The middle ground is a national organization quieting instinctive fear and promoting industrial efficiency. By increasing income, by coöperative living,

and by spreading justice, our emotional nature is brought into harmony with culture, science, and brother love. As men sink below the normal their fear, hate, and passion rise as awesome specters. There is a like danger from a dominance of the intellect. Rationalism, utilitarianism, cosmopolitanism, and other varieties of international thought create an opposition between heredity and culture. No one can be properly called a pacifist who ignores human nature so completely as to make it rebel against his schemes. More than the meager ties of speculative thought are needed to bind men in effective units. The national, the local, and the economic are the forces through which our heredity has developed, and they alone are capable of firmly protecting normal life. To them we must look for the broader view and solid basis on which our advancing culture may rest. Race, hate, and fear disappear when normal men are reorganized along economic lines. The old patriotism had them as its main agents; the new must be their bitter foe. Brother love and economic coöperation are the two elements which, united, give the true basis of nation and patriotism.

THREE PLANS FOR A DURABLE PEACE

BY WILLIAM I. HULL,

Professor of History and International Relations, Swarthmore College.

I believe it was Count Von Eulenburg who declared that a durable peace upon this earth is to be found only in the cemetery. But there are people, even in Germany, who do not accept that pessimistic view; and in Germany and elsewhere, all over the world, there are people who are earnestly and determinedly seeking for the proper basis of a durable peace.

As I have thought over the various plans for bringing this most desired end about, it has seemed to me that they class themselves under three headings; and, as an American, I may call these three plans, perhaps without undue conceit, the German, the Allied and the American.

The German plan of preserving a durable peace was to build up mighty armaments. "Let us have an army so invincible that no other power will dare to attack us, and we can then preserve the peace." Great Britain adopted practically the same philosophy. "Let us build up a navy so powerful that not even Germany, with its unequalled army, will dare to attack us." And so we have seen during the last generation the unprecedented building-up of armies and of navies.

That plan of preserving the peace is at present somewhat under a cloud. It is true that there are Germans who insist that they did not go far enough, that their army was not big enough; and there are Englishmen who insist that *they* did not go far enough, that their navy was not big enough, and that if they had both been larger, the peace would have been preserved. The rest of the world is very skeptical, however, of the validity of that argument. This plan of preserving the peace is not only a *big* thing in itself, but the rest of us are convinced that it carries inevitably the seeds of warfare with it.

The second plan of preserving the peace has emerged amongst the Allies. They claim that durable peace must be preserved by an alliance of the armed power, an alliance of the military forces,

of nations that are like-minded with themselves; and in this time of war they have built up these enormous and unprecedented alliances. They are looking forward, also, to the time of peace, when these alliances shall continue to coöperate, both in a military and in a commercial way.

A third plan for the preservation of peace is what I venture to call the American plan. It is a plan which rejects both the increasing armaments of the separate nations and also alliances between the armed forces of the separate nations. It is a plan which was entered upon by the thirteen independent states of our infant republic back in 1789. This plan is based not upon the optimism, the millennial optimism, that men will stop quarreling with one another, but upon the determination that when quarrels arise between states as between citizens, they shall be settled not by military force but by judicial process.

We, in America, have put that experiment into operation. We have found that it works. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 represent the first attempt to give to the rest of the world the American plan of preserving a durable peace. The Hague Conferences, in the endorsement of international arbitration and in the establishment of the permanent Court of Arbitration, took the first step in the application of that American program for the rest of the world; and the world is looking forward to the time when the forty-six nations in the family of nations shall settle their international differences and disputes as regularly and as inevitably by judicial process, as the forty-eight states of our union settle interstate disputes.

Now, what is the supreme difficulty in the realization of this American program? Some have thought that it is the difficulty of getting disputes before the arbitral tribunal, and the League to Enforce Peace has made it its object to compel by economic and, if necessary, by military pressure, the bringing of disputes before the international tribunal. Some think that the supreme difficulty is to get the awards of the court accepted. This has not proven the case, however, as far as experience shows; for out of about two hundred and forty-three disputes settled by arbitration since 1794, not a single one of the decisions of the tribunals has been resisted.

Are there, then, already in existence sanctions sufficient to

bring disputes before the court and to have the decisions of the court accepted when they are handed down? It would certainly seem that there are, in view of the fact that more than twelve score have been accepted. Among these forces is, first, diplomacy,—an international diplomacy. I fear that too many,—that the ninety-nine, perhaps, of every hundred American citizens who are demanding that in case Germany does not yield to the demands of the United States, diplomatic relations shall be broken,—do not really understand what is meant by the breaking of diplomatic negotiations. I cannot analyze this great power of our time, but can merely remark that if diplomatic pressure can be made almost world-wide instead of being exercised by one nation only, as would be the case of the United States against Germany, the diplomatic power alone is of enormous strength.

Secondly, the commercial and financial sanction, to which I can only allude at this time; and thirdly, the great power of public opinion,—both national public opinion and international public opinion. Lord Bryce, in his *American Commonwealth*, has revealed to us Americans the tremendous, the *sovereign* power of public opinion within our own country. There is a public opinion in every country. It is that great, unorganized sovereignty to which President MacCracken referred, and it has been appealed to scores of times, as I have indicated, and has never yet failed. If that public opinion within each nation and between the nations can be thoroughly organized, it will form the third of these twentieth century sanctions.

Then, fourthly, we are told that force is always behind the law. Yes, that is true; but it is a long way behind the law in civilized communities. It is the ultimate sanction of law; and how many thousands of disputes are settled through legal process by no more physical force than is represented by the exertion of the judge who presides in pronouncing the decision?

It is undoubtedly the last resort; yes, but what kind of force is it? Is it merely military power? Would this international police force towards which we are looking represent the military power of each nation? Would it represent the allied military powers of a few nations? Not if it is a genuine police force.

This leads me to say that I devoutly hope that that element of the League to Enforce Peace which stands for a genuine interna-

tional police force will triumph within that organization, that it will triumph over that other element of the League to Enforce Peace, which insists that the military force represented by a partial alliance of national armaments shall be the sanction, and that this military force shall be placed in the forefront of the program.

On the other hand, there has existed in this country ever since the second Hague Conference, and long before the "frightfulness" of the present war caused the League to Enforce Peace and the plans for an Anglo-American or Pan-American offensive and defensive alliance to spring into existence, an organization which stands absolutely upon the judicial basis for the settlement of international disputes. This organization, the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, believes explicitly that when the right kind of a court can be organized, and when the diplomatic, economic and public opinion sanctions can be organized and placed behind that court, international disputes will come naturally and invariably before it, and the awards of the court in those disputes will be accepted as regularly and naturally as are the awards of the Supreme Court of the United States. This society stands also upon the proposition that if force is ever used, even as the ultimate sanction, it shall be, not national armaments, and not an alliance of national armaments, but a genuine *police* power.

Now, that is the road, also, that has been taken by the Central Organization for a Durable Peace. Its program was launched at The Hague, it is true; but it is the old, historic program of the United States of America; and this Organization for a Durable Peace, and the Hague Conferences of the future, are going to work steadfastly along the American pathway to complete, world-wide and permanent success.

THE CENTRAL ORGANIZATION FOR A DURABLE PEACE

BY FANNIE FERN ANDREWS,

Member, Central Organization for a Durable Peace.

Whether silence or speech should obtain at the present time, whether during war all constructive action for the future welfare should cease, is a question long since answered. It is a notable fact that during the horrors of the Thirty Years' War, Grotius wrote his treatise on the *Rights of War and Peace*, which was the first systematic statement of the principles of the law which should regulate the conduct of nations in their mutual intercourse. This work, as pointed out by the *American Journal of International Law*, "convinced statesmen, bound nations, and molded the thought of future generations, substituting as it did a rule of conduct based upon right reason for mere force." Today, as we witness the intolerable consequences of violated standards, we stake our only hope on the prospect of a new departure in the development of law and in the subjection of the nations to its rule. Indeed, the world may need another Grotius.

Of one thing, however, we are certain—that the fundamental basis of the new world order which must come after the present war must be laid today. When the representatives of the states come together in the midst of the wreck and desolation left by the war, their task will be almost overwhelming, for they will be charged with nothing less than a general reorganization of international procedure. This will be accomplished by utilizing the existing elements of order and by combining them with others which fit the changed conditions. What the new elements will be will depend on generally accepted opinions, for as the nations have appealed to public opinion in all parts of the world to justify their actions in the war, so they will lend a sensitive ear to projects which have been endorsed by any considerable body of people. The moment calls for full and free discussion, for in no other way can wise conclusions be reached. The obligation of the present, then, is to formulate and to promulgate the plans for a new departure in international

procedure. We may mold history tomorrow if we can mold opinion today.

Of the various efforts designed to organize public opinion for the support of a new world order, the Central Organization for a Durable Peace stands out prominently. This was formed by the International Confidential Meeting at The Hague last April, when thirty international jurists, statesmen, economists and publicists from Germany, Belgium, England, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and the United States came together to discuss the basis of a durable peace. The deliberations of this meeting, which, it should be pointed out, in no way concerned the present war, were summed up in the Minimum-Program, which is offered to the world "as a foundation for common action."

The nine points of this program were drawn up with the view of meeting the practical situation after the war. The establishment of a durable peace involves two steps. It is natural that the people who have carried the heavy burden of the war will reserve to themselves the regulation of the settlement of immediate questions, especially those which touch the political, financial, and territorial situation. We may expect, therefore, that in the congress which will assemble to draw up the terms of peace, there will be a limited number of states, and that consequently the settlement will be made by the same group of men who failed to prevent this most disastrous of wars. In order that this settlement may not result in a mere armistice, having in it the seeds of future war, it must adhere to certain principles.

The Minimum-Program points out two safeguards, and here it must be emphasized that this is in reality a minimum-program, stipulating only those principles, without adherence to which a durable peace is impossible. The program points first to the principle of nationality. It recognizes that the political frontiers in Europe, coinciding only rarely with the limits of nationalities, are a constant cause of war. The Central Organization for a Durable Peace does not attempt to regulate these conditions, which are the result of an historical evolution, but it insists that whatever may be the issue of the war, the number of such cases may not be augmented by the next treaty of peace. It states definitely that in the annexation or transfer of territory the interests and wishes of

the population concerned should be the only point considered, and wherever possible consent should be obtained, by plebiscite or otherwise. The second safeguard is the insistence that states shall introduce in their colonies protectorates and spheres of influence, liberty of commerce, or at least equal treatment for all nations. In this domain, we find a fruitful source of conflict, and it is incumbent upon any congress which bases its settlement on the principles of a durable peace to deal with this branch of economic rivalry because of its potency in creating dangerous oppositions and thereby provoking wars.

So far, then, the Minimum-Program concerns the Peace-settlement Congress, and it is not amiss to mention again that it is merely laying down principles which it considers most fundamental. It might with great propriety urge the study of other problems which will face the congress when it begins to fix the conditions of peace. The meaning and obligation of guarantees of neutrality, the rights and duties of invading armies and civilian populations in occupied territory, the usage of prisoners of war, reprisals, war-zones, the arming of merchantmen, the regulation of submarine warfare, the law of blockade and contraband—all these matters, and many others also, will come up for consideration. One need only mention the problem of fixing war indemnities to be reminded of the task which will confront this congress.

The Central Organization for a Durable Peace bases its program on the calling of two assemblies—a comparatively small body to draw up the terms of peace as described above, and a large body representative of all civilized states to deal with the reestablishment and strengthening of international law, this to be called through the machinery of the Hague Conference. It is evident that the matters mentioned above concern the whole body of civilized states, since there can be no permanent settlement of some of the questions which concern the belligerents until many world questions of international law are satisfactorily dealt with. In this connection, the problem of armaments and the freedom of the sea are especially urged for present consideration.

It is necessary to organize peace if it is to be durable. The program proposes, in addition to the Hague Court of Arbitration, a Court of Justice, a Council of Investigation and Conciliation, and the permanent organization of the Hague Conference. Thus

no entirely new institution is included in the plan. The Hague Court of Arbitration presents a successful record since its organization in 1902. The Second Hague Conference voted by a large majority the project of an International Court of Justice, although, as is well known, it failed to realize on account of the difficulties incident to the problem of its composition. The idea of a Council of Investigation and Conciliation for dealing with non-justiciable questions, those indeed which are most likely to lead to war, has developed from the Commission of Inquiry established by the First Hague Conference. Finally, to look forward to the development of the Hague Conference into an international assembly, meeting periodically to formulate and codify rules of international law, coincides with the spirit of the Second Hague Conference in providing for the calling of the Third.

Besides urging the consideration of those principles of durable peace which should govern the Peace-settlement Congress, and the plan for international organization, the Central Organization for a Durable Peace states that the stability of peace will never be maintained by measures of international order alone. In speaking of the limitations of international law, Mr. Root said: "Law cannot control national policy, and it is through the working of long continued and persistent national policies that the present war has come. Against such policies all attempts at conciliation and good understanding and good-will among the nations of Europe have been powerless." The Program mentions two measures in this domain which are especially indispensable: (1) the guarantee to the national minorities of civil equality, religious liberty and the free use of their native languages; (2) the parliamentary control of foreign politics with interdiction of all secret treaties.

The most striking part of the Minimum-Program, and that which offers a great departure from present international procedure, is the provision for an international treaty, binding states to refer their disputes to a judicial tribunal or to the Council of Investigation and Conciliation, and further to use concerted diplomatic, economic and military pressure against any state that breaks the treaty. According to this plan, we find developed a world League of Peace, which, if supported by a strong public opinion, can come into existence through the action of the world congress to be called after the war. It is not the intention to defer the organization of

this League of Peace until all states are willing to sign the treaty. When a number of states of sufficient importance to make the League effective become signatories, it should be declared organized. But it is the intention that the League should always remain open; that it ought above all to avoid the character of a political alliance; and that it ought to be, and ought always to remain, a League of Peace. This plan, and that of the League to Enforce Peace, are so similar that the two organizations might well join forces in giving to the world a stable basis for a durable peace.

The aim of the Central Organization for a Durable Peace is to form national groups in all countries who will make a technical study of the proposals laid down in the Minimum-Program.¹ Nine research committees have been organized, representing the nine points of the Minimum-Program. Some thirty-five research studies, including nine prepared by members of the American committee, have been sent to the various chairmen. These studies are to be made the basis of technical study and discussion. In estimating the importance of this work, one has only to mention the names of those who are taking part in it. Among those who have prepared research studies are Dr. W. H. de Beaufort, Ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ex-Prime Minister Heemskerk of Holland, Ex-Minister Adelswärd of Sweden, Professor Lammasch of Austria, Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson of England, Professor Altamira of Spain, Professor Koht and Mr. Lange of Norway, Professor Michels of Italy, Professor Stauning of Denmark, Professor André Mercier of Switzerland, General De Meester of Holland and Professor Schücking of Germany, not to mention our own distinguished group.

Through these study groups, which now represent twenty-six nations, this organization is building up a united support of the underlying principles of equitable law, and is thereby destined to become a world factor in influencing the great settlement. The effort demands the support of the world. The people of one nation

¹ Following are the members of the International Executive Committee of the Central Organization for a Durable Peace: Dr. H. C. Dresselhuys, President, Holland; Th. Baron Adelswärd, Sweden; Prof. R. Altamira, Spain; Mrs. Fannie Fern Andrews, United States; G. Lowes Dickinson, Great Britain; Mgr. Dr. A. Giesswein, Hungary; Prof. Dr. H. Koht, Norway; Prof. Dr. H. Lammasch, Austria; Prof. Dr. Achille Loria, Italy; Paul Otlet, Belgium; J. Scherrer-Fülle-mann, Switzerland; Prof. Dr. Walther Schücking, Germany; Th. Stauning, Denmark; Jhr. Dr. B. de Jong van Beek en Donk, General Secretary, The Hague.

alone, or of a group of nations, cannot effect a new world order; it is a task for the civilized world. The work of the Central Organization for a Durable Peace may be described as a simultaneous world study to prepare for action at the supreme moment of the world's history which we shall witness after the war. This moment will call for high statesmanship—a statesmanship freed from bias, resting its action on legal principles, and motivated by the desire to establish the eternal laws of justice and humanity.

ISOLATION OR WORLD LEADERSHIP? AMERICA'S FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY

BY GEORGE NASMYTH, PH.D.,

Secretary, Massachusetts Branch, League to Enforce Peace.

Is the future foreign policy of America to be that of isolation or of leadership in world politics? This is the question of principle which underlies our general theme, "What shall the United States stand for in International Relations" and it brings America to the cross roads of a great decision. If our discussion of a League to Enforce Peace is to have any practical bearing, it must be by affecting American foreign policy, for it is only through American foreign policy that we can affect international relations. This brings us to the critical issue of the next decade. I believe this will be the most wonderful ten years of human history. During these years we shall all have to line ourselves up on one side or the other of this great issue—the issue between world federation or of international anarchy.

Note that the line of division is not that between militarists or pacifists, nor between more armament or less armament, nor between preparedness or anti-preparedness. It is a clean-cut division between world federalists and anti-federalists. The old struggle which we had in those critical years of American history from 1783 to 1789 and continuing through the first half of the last century,—the struggle between national rights and state rights,—now is to be repeated on a world scale, with world rights as against national rights.

Now, this policy of leadership in world politics involves risks. I am surprised that this underlying question has not been debated before. In all the discussions that I hear about the League to Enforce Peace, I find the debate turning about minor points but not about this great issue of whether we shall abandon the traditional American foreign policy which pledges us not to interfere in European politics, whether we shall give up our policy of isolation and run the risk, as under the League's plan we might well be criticized

of doing, of getting involved in a war in Europe over unknown causes.

When this basic objection begins to appear, and I am sure that we shall get down to this fundamental question eventually, it seems to me that the reply is this: In the first place, we do not risk being involved in wars over unknown causes. There is only one cause for war under the League's program, and that is a violation, a deliberate violation, of solemn treaty pledges. In the second place, does not the present system of international anarchy involve risks? Have we not been in fact on the brink of war during the past year, ever since the *Lusitania* crisis, not knowing but what each morning we might wake up and find another ship torpedoed, more American lives destroyed, and a crisis coming on in which we should be dragged, by forces beyond our control, into the world war?

If we look back over the recurring international crises of the past year, it is clear that the real question which we have to decide is not isolation or world politics. That issue has been decided for us by the events of the past century. The world has become so small, as the result of the work of the scientists and engineers, and the growth of the means of communication, that we can no longer remain aloof from the life of the other nations. We have been elected citizens of the world, without either our knowledge or consent. Even now we are being taxed without representation to carry on this war, and we shall be taxed still more heavily in the economic crises which this war will produce in the future.

The real issue, then, is this: Shall we shut our eyes to the plain fact that we have become a part of the world, and try to keep up an impossible policy of isolation, and then be dragged in at the heels of a great militaristic development of the world if Europe remains an armed camp? Or shall we frankly recognize the facts and take a boldly constructive initiative and ask the other nations to join with us in organizing the world? On this question the League to Enforce Peace speaks in unmistakeable terms; its object is to convince American public opinion that the only rational policy is to stand, not for international anarchy, but, world organization under justice and law.

Now, how is such a League of Nations to be brought about? It has been suggested that the peace conference which ends the war will be the best opportunity. Others have suggested that the third

Hague Conference, following after the war, will be the time. The League's program specifically states that its object is to establish and maintain peace after the close of the present war. But I believe that at the present time there is an opportunity to make a great advance in this direction of world organization. Suppose that President Wilson should offer to the belligerent nations, not merely a formal tender of good offices, but a constructive plan of mediation, based on an understanding of the real purpose for which the people in all the nations are fighting—security against the danger of aggression in the future, and an opportunity to develop their civilization in peace. Suppose he should make a simultaneous proposal to the warring nations in terms something like these:

Will you, Germany, agree to evacuate Belgium and Northern France and Northern Serbia; to compensate Belgium; to enter into a league to enforce peace which will guarantee all nations against the danger of aggression in the future?

And suppose that at the same time he should say to the Allies:

If Germany accepts these conditions, will you agree to discuss terms of peace? If not, what are the definite terms of settlement which you will take as a basis for discussion?

In order to give these proposals carrying power, we should at the same time signify that America is willing to do its share towards the reconstruction of the new world order by agreeing to (1) become one of the guarantors of Belgium's neutrality after the war; (2) throw the weight of our economic resources against any nation which shall violate the neutrality of any independent buffer states, such as Poland, which may be created; and (3) become a member of a league of nations to enforce peace, thus giving Germany and all other countries additional guarantees of national security under a system of world law and order.

In other words, we have the opportunity, by a constructive offer of mediation of this kind, to get a discussion of definite terms of settlement under way, and once under way, this discussion would soon lead to a much clearer understanding of the real issues of the war than we have at present.

And there is one other way in which we may make an advance—the formation of a Pan-American League of Peace. We have ad-

vanced very far in that direction with the offer which Secretary Lansing has made to the ambassadors and ministers of the Latin American republics. Here we are really proposing a League to Enforce Peace, with at least an economic sanction—non-shipment of arms and ammunition to the states which violate their agreements or to revolutionary parties which do not represent a majority of the people.

Lastly, there is still an opportunity for an action which, to my mind, should have been taken a year or more ago,—calling a conference of neutrals. Great Britain, in her last note, has practically asked us to do that. It would be a conference to discuss our own neutral rights and help each other maintain them, but there might come out of this a constructive offer of mediation.

Here are at least three ways by which, before the end of the war, we may make definite advance toward the organization of the world. As soon as we have public opinion strongly in favor of a League of Peace, here is the opportunity by which America may almost immediately place herself in the leadership of this great constructive movement of modern history.

ECONOMIC PRESSURE AS A MEANS OF PRESERVING PEACE

BY HERBERT S. HOUSTON,

Treasurer, League to Enforce Peace, New York.

At the meeting of the Academy a year ago¹ there was serious and scholarly discussion of the results in commerce, in government and in human progress that would follow from the great war. Today that war still continues and, at the moment, we ourselves seem to be at its very brink. And so we come again, at this meeting of the Academy, to consider the questions that confronted and disturbed us a year ago.

At such a time it may require a brave spirit to look through battle smoke to hills of hope beyond on which shall rise, some day, world courts of justice, following the orderly processes of law. But that was the dream of Penn, in whose city we gather. It was the dream of Hugo Grotius, of Emanuel Kent and of hundreds of others, all through the generations. And two months after our meeting of last April, there gathered in this city of Penn, several hundred men who had the faith to believe that the great dream might come true and the courage to plan definitely to that end. As was fitting, they assembled in Independence Hall and there formulated the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace. Here was a mighty challenge flung in the face of a warring world—a challenge to establish peace, when the war ends, on a basis of justice and to maintain it through courts, upheld by international agreements and made effective by international forces. And these proposals have received broad popular support. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States appointed a committee to study the economic results of the war and to consider plans for a lasting peace. After a careful survey of all the plans for peace this committee submitted the proposals of the League as constituting the wisest and most

¹The proceedings of this meeting appeared in the following volumes of *The Annals*: Vol. LX, July, 1915, "America's Interests as affected by the European War"; and Vol. LXI, September, 1915, "America's Interests after the European War."

practicable that had been formulated, and the hundreds of constituent commercial bodies in the National Chamber, with several hundred thousand members, voted in favor of them by a great majority; in fact all but one of the four proposals received a majority in excess of two thirds. Last October the International Peace Congress, in session in San Francisco, embodied these proposals in its platform; and peace societies in Massachusetts, in New York, in Pennsylvania and throughout the country have taken similar action. Many church associations have given their support, as have the economic societies in various cities. Recently in New York the Executive Committee of the League met in conference with the leaders of the Security League, the Navy League and of other preparedness organizations and it was discovered that they were practically of one mind in favoring national defense for America and international peace for the world, resting on law and on courts. Right now the Associated Advertising Clubs are carrying forward a nation-wide publicity campaign under that shibboleth "National Defense and International Peace," in support of the 30,000 engineers who, during last May, made a card-index survey of industry so that it may be mobilized for defense, if need comes. In the coming national political conventions the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace will be presented for adoption in party platforms. All this is a record of things done, or now in hand to do, in furtherance of a plan to secure world peace that has been formulated since the last meeting of the Academy. I submit that it is a cheerful record, in a time of war and rumors of war, and that it gives some ground for the hope that wars may be reduced in number in the future, if not wholly done away with.

A year ago² I referred briefly to a resolution that had been presented before the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, favoring the use of economic pressure as a force to further world peace. Today I can say boldly that that view has the support of the business men of America. By an overwhelming majority, in the referendum of which I have made mention, they favored the use of a "System of commercial and financial non-intercourse" against nations which, after joining with other nations in setting up courts,

²See *The Annals*, Vol. LXI, September, 1915, p. 272.

persisted in going to war before taking their international differences to these courts for decision.

Let us briefly examine commerce as economic pressure. Of what does it consist and how could it be applied? The most effective factors in world-wide economic pressure, such as would be required to compel nations to take justiciable issues to a World Court for decision, are a group of international forces. Today money is international because in all civilized countries it has gold as the common basis. Credit based on gold is international. Commerce based on money and on credit is international. Then the amazing network of agencies by which money and credit and commerce are employed in the world are also international. Take the stock exchanges, the cables, the wireless, the international postal service and the wonderful modern facilities for communication and intercommunication—all these are international forces. They are common to all nations. In the truest sense they are independent of race, of language, of religion, of culture, of government, and of every other human limitation. That is one of their chief merits in making them the most effective possible power used in the form of economic pressure to put behind a World Court.

Business today is really the great organized life of the world. The agencies through which it is carried forward have created such a maze of interrelations that each nation must depend on all the others. A great Chicago banker, John J. Arnold, Vice-President of the First National Bank of that city, said to me a few weeks ago that so closely drawn and interwoven had become the economic net in which the world was enmeshed that if the great war could have been postponed four or five years it would never have swept down upon men like a thunderbolt of destruction. As an additional strand of great strength in the warp and woof of modern progress, Mr. Arnold believes that an International Clearing House will come—in fact that it is an inevitable development in international finance, for settling balances between nations, just as our modern clearing houses now settle balances between banks in cities in which they are located. Beyond question such an International Clearing House, when established, would quickly become an invaluable auxiliary to a World Court, helping to give it stability and serving, when occasion arose, as a mighty agency through which economic pressure could be applied.

And I believe Mr. Arnold is right in his view that an International Clearing House is bound to come. Business, finance, and commerce are now so truly international that there is a manifest need of it. As a strong proof of this let me remind you that when this war broke, 40 per cent of the securities of the world were held internationally.

Now economic pressure is not a new thing in the world. It has been used before by one nation against another and usually with tremendous effectiveness. When Philip was organizing the great armada the merchants of London persuaded the merchants of Genoa to withhold credit and moneys from the Spanish King. The result was that the armada was delayed for over a year, and then the English were prepared to meet the shock. What could be done three centuries ago for a year to delay a Power so great as Spain then was could be done in this century far more effectively. And it has been employed in this century. When the German Emperor dispatched the gunboat to Agadir bringing on the acute crisis with France, I happened to be in Paris. On the fourth day of the crisis I was having luncheon at the Grand Hotel with a young French banker of the Credit Lyonnais. I remarked on the fact that the crisis was becoming less acute and inquired the reason. "We are withdrawing our French investments from Germany," was the rejoinder "and that economic pressure is relieving the situation." As we all know, it not only relieved the situation but it served as a definite means to prevent a war that seemed imminent. Now I submit that a force which England could use against Spain in the sixteenth century and that France could use against Germany in the twentieth century—in each case let me remind you a single nation was applying force against another single nation and that nation its enemy—I submit that that force can be applied by all nations collectively against another nation that refuses to take a justiciable issue to a World Court for a decision.

A nation that should decline to take justiciable questions to the World Court, after having agreed with other nations to do so, would manifestly become an outlaw. Why shouldn't other nations immediately declare an embargo of non-intercourse with an outlaw nation, refusing to buy from that nation or to sell to that nation or have any intercourse whatsoever with that nation?

One of the great advantages of economic pressure is that it can be applied from within, rather than from without. Economic pressure touches the war chest of every country. Instead of fighting with bullets we can fight also with the money and credit that must be behind bullets. And the world can fight in that way to protect the civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through the centuries if it will use the force of commerce that stands ready to its hand. Nations can declare an economic embargo against an offending nation. Or it is more accurate to say the offending nation raises an economic embargo itself by its own act in breaking its pledge to other nations and placing itself outside the pale of civilization by becoming an outlaw.

Of course, the one apparently strong and valid argument to be brought against economic pressure is that it would bring great loss to the commerce of the nations applying it. But that loss would be far less than the loss brought by war. And there would be no loss whatever if war were avoided.

If a balance could be rightly struck in this country is there any one who believes that our interests would be best served by war in some other country? This is quite apart from any question of humanity or civilization. Let it be a trial balance of commerce alone and it will show a heavy debit against war. And an accounting will show the same result in all other countries. If this be true, with only current commerce entering into the equation, how staggeringly true it becomes when the piled up debts caused by war are considered. Economists who have examined the matter state that this war has already cost over sixty billions of dollars. And the end is not yet.

So why shouldn't business, which has been binding the world more closely together for centuries, be employed to protect the world against the waste and loss of war? The loss in trade would be small or great in proportion to the amount and duration of the pressure; but it would be at most only an infinitesimal fraction of the loss caused by war. The League to Enforce Peace stands for the use of both economic and military power against a nation that goes to war before submitting any question arising to the international court. If the question is submitted and decision rendered the nation can go to war if it is so disposed, but the League believes that it will not be so disposed. Instead, in the time required for submitting the

question to the court and getting a decision a nation will, as a rule, have its war fever cooled and its calmness restored, with the result that the court's decree will be accepted. There is not a case on record of a nation refusing to abide by an arbitration decision, in all the arbitrations that have been held in the last century. So if nations can be brought before an international tribunal the record shows that decrees will be obeyed and wars avoided.

AN ARMED INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL THE SOLE PEACE-KEEPING MECHANISM

BY OSCAR T. CROSBY,

Warrenton, Virginia.

Some thoughtful men believe that the human race is benefited by the heroisms, the sacrifices and the discipline of war. They conscientiously oppose efforts to subjugate nations to that rule of relative peace which obtains between the groups constituting nations.

Other thoughtful men (now the vast majority, I believe) hold that killing-contests subtract from, more than they add to, the sum of human happiness. They believe that discipline, sacrifice—yea, even heroism—may enter into the civil life of men while we still strive to lift up heavy masses of our brethren from poverty and ignorance to comfort and enlightenment.

This latter view is here assumed—though it is recognized that argument may be required to sustain it against the militarist view first stated.

If we want to escape from international war, and from the burdensome preparations for war—how shall we do it?

Obviously the most direct and safest method would be to follow general experience gained in suppressing violence between individuals, tribes, clans, provinces and federated states as they have successively coalesced into groups of larger numbers and more complex political organization. In this process *sovereignty* has been continuously sacrificed to a greater or less degree. The loss of this precious attribute has been compensated by the gain of *order*—of settled tranquillity. This compensation is not yet complete even in our most civilized states. Violence still appears occasionally between individuals and between various groups—political, social, economic. But the repressive mechanism soon works. Order re-appears.

Contests, other than the physical shock of body against body, continue, while yielding a little after every disturbance, to a larger coöperation. Now the mechanism which produces this result may be wholly typified by the justice-of-the-peace and his constable. And it may be described as centralized judging power controlling

centralized force. These have been substituted for diverse or independent judging and for competitive force. This centralized mechanism is the foundation of civilization within the state. It deals with imperfect men. Had it waited upon ideal citizenship, we should still be savages.

The relative tranquillity thus attained is bought at a price. That price is the subordination of *minor interests* to *general interest*. It pays me to submit to what I consider an unjust decision, because by this submission I participate in the general tranquillity, and obtain protection from all violence except that of the central force. And if I have not sufficient intelligence to grasp this fact, then you—the majority—put me under duress. Your organized central force renders the task comparatively easy. Mere knowledge of the existence of your force renders me comparatively tractable.

Can those groups which are now the remaining sovereigns in our world—the fifty odd independent states—find any other formula for attaining that (relative) mutual tranquillity which is enjoyed within their boundaries?

Let us briefly consider some of the compromises now much mooted.

There is, first, limitation of armaments by mutual agreement. Small armaments—or even disarmament—cannot guarantee peace. It only diminishes the peace-time cost of war. We may fight with less expensive weapons than dreadnaughts. But we shall find no way of controlling war-preparation by rules which smack of the Sermon on the Mount. Strength will not write itself down to the level of weakness, *while physical violence remains as the ultimate determinant* of international disputes. And if such folly were put into words, the inventor would bring them to naught. He will sleeplessly defeat any attempt to fix exact ratios between ready-to-use capacity for destruction.

Next, we have various forms of “cooling-off” devices—agreements to delay war after failure of diplomatic agencies—by submission of disputes to various forms of forceless courts.

The vice of all these methods lies in this—that very frequently *the issue will be resolved in favor of one or the other contestant*, during any period of delay beginning after failure of all formal and informal methods that have always been open to states. To delay will mean to yield. We may always do that without treaties and toothless

courts. And meanwhile, what suspicions, what hates, will be engendered as we learn—or fancy we learn—of our rival's preparation for the ultimate shock of arms!

Next we have the proposal of the League to Enforce Peace. Again forceless courts. Again final resort to arms. But something else beside. We must see the miracle of unanimity among all on-looking nations who are to judge when a supposed recalcitrant shall have committed an "act of hostility" before going to a court. But we have cut each other's throats for ten thousand years expressing differences of view as to what constitutes an "act of hostility"! Why should we agree in the future? And if the League program be modified to provide for a central organism of judging and enforcing, then we reach the Armed International Tribunal—sole peace-keeping mechanism.

To attain it, we must amend our Constitution. A proposal to that effect is now pending before the United States Senate. It may produce the great desideratum—Simultaneous Discussion in Responsible Parliaments of Identical Propositions for an International Tribunal.

THE BASIS OF A DURABLE PEACE

BY JOHN H. MACCRACKEN, PH.D., LL.D.,

President, Lafayette College.

I take the opposite view of preparedness from that of Professor Patten. I do not believe that "consciously to prepare drags our social life down to the level of a border town" unless that means the level of such border towns as Geneva or the Hague. Nor that "the present war is a good illustration of how preparedness adds fuel to passions and makes conflict inevitable." Neither do I believe with Professor Patten that "economics can be trusted to uphold universal peace and give it a better basis than martial ideals" unless it be accompanied with a change in political organization. Neither do I agree with Professor Patten as to the disastrous effects of some form of universal military training. On the contrary, as an educator and as a believer in democracy, I am inclined to believe that a mild form of military training, which would be no more burdensome than the Swiss system, would not only make for preservation of peace within our borders, but would make for democracy by uniting all Americans in at least one common interest, and would supply a certain obvious defect in the moral training now furnished by our public school system. On the other side, I am ready to go farther than Professor Patten probably would be willing to go, in favoring a revision of the doctrine of sovereignty and the yielding of the right to make war to an international tribunal or a league to enforce peace.

Discussions of peace terms are premature. The war is not yet over. For Americans to assume that they will have much to say about the terms of peace, except in so far as those terms affect the rights of neutrals, would be justly resented by those who are bearing the burden of the war. If Washington's maxim, "avoid entangling foreign alliances" prevents us from lifting a finger to stay a cataclysm, certainly it should prevent us taking any part in the distribution of the plums. I take it, therefore, that in discussing the basis of a durable peace it is not intended that we should discuss the terms of peace which may conclude the present war; whether Germany

should keep Belgium or Alsace Lorraine, whether Poland should be independent, whether Servia should be annexed to Austria-Hungary, whether Germany's colonies should remain in the hands of France or England, returned to Germany, or made independent. Whether the peace to be concluded in 1917 or 1918 will endure until 2017 or 2018, will depend largely on what the terms of that peace are. Nevertheless, they are not our business.

We may, however, as political philosophers, subscribe to certain general propositions:

(1) A peace may be durable because protected by overpowering force.

(2) A peace may be durable because held in equilibrium by nicely calculated adjustments of the balance of political power.

(3) A peace may be durable because it rests upon justice and because the conditions which it creates are inherently reasonable.

We may even go further and say with the 100 German scholars—Harnack, Delbrueck, Dernburg and the rest—"We subscribe to the principle that the incorporation or annexation of politically independent nations, and people accustomed to independence is to be condemned" and even then have said little more than that freemen never shall be slaves and as for those who are slaves or vassals, it matters little whether they serve one master or another. Some of us would perhaps go even further and say with the Englishman Vernon Lee "to transfer a province is as undemocratic as to sell a slave."

Nor can we say that the only condition of a durable peace is the decisive defeat of one side or the other. If Germany is victorious a durable peace may come, backed by an invincible army and economic vassalage. If the allies win, a durable peace may come backed by nice balances of power and the limitations placed upon militarism. A drawn conflict might conceivably be followed by a century of peace, through a new alignment of the allies. Stranger things have happened in history than that Russia and Japan, England and Germany should make common cause. As President Tupper has recently said: "The cessation from war may be prolonged for a century through causes not one of which may be to the

honor of peace." No, it is unprofitable to be drawn into European family troubles, and to be made a divider of family estates between brothers.

What we have to consider is, first, how we may deliver ourselves as a nation from the fear of war and insure the durability of our own peace, and secondly, how we may free the world in the future from the social and economic disturbances which we, along with Europe, suffer through international conflict. This is a subject which has been discussed by wise men for 200 years. I have no solution to offer in twenty minutes.

Some good practical suggestions have been made which all must endorse:

(1) The freedom of the seas and immunity from capture of belligerents' goods will internationalize three-fourths of the globe.

(2) Provision for a year's delay before going to war, to let anger cool, is desirable but hardly practicable unless there is some way of stopping secret preparations in the meantime.

(3) A council of conciliation has proved useful in private industrial disputes and might help in national conflicts.

(4) Publicity in international negotiations which would permit public opinion to make itself felt before any acute stage was reached is to be encouraged.

If we want a permanent cure, however, we must go somewhat deeper.

In the interest of clear thinking, we ought to define the much abused word "peace." There are a good many of us interested in doing away with the settlement of international disputes by arms, who have no expectation of thereby terminating international conflicts. In our private life today, we have done away for the most part with the ready appeal to the revolver, the knife, or the lynching rope as a means of settling the conflicts of individual wills. But conflicts and the spirit of conflict remain. The economic struggle is severe. Conflict between various religious beliefs is by no means fought out. There is conflict between races, between Irish and Jews and Germans, between Italian and Swede and Japanese, and between white and black within our own nation in spite of durable peace, and those who believe that conflict and struggle is the order

of the universe, need have no concern lest if we abolish the crude appeal to gunpowder and the physical overpowering of the individual as a means of settling international disputes there will not remain international conflicts, hatreds, jealousies and strivings sufficient to fulfill any biologic law.

It is not a static condition which we have in mind, therefore, when we talk of a durable peace, but a cleared arena in which men may struggle in more diversified ways than the conditions of trench fighting or airships or submarines permit. And because the conflict possible in times of peace is so much more complex than the conflict possible in war, we must not be surprised that those who tire easily of mental intricacies are disposed to say, "better a clean-cut straight-out fight and be done with all subtleties and intricacies." "Better war with plain soldiers than peace under the leadership of the lawyers, scribes and pharisees." Fortunately, war itself is becoming so complex, so much a matter of nice machines, of rail-roading, of chemistry, of tunneling, of shooting at unseen foes and toiling in remote machine shops, that to the one who really understands war, it has lost a good deal of the appeal of the old straight-out man-to-man conflict, and is well nigh as tantalizing and baffling as the more complex conflicts of peace. Have nothing to fight about is not the only answer, therefore, to the question, how may we have a durable peace. There is the second answer. Accustom men to use different weapons in their conflicts. Both answers are said to be utopian. To some, the last seems the more utopian of the two, but to political philosophers, who, as Professor Patten has suggested, must be psychologists as well, the second seems perhaps less utopian than the first.

Those who believe in getting rid of the causes of war, say, if we want to preserve peace there must be no economic struggle between nationalities as such, that is, there must be no national tariff walls, no national spheres of influence. The watch word must be the open door. If we want to avoid conflict with Germany after the war, they say, don't shut out her goods, give her a chance to sell freely, and sell freely to her in exchange. If we want to avoid conflict with Japan, enforce the terms of our treaty, allow the Japanese to buy land in California, overcome the notion that a white skin is superior to a yellow one. Let the Philippines, they urge, go their own way and if Germany or Japan want them, thank God it is not

our concern. Avoid conflict of religious creeds by claiming nothing that the others will not concede. If anybody objects to the reading of the Bible in the schools, drop it. If anybody objects to a Christmas carol, drop it. If anybody objects to an Easter vacation, drop it. If economic conflict becomes too severe, form a trust and let the people pay. If the union threatens a strike, don't fight, give whatever they ask, the public will foot the bill. Get rid of struggle, of conflict, at any cost, especially conflict with the fellow who can fight. No price is too high to pay for industrial peace has become a maxim among insiders in the business world just as it has become a maxim that it never pays to go to law. Justice, they say, is a very dear commodity and the ideal only of the immature and inexperienced. In opposition to this tendency there are many who believe that a durable peace, bought at the price of sacrifice of ideals and convictions, would be bought too dear, who believe we are not here for the purpose of getting through life with as little discomfort and annoyance as possible, but that we are here to struggle, as all the rest of nature struggles, evolving through such struggle properly directed, into a higher civilization. "Instead of dreading international disputes as mere curses and dangers," as someone has said, "we must learn to regard them as we think of our differences in domestic politics, as the very springs of movement and change, and the proof that we are alive and are adapting ourselves to our environment."

But though the termination of struggle may not be our object, may we not reasonably inquire how international conflicts may cease to be conflicts of arms? To the scholar this does not seem so chimerical as to do away with the occasions of war. If it is the law of nations to struggle, it is also the law of the individual, and yet, we have gradually defined the conditions of that struggle for the individual. The revolver is still useful to the individual in his struggle, and yet we have said in many large cities you cannot even own a revolver. The fist has all the sanction of nature and yet its use is so much restricted by law that men will pay seventy-five thousand dollars to see two men use their fists on each other, so rare is the sight. Instinctive fighting, Professor Patten finds more meritorious than fighting which is the result of rational premeditation and yet European nations justify the hanging of the woman who shoots in defense of her child and the destruction of a whole



village for the shots of two or three men not in uniform. The view of German militarism is the very opposite of Professor Patten's view, nothing is more immoral than instinctive fighting. We are dealing in war, then, not with a natural necessary phenomenon but with a fiction created by the human mind; with a game which is played according to certain rules sanctioned by the reason not by emotion or natural instinct. A man in uniform may do what one out of uniform may not do. If a ship follows the natural instinct to escape, you may sink her and her passengers with good conscience, if she stops, you must give the passengers a chance for life. If a ship enters a neutral port, it may leave in twenty-four hours; but if it stays thirty, it stays for the war. Now, however much justification there may be in nature, in instinct, for simple conflict, there is no question that war, as we know it now, is the product of human reason, and as the product of human reason, it must be amenable to reason. Just as a corporation has not the natural rights which an individual has, but because it is the creation of law is subject to law, so war, as we know it today, because it is the child of mind, is subject to mind. If the law can say to a corporation, you cannot practice law, because you are not endowed with any natural rights, so reason, having contrived modern warfare, can say to it, you have ceased to be a reasonable tool for reason's purposes, you are outlawed. Why should questions arising out of our daily national life be settled by methods utterly extraneous to our normal national life? It is one of those misleading half truths to say, all government rests upon force, the power to hold the physical body and to destroy it.

The first step to a durable peace, therefore, is to convince men of the ridiculousness of war. The present war is being fought to determine whether anybody shall have the right to say *I am Lord*, and there is none beside me; whether anybody or any nation shall occupy so undisputed a lordship that the mere rattling of his scabbard shall determine international disputes. But will it settle that question? No nation will ever again on this planet be allowed to test its martial equipment in combat with some other nation with a fair field and no favor. The present war undoubtedly proves that Germany had the best military establishment, but it also proves that diplomacy and a fair judgment of world conditions are as important as a fighting machine. This will become still more evident when the Peace Council meets, for all recent wars have shown that the

fruits won by arms are likely to be filched by intrigue. The conflict will show that in the game played according to the rules including the rule which allows me to turn a neutral nation into a supply depot for munitions, including the rule which allows me to march non combatants in front of my soldiers and to use captives as laborers, the might of this group of nations is greater than the might of that group of nations. Now if there were no rules this would be an important and incontestible fact of nature to be accepted as such, and to be reckoned with accordingly. In primitive conditions, the man who can physically overpower you is undisputed lord, and any arrangement into which you may enter must recognize this fact. By nature the human male can dominate the female. If there were no rules to the game that would be a fact by which we must all make our reckonings, and some do go back to it when it comes to an argument on suffrage. But once you admit any rules to your game, once you rationalize your instinctive procedure, you have entered on a process to which it is difficult to set limits. If two nations can agree, we will only fight according to these rules, they can also agree we will not fight to kill at all. As long ago as David and Goliath, it was possible for tribes to fight by selected champions, and colleges can still limit their football teams to eleven men no matter how big the college. There is, therefore, in the essence of things, no inevitable necessity in warfare so far as the human reason can see any more than in college hazing or in class scraps.

Now the American people see this perhaps more clearly than other people, but how can they take advantage of their rational view of war? If we are sure that it is a game we do not want to play and if there are any other nations of the same mind, we can minimize the police business by joining hands; by following the procedure of the league to enforce peace; by providing an international court with an international army and navy to back its decrees.

What is the greatest theoretical obstacle to any such internationalism?

A false doctrine of sovereignty.

A false doctrine of what constitutes greatness.

A false doctrine of what is to be most admired and worshipped.

We have been taught that a state which was under any obligation to anyone, either by way of moral obligation or by contractual relation, is not free and is not a complete state. It has parted with

a portion of its sovereignty. Sovereignty knows no law. The more isolated, the more self-sufficient the state, the freer from interrelations, except with inferiors, the greater the state.

Now this is undoubtedly good natural theology as well as classic political theory. But with the help of Christian teachings, political philosophers have advanced to a point where they see that it is false. "The future of civilization after the war," says Lowes Dickinson, "will depend upon the decision of the question, whether it is their independence or their interdependency that the nations will stress." All modern civilization depends on complexity of relation not on isolation. The great man is not the man who sits isolated, but the man who is most tied up with other men. The man who stands to gain is not the man who never deals save with inferiors, but the man who is readiest to contract with his equals.

The ideal of devotion to country was as strong in the hearts of many statesrights men in relation to their State of Virginia or to North Carolina as it can ever be in the heart of any American toward America. If the states had realized the immeasurable difference between the confederation, and the United States under the constitution, doubtless they would never have given their consent. Yet we can see no moral dishonor in their surrendering the right to make war, thus impairing their right to sovereignty. When Chief Justice Marshall enlarged and made possible the concept of the people of the United States, he was sowing the seed which was to reach fruition in the Civil War and make this, once for all, a united people. "If we want to bring in internationalism," says Brailsford, "we must go behind powers, to the populations which are capable of thought on other than national lines." We must use Marshall's conception of sovereignty not politically organized, or at least transcending the political organization. This concept alone could justify international coercion. But this will not be enough unless you provide some machinery as a rudimentary organ at least through which this sovereignty can find expression.

Internationalism will come, it has been said, when we have the international mind. Perhaps we ought to say the international hand or tongue. It is not too early to sow the seed for it. The socialists and the tradesunionists will help. The first step is for us who are college professors to see that a true up-to-date doctrine of sovereignty is taught in our colleges and universities and from there it

will filter down and be taught in our public schools. Then our children will be ready to surrender, on behalf of this country, the right to make war, to an international tribunal.

Finally, we must combat with all of our powers the notion that war is the supreme form of tribal expression, that its biological and moral effects are benefits the race cannot spare, and that the game of killing, played according to rationalized rules, is an appropriate manifestation of the general cosmic struggle for rational man.

Much of our modern ideas of citizenship and nationality find their roots in the town life of mediaeval cities. One aspect of that town life we have neglected to our cost. It is the king's ban—proclaiming extraordinary penalties upon him who should disturb the peace of the city, and thus interfere with its freedom of trade. Peace thus came to be one of the highly prized privileges of cities and city dwellers in turbulent times, and where strife would naturally have broken out most easily, because of the arrival of strangers, and conflict of economic interests there, by the proclamation of the king's ban, peace did most prevail.

As a basis of durable peace and as a safeguard against future international conflicts, let us try to revive for our modern world trade market, the king's ban against any disturber of the peace.

THE ROAD TO A DURABLE PEACE

BY EDWARD A. FILENE,

Boston.

The world has become convinced that might is not right, but it has yet to learn that right is not might—at least, right is not mighty enough to insure its automatic triumph. Most of us are convinced that miracles do not happen in the affairs of men and nations, or that if they do they are no more the exclusive property of right than they are the exclusive property of might. If we read history in the light of facts rather than our wishes, we are forced to see that when left to themselves in an unregulated contest might triumphs over right more times than right triumphs over might, but right will always prevail, provided as much straight thinking is put into it and as much power put behind it as is given to the designs of might.

These principles are fundamental to any discussion of the forces of war and the forces of peace. This war is a dramatic illustration of what can happen when the force of the world is used to break law instead of to maintain it. History will probably regard the present war as essentially a conflict of social ideals. Two hundred years from now, this war will probably be referred to as the "Great Social War."

I take it that most of us here believe that in this conflict of social ideals democracy with all of its shortcomings more nearly represents the right than does any other social or national ideal. And this war, to my mind, is proving that, so long as autocratic nations support their claims with force, the more democratic nations dare not trust for protection merely to their superior ideals. If democratic ideals are superior, we have no right to run any risk of their safety. We have not yet reached the time when an ideal will stop a bullet. Force without ideals is dangerous, but ideals without force are too often powerless. We have worked out the ideal of peace with clearness. The problem of our generation is to work out the machinery of peace with efficiency.

I conceive it, therefore, to be the duty of every democratic nation to be prepared adequately to defend its ideals against the

encroachment of autocratic might. But it is not easy to awaken an enthusiasm for preparedness in a democratic nation with its natural aversion to military power. The rank and file of American democracy, at least, fears that with an effective fighting force at hand there is the danger of a hasty yielding to the temptation of war. It may appeal to some as a weakness in a democracy that it does not respond more readily to the call of preparation for self-defense, but to my mind, just there lies the superiority of a democracy.

I am convinced that if with the preparedness movement there could be joined an international policy under which the economic and military forces of the United States would be dedicated not only to the cause of national defense but also to helping to maintain more permanent peace among nations, that millions of our citizens now opposed to the preparedness movement would become enthusiastic advocates of it.

The most pressing problem that the war has forced upon us as a nation is the problem of adequate national defense combined with a policy that will look towards the mobilizing of the economic and military force of all nations for the support of law rather than the breaking of law.

It is just such a policy that is advocated in the platform of the League to Enforce Peace, the central proposal of which advocates the establishment of an International Court and Council of Conciliation supported by a League of Nations agreeing to submit their differences thereto for examination before proceeding to make war; and further agreeing to use their combined force (first in the form of business and financial non-intercourse or in the form of military action if economic pressure proves ineffective) against any nation of the League that refuses to submit its difficulty for examination before making war.

The desire for some plan that will look toward an effective guarantee of more lasting peace among the nations is well nigh universal. In a democracy such as ours, the danger is that such desire will remain scattered, unorganized and therefore ineffective. The general public needs, above all things, unification of sentiment. The men of business, of labor, of agriculture and of government need a common standing ground from which to look into the future and to plan for a wise direction of its vital interests. Unless the scattered desires for more permanent peace can be fused into one great

national movement that shall capture not only the mind but the enthusiasm of the whole people, there is little hope that America will play its part in the reconstruction of human society at the end of the war. The program of the League to Enforce Peace, more than any other program, offers such a common ground.

It is not a program that gives complete satisfaction to the extreme pacifist or the extreme militarist. It agrees with the pacifist that the goal toward which America should work is that of lasting peace among the nations, but it insists that civilization has not yet reached and may never reach the point where force can be withdrawn as a sanction for law. It agrees with the militarist that public opinion must have force behind it before it can become effective in keeping the peace of the world, but it insists that the military preparedness of a nation should be used not merely in national defense but also in support of an international policy of law as against war for the settlement of disputes between nations.

None of us are sanguine enough to expect that any plan will eliminate the necessity for using force in the affairs of nations at least for some time to come, but we are confident that methods can be devised so that when force is used it will be used in the preservation of order rather than in the mutual destruction of the nations at difference just as within the nation police protection has taken the place of individual combat.

The following propositions, in my judgment, represent an accurate analysis of the present situation with reference to the preparedness movement and the duty of the United States toward the problem of more permanent world peace.

I. We need preparedness for national defense.

The instinct of self preservation is one of the fundamental forces of nature and when justly exercised in the defense of the individual or the nation cannot be adjudged other than moral.

II. We cannot get adequate preparedness unless we combine with it an international policy which will restrain its use for aggrandizement and will pledge its use to the maintenance of international law.

This is because of democracy's instinctive fear of the possible misuse of military power. A trip through the Great Middle West

will convince anyone that the rank and file of Americans are not in the mood to support a movement for a great military power dedicated solely to the cause of national defense. President Wilson accurately interpreted the American spirit when recently he said:

America will have forgotten her traditions, whenever, upon any occasion, she fights merely for herself under such circumstances as will show that she has forgotten to fight for all mankind. And the only excuse that America can ever have for the assertion of her physical force is that she asserts it in behalf of the interests of humanity. When America ceases to be unselfish, she will cease to be America. When she forgets the traditions of devotion to human rights in general which gave spirit and impulse to her founders, she will have lost her title deeds to her own nationality.

This high tradition of unselfishness indicates that America will respond to any movement for preparedness if it be dedicated not only to national but to international interests at one and the same time.

III. The Democratic instinct thus proves itself sound, because in the long run an unselfish international policy will result in the best possible selfish protection.

IV. Without an international policy that makes peace more lasting, the nations of Europe must enter another race for armaments which, together with their war debts and the rebuilding of their industries, will create an urgent need for money that will force them to institute a destructive competition for markets that will react against the progress of democracy by complicating all of our fundamental problems.

If, at the end of the war, no method but war is left for the settlement of the inevitable disputes that will arise between nations, Europe will be driven to institute this race for markets in order to prepare herself for the next war, and the probable effect of such a race for markets upon our American problems will be as follows:

a. *Our Export Problem*

Our foreign markets will be greatly narrowed and in some lines closed by the reduced power to buy on the part of the European nations. Indirectly, the power to buy will be reduced among other nations. Our foreign markets will be further restricted by the high protective tariffs which the European nations will maintain at the

close of the war, first, as a method of securing greater income and second, as a method of making each nation as nearly self-sufficient as possible, for self-sufficiency is a great military asset.

b. *Our Tariff Problem*

It will be suggested that we can meet such a situation by erecting high tariff walls. But in many cases nothing short of a prohibitory tariff will meet the situation, and a prohibitory tariff would result, first, in a serious reduction of our governmental income, and second, would further restrict our export trade, because between nations as between individuals it takes two to make a trade. Therefore, any serious restrictions on our imports would, in the long run, limit our exports.

c. *Our Taxation Problem*

If the urgency of the situation should force us to a high protective tariff, our income would be so seriously reduced that we would face great deficits. These deficits would suggest an increasing amount of direct taxation, and efforts at direct taxation invariably produce violent protest and serious class strife. Throughout history, nations have gone down in efforts to levy direct taxes to the satisfaction of all classes.

d. *Our Labor Problem*

If Europe throws upon our markets vast amounts of goods produced by labor that for patriotic reasons accepts abnormally low wages, it is clear that the higher wages of American labor will be thrown into a serious competition. There is, I know, a disposition upon the part of some to believe that labor will be so scarce in Europe at the end of the war that European wages will be kept up. But it must be remembered that to an unprecedented degree women have been drafted into the industrial army of Europe, and that every year a vast number of boys are entering manhood and becoming available for industry. There is reason to believe that more labor will be available at the close of the war than before.

In addition, the intensity of this unprecedented and relentless commercial competition will divert public thought and energy from the fundamental problems of social progress. And this would mean an intensifying of our class strife and labor difficulties.

All this presents a grave outlook but it must be remembered

that if at the end of this war some method other than war can be established for the settlement of future disputes that Europe will be relieved to some extent of this abnormally urgent need of money and therefore America can escape this complication of her problems.

V. In addition to material defense, a policy of preparedness for national defense as a means toward international peace can be made the centre around which will gather a national movement in which may be awakened in Americans new ideals and new loyalties and new ambitions such as the Europeans are gaining as a sort of by-product of the sacrifice and suffering of war.

Along this road lies the purest approach to a durable peace. If we will follow it, as I feel sure we will, our high confidence in democratic institutions and in the destiny of America will be justified.

THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE—A REPLY TO CRITICS

BY THEODORE MARBURG, M.A., LL.D.,
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The League to Enforce Peace welcomes criticism; its sponsors feel that criticism will only serve to bring out the strength of its case.

Yes, the platform lacks details and elaboration. It does not lack definition. Nor has there been lack of study and public discussion of its possible workings. We have got to overcome the initial difficulty of getting the powers to agree to any plan. Therefore the simplicity of this one. It is felt that if the nations can be gotten to subscribe to its fundamental principles, the envoys charged with the duty of perfecting the plan will be equal to all questions of detail, program or organization. The plan contemplates "not a league of some states against others, but a union of as many as possible in their common interest."

The central idea of the League is that wars are the result of the condition of international anarchy out of which the world has never yet risen, that they will not cease until justice prevails and that justice cannot triumph until the world organizes for justice. We find within the modern state certain institutions such as legislature, courts, and executive, which aim to prevent strife among men and to promote the general welfare by promoting legal and social justice and by enlarging opportunity. This system was applied to the states, originally sovereign entities, composing the American union. Entering the Union involved a certain surrender of sovereignty and independence and a sacrifice of the principle of equality in the unequal representation in the lower house of the federal legislature. The interests of the states, economic and other, had often clashed and resort to arms between them had not been unknown. Because of this fact some of them were slow to consent to the plan. But the workings of the Continental government, crude as it was, convinced men that in this direction lay progress, in this direction light for the world; and, though with

hesitation and misgivings on the part of some, all finally took the step. Once only in a century and a quarter has the peace between them been disturbed. True, the South was forced to abandon the institution of slavery, and lack of protective duties against the cheaper agricultural products of the West caused farms to be abandoned in New York and New England. But individuals moved freely from one section to another. There was no suppression of local aspirations and ideals. On the whole the welfare of each made for the welfare of all. And today the benefits of the Union are unquestioned. We naturally ask ourselves why the same organization which brings justice and peace and orderly progress within the nation may not be applied with equal success between the nations. Far from representing a confusion of ideas it is the essence of logic. The question is: how far can we attempt to go in the direction of such organization at present? On this question the League to Enforce Peace occupies a middle ground. And because of this fact it faces criticism by two opposing groups. One maintains that we go too far, the other that we do not go far enough.

Men who previous to the present war were opposed to the introduction of the element of force in international institutions have now come to regard it as essential.

The principal declared purpose of the League to Enforce Peace is to make war, immediate and certain war, upon any nation which goes to war without a previous hearing of the dispute. A Council of Conciliation will entertain disputes arising out of a clash of political interests. Incidentally a true international court of justice is to be set up to entertain justiciable questions, and there are to be conferences from time to time to formulate and codify international law. In the measure in which nations are estopped from fighting, the growth of law will be stimulated and resort to international tribunals become more frequent. These latter happy results in their turn will diminish resort to arms. But it is manifestly not justiciable questions, nor even the nebulous state of international law, which, by and large, brings war. War arises principally out of conflicts of policy. To deal with these successfully is the immediate problem before the world. The demand for a hearing of the dispute once complied with, nations, members of the League, are then free to go to war as under present conditions. That is to

say, the League as such stops short of enforcing the judgment or award. In fact, it is a question whether the Council of Conciliation, unless requested to do so, will proceed to an award at all; though it must be remembered that nations submitting a dispute to any tribunal may, and often will, enter into an agreement beforehand to respect the decision.

The failure to enforce the judgment or award is a source of objection to the League's program on the part of men whose opinion is entitled to respect, among them Charles W. Eliot. Their criticism is that, unless the verdict be enforced, many wars will still take place, and that, if a nation may be called upon to defend its position by force of arms after a hearing has been had, armaments must be maintained. Both of these criticisms the League admits to be valid. The check upon war would be much more effective if the nations could be persuaded to accept a plan providing not only for compulsory investigation, but for an award, and finally for a sanction which would insure the execution of the award. But the 'desirable' is not always the 'realizable.' It is felt that, although in the interest of world peace they ought to be willing to give and take, as a matter of fact the Great Powers would not enter into an agreement to submit all disputes to a tribunal if they were bound to carry out the award. Great Britain, for example, might have the question of Gibraltar or Egypt, or a sphere of influence, brought up; Japan the question of Korea or her activities in China; The United States the Monroe Doctrine or the question of Oriental immigration. To be realizable—*i.e.*, something which governments at the present stage of world feeling and enlightenment are likely to adopt—the plan must, therefore, omit the feature of executing the award.

Under existing practices when two nations enter an arbitration they do so voluntarily. The nature of the question to be decided is defined in the preliminary agreement and they know beforehand the worst that can befall them. When at present, therefore, they consent to arbitrate a question they do it in the full expectation of abiding by the result. To go further and enter into general treaties in pairs looking to the settlement of future disputes is still a very different matter from entering into a common treaty with a large group of nations. In the former case each nation knows pretty well the antecedents, policy and interests of the contracting party.

In the latter, that fact is much more complicated. The United States, for example, would be willing to go much further in a treaty with Great Britain than in a treaty with the Balkan States or Turkey. There still remain in the plan two steps which constitute an advance over existing practice, namely (a) the obligation of the signatories binding themselves to use the tribunals they may set up; (b) the use of force to compel them to do so if recalcitrant.

Now why do we base such high hopes on a mere hearing? Because experience, municipal and international, points to its great value in warding off actual strife. In the state of Massachusetts there has long existed a provision for compulsory investigation of labor disputes in the quasi-public services. The power to summon witnesses and lay bare the facts of the dispute, without proceeding to a judgment, has prevented labor war in these services. In Canada we witness the successful working of the Dominion Law covering similar disputes and properly extended to coal-mining, the stoppage of which vitally touches the public interest. In the international field there is the Dogger Bank affair, referred successfully to the International Commission of Inquiry set up by the First Hague Conference.

Such a League as is proposed would necessarily have an Executive Council or Directorate, sitting at the capital of some small country, and charged, amongst other duties, with one certain duty of overwhelming importance, namely, that of declaring war in the name of the League on any nation which went to war without a preliminary hearing of the dispute or an earnest attempt to secure one. And this is the one sole cause for war by the League. There is no other.

War on land cannot well be made without invading the territory of the enemy. It will be remembered that at the beginning of the present war France retired her forces a certain number of kilometres within her own borders. If some such rule as this were set up, the locus of the first battle, a geographical fact, could be easily determined, and there would remain no doubt as to who the offender was. No provocation, whether by threat, either of word or of preparation, nor even an alleged act of injustice, would be accepted as an excuse. There would be no conference of the powers to deliberate as to what action, if any, should be taken, to raise in the breast of the would-be aggressor the hope that dissension among the

powers might lead to the customary inaction. The Executive Council would be in being, charged with one supreme and certain duty, to make war upon the offender. That duty to declare war in the name of the League is a heavy responsibility, and therefore the fact on which the Executive Council is asked to act should be an easily ascertainable fact. Warlike preparation is not an easily ascertainable fact, nor is that of unjust acts. Both are facts most difficult to ascertain, and therefore are to be neither a ground for the declaration of war by the League nor an excuse for war by the nation offending against the provisions of the League.

The constitutional power of the United States to enter into such a compact already exists. Mr. Taft has pointed to its exercise in connection with the treaties guaranteeing the integrity of Cuba and Panama. They carry the obligation to use force if necessary. When the contingency contemplated by the treaties arises, Congress, which alone has the power to declare war, would be called upon to fulfil the treaty obligations. The country was justified in taking this risk because the treaties make for the security of Cuba and Panama and so for peace.

Our critics, pointing out that conciliation is a voluntary process, assert that to force conciliation is a contradiction in terms. They set up their own straw man and then proceed to knock him down. The League does not force conciliation. It simply forces a hearing, leaving the parties free to accept or reject the finding. Under the League, nations are prevented from going to war to get what they suppose to be their rights until, by means of a hearing, not only the outside world but—that which is of high importance—their own people have the facts of the dispute spread before them. They are not prevented from indulging in that costly pastime if, after a hearing, they still hold to the opinion that they are being wronged.

In the meantime, pending the hearing, each disputant is enjoined by the League, under penalty of war, from continuing the objectionable practice or proceeding with the objectionable project.

The judicial tribunal which the League aims to create will be a true World Court with permanent judges, and the assembly an embryo World Parliament to meet periodically. The Court, while set up by the League, will be open to any nation electing to use it. And there is no reason why the Parliament, though convened and

prorogued by the League, may not be composed of representatives of all nations, a true development of the Hague Conferences and the Interparliamentary Union. If now, the League should fail of its main object and melt away, these institutions should remain, a valuable legacy to the world. Far from running counter to the promising current of arbitration, the project therefore is moving with it. It is not blocking it.

By far the weightiest argument against the League is the entangling alliance argument. Of this it should be said that when avoidance of such alliances was enjoined by Washington we were a small country highly vulnerable because of our comparative weakness. Who shall say the same of us today? A people of one hundred million, with untold wealth, so placed geographically as to be practically unconquerable by any single power or likely combination of powers! The dominant trait in Washington was his sense of duty. Were he alive today would he not recognize the obligation of his country to fulfil a duty to the society of nations instead of taking advantage of its fortunate geographical position to shirk that duty? He saw what coöperation meant for the colonies. Would his vision be less clear in sensing the great need of our day, the overwhelming importance of international organization to take the place of international anarchy? America may on the surface appear a selfish nation but she has been stirred to her depth by ethical movements in the past and may be counted upon to rouse herself in similar fashion again. An appeal in a high cause involving sacrifice, even hardship and suffering, would go further today than is dreamed of by the high priests of gain and ease and security. Thousands of Americans who have not shut their eyes and ears to the sights and sounds of this awful day are ready for some attempt to destroy the monster, war, and ready to have their country play its part as the mother of men.

A people wedded to justice will not be afraid to assume its share of responsibility in a league of nations in order to lighten the curse of war in the world even though it involves risks. For the principal objection to war is that it is such a wholesale source of injustice, public and private.

We teach our children not to mind so much what is done to them but to mind very much what is done to others; to be slow to resent little offenses and slights, and even injuries they themselves

suffer; but to be ready at all times to act when some one else is being persecuted or injured. We teach them, too, that the only fear any one should have is the fear of doing wrong. Has not the day arrived when these should likewise be substantially the standards of conduct for nations? I say 'substantially' because the standards of private conduct are modified for nations by the fact that the nation is a trustee of the interests of its people and of its special form of civilization, including the political principles which it represents.

In most civilized countries, the day is past when a principal obligation of the individual is to insist on his rights. It is the side of duty, rather than rights, which is emphasized today; and the new order of international society toward which the nations are moving will do the same.

I feel strongly that the present evil of recurring war is due largely to the selfish motives which have dominated the policies of all nations in the past. The United States probably has been governed by them less than other countries but even its attitude leaves much to be desired. A better day cannot dawn until it is realized that in *general the future interest of a nation will be found to lie in the direction of a present duty to the society of nations*. The fact that Europe permitted the crime of 1870 made possible the crime of 1914. The tragedy we are now witnessing holds within it the seeds of untold future disaster for all of us. And unless the neutral world realizes the significance of it, unless it acts now as if the society of nations were already in existence and assumes its full share of responsibility for the triumph of the right, the seed will bring its harvest.

Has not the time come when this great country should stand for the right, should strike for the right when necessary, and should help organize the world for right? And how much less frequent the need of striking at all when such absolute and potential power as a League of all the great nations will represent shall be back of the right!

Until we have such organization no country can be really free. Plato has defined the free man as he who has sufficient control over his appetites to be governed by reason in choosing between good and evil. What nation today is free to choose between good and evil? How few the nations that would not lay down the

burden of armaments if they felt themselves free to do so! Within the state true liberty is secured only by a surrender of license; that is, by self denial and by a measure of restraint imposed upon each by all. Society implies restraint; self restraint and restraint from without. In the society of nations there can be no true liberty without surrender, in some measure, of sovereignty and independence. It is the duty of the United States to help in organizing the world for justice because it is only through justice that peace can be secured. A selfish policy which leaves a government apathetic to a universal woe and causes it to act only when its own rights are trespassed upon cannot produce peace. There must be coöperation with other nations in the cause of justice. Thus much for sacrifice if sacrifice be called for.

But, while ready for it if need be, we cannot admit that the plan of the League to Enforce Peace would actually involve the United States in wars. The League would not be instituted unless it embraced all or nearly all of the great nations. Its military power would thus be overwhelmingly preponderant. Now, what is the dominant demand of the League? A hearing of the dispute before going to war! Could any demand be more reasonable, more just? We are charged with planning an oligarchy implying oppression. If we sought to enforce the award of a tribunal in disputes involving conflicts of political policy there would really be danger of oppression. To avoid this we should then demand that the League embrace not only all or nearly all the great nations but the smaller progressive nations as well, so that out of their united action substantial justice might emerge. But what injustice, what oppression, can arise from a demand for a hearing which leaves the disputant free to go to war afterwards? And is there any nation, however powerful, which would refuse this reasonable demand if faced, as it would be, with the alternative of having to wage war against practically the civilized world?

The French Ambassador at Rome reports San Giuliano's view, July 27, 1914: "Germany at this moment attaches great importance to her relations with London and he believes that if any power can determine Berlin in favor of peaceful action it is England." Two days earlier, July 25, Sazonof had asked that England place herself clearly on the side of Russia and France. Such an act on the part of the British Cabinet was not possible because, until

Belgium was invaded, it was doubtful whether the people of the British Isles would support the government in a hostile attitude toward the Central Powers. But the opinion is general today that if Germany had known with certainty that England would line up against her, she would not have declared war. Under the plan of the League Germany would have known that she would have not only England to reckon with but Italy and the United States and the A. B. C. countries of South America, not to mention minor members of the League. Now is it reasonable to suppose that facing such a possibility she would have denied Sir Edward Grey's demand for a conference over the dispute?

The only loss a nation could suffer by a hearing would be that of being deprived of the advantage of superior preparedness. And is not that one of the very advantages we want to take away from nations in the general interest? Nations bent on aggression would go through the form of a hearing and proceed with their designs afterwards. There would, therefore, still be wars. But it is inconceivable that the League as such would ever be called upon to wage war under the terms of the compact. It is possible that after a hearing the nations may still regard a threatened war as so unjust or so dangerous to the world at large that they will come together anyway and say: "this may not be." But *that* they may do now.

Objection is made that the League plan calls for coöperation with monarchies. In many constitutional monarchies such as those of Italy, Holland, the Scandanavian countries, etc., the people practically enjoy self-government. France and Switzerland are republics, and England is a true democracy despite its monarchial form of government. Drawing our love of liberty originally from England, we paid back the debt by the example of the successful practice of a broad democracy. We thus encouraged its growth not only in the mother country but generally throughout the world. Social democracy, which is opportunity to rise in life and is largely the result of economic conditions, is greater in all new countries than in the countries of the old world. It is greater in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States than in England. But when we come to political democracy, which is the opportunity for the will of the people to express itself in law, there is more of that in England than in the United States. If one knows what

the will of the English people is he can pretty well gauge the action of the English Parliament. Is the same true here? Old age and disability pensions every justice loving man of the United States would like to see established here. Have we got them? If it be the fault of federal or state constitutions does this alter the fact?

WHAT PROGRAM SHALL THE UNITED STATES STAND FOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?

BY WALTER LIPPMANN,
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I

We have been invited to do some very slippery guessing. Out of our little fragments of knowledge and error, out of our half-analyzed prejudices and loyalties and hopes, we are to piece together a theory of the rôle we wish America to play. We are compelled to make innumerable estimates on insufficient evidence, and many a fact we cling to may prove to be an aspiration. We are illustrating the assertion that a democracy stakes its salvation on its hypotheses.

For though no one of us can possibly know enough to be certain, no one of us can shirk this speculation. No one can reserve decision until the truth is perfectly clear. For we are not dealing with a point in Babylonian architecture over which a breathless world can suspend judgment for a generation or two. We are in that living zone of real choices where refusal to commit oneself is in itself a gigantic practical decision. A scholarship which was afraid to commit itself because it did not know enough to feel sure would merely be trying to conceal its vanity by covering the pride of intellect with the cloak of science.

II

Casting about for a method of grasping this complicated subject, it has seemed to me useful to make a few rough distinctions. We may say I think the nations of the world consist, first of all, of the great powers—Britain, Russia, Germany, Japan and the United States. They contain the major force of the world, and from them come the major initiatives of world politics. Grouped about them are the second class powers—France, Italy, Austria-Hungary, themselves of great importance but not decisive. Following them may be put third class states—such as Roumania, Bulgaria, the Scandinavian countries, the Argentine, Chile, and perhaps Brazil. In any calculation of forces in the world, their adherence one way

or the other affects the balance of power. All three classes consist of states which may be said to be represented in the concert of the powers.

Beyond them lie the territories about which the great decisions are made, the territories which constitute the objects of diplomatic action—almost all of Africa, of Latin America, Turkey, Persia and China. The discussion which goes on in the concert of the powers centers chiefly in these weak territories. Sometimes the discussion is about the actual control of some part of them, as in the Moroccan crisis, the Bagdad railway episode, the Anglo-Persian Convention, or the scramble for vantage in China. Sometimes the discussion turns upon securing additional favor and prestige, as in the intrigue of Europe to attach the Balkan States to one diplomatic group or the other. Sometimes the struggle turns on the effort to secure strategic advantages, such as Germany's attempt to open a road to the Levant, to secure a naval base in the Atlantic. Sometimes the argument turns on the method of conducting war for supremacy in the Council of Nations, as in Germany's plea for that limitation of sea power which she calls the "freedom of the seas."

III

A perfectly disinterested international program would be concerned primarily with the strengthening of the backward states. Its great object would be to create order and strength in countries like China, Turkey, and the Caribbean States. A real friend of mankind would be passionately devoted to the regeneration of those territories which constitute the stakes of diplomacy. He would wish to see their finances put in order, their administration modernized, their economic resources developed and not exploited, their people educated. He would believe that when states become modern and strong they cease to be the objects of imperialistic bargains, and are admitted to a place in the Council of the Nations.

Now historic events and geographic facts have indicated two great spheres of backward territory where the United States has a part to play—Latin America and China. As nations go, the United States has had a noble if negative program in respect to them. The Monroe Doctrine, in spite of all its vagueness, has meant a resolution on the part of the United States to give Latin America the opportunity to find itself.

Some of the Latin countries have done so, but others, especially those facing the Caribbean, have not succeeded in reaching that degree of political efficiency which the world requires. The question put to us is whether we shall take an affirmative part in regenerating them, or whether our policy shall be one of protection and irresponsibility. We are at present pursuing both policies—towards Mexico a sort of meddling *laissez-faire*—towards Haiti and San Domingo a positive program aimed at stability. The reason we pursue those differing policies is due largely to the fact that it is easier to intervene in Haiti than in Mexico—the one is not costly, the other would be. And I am not prepared to say that that isn't a good reason for making the distinction. But, nevertheless, the fact remains that we cannot forever hold to a Mexican policy which allows Mexico a free hand and at the same time protects her against the consequences. The day may come, if Mexico doesn't straighten itself out, when we may have to choose between some kind of positive American intervention, and serious trouble with Europe.

While the method in regard to Mexico is not clear, the American purpose is. We are committed to the realization of stable and progressive government in Mexico. Whether we can attain that by diplomatic and financial pressure and advice, whether we shall have to undertake a partial or a complete armed intervention, I do not know. But our guiding motive is to use as little force as is needed to attain the end.

The central item of our international program is the regeneration of Latin America. But behind this program lies the politics of the world, and before we can undertake it with any assurance we need to know how the nations of Europe and Asia would regard it. But that is a very difficult thing to know, and we are compelled to make a number of guesses. We may rule out Russia. It can have no counter-ambitions in Latin America. Britain we may assume to be more than friendly to our program. Though there will be competition between American and British merchants and capitalists, the imperial interests of Great Britain are not concerned with conquest in Latin America. The Empire is almost as much concerned as we are in the successful reform of Central and South America. On all vital issues there the United States and Great Britain are in a position to coöperate, a fact which ought to prejudice our policy in a decidedly pro-British way.

Concerning German plans in South America there is much greater difficulty in making a decision. It is said, of course, that Germany dreams of a dominion in Southern Brazil. The fact probably is that some Germans do, and some don't. It may be that German policy has crystallized now and turned definitely towards the Near East—but this we know, without mastery of the seas, a German colony in Southern Brazil would be a hostage to fortune, and I am inclined to believe that for a long time it will be utterly beyond German power to maintain a supreme army in Europe, and a supreme navy in the Atlantic. But even if there is a danger we must remember that Southern Brazil is nearer to Europe than it is to us, and that the danger is if anything more real to Great Britain than to the United States. It is a danger, however, only if Southern Brazil is temptingly easy to conquer. It is possible, therefore, to eliminate it entirely by an Anglo-American naval entente. With the adherence of France and possibly Italy, the supremacy of the seas would be invincible. If that exists, conquest in Latin America ceases to be a possibility.

IV

If our program is the regeneration of the Latin states, our politics must it seems to me look towards definite coöperation with the British Empire. In that coöperation, I believe, lies the hope of our future. We have reached a point where we are emerging from our isolation. Foreign trade is drawing us into the outer world; we are lending capital abroad, planning a merchant marine and a naval program. Wherever we go, we cannot help meeting that organization of one quarter of the human race which is known as the British Empire. We cannot ignore it—no world power can. And we have got to choose, and choose soon between antagonism and friendship. Germany made the choice about twenty years ago. She chose to challenge the mistress of the seas and brought down upon the world an unthinkable calamity. We have to make the same choice. Surely if there is any wisdom and humanity in us we shall seek a self-respecting friendship with the British Commonwealth.

I do not need to remind you of Canada, touching us at the noblest and longest frontier in the world, or of Australia and New Zealand, so like ourselves in democratic hope, subject to the same

fears about the Orient. It seems to me that if two states so parallel in interest as America and England cannot find the way of coöperation then there is little hope in the world. I realize the prejudices which fight against it—prejudices fastened upon us in school where children are taught to regard Indians and Red Coats as their natural enemies; prejudices cultivated not a little by trade competition, and kept alive as a political issue by fanatical Irish and German politicians. But our future, and I think the future of the Empire, depends upon the conquest of that prejudice, and it is altogether intolerable that racial memories should be permitted to thwart and distort our efforts to come to an understanding with the British.

All competent observers are agreed that after the war the problem of imperial reorganization will be one of the great issues. The more hopeful ones look forward to a commonwealth in which the five self-governing dominions are placed on a more equal footing in the determination of imperial policy. We shall then find ourselves the neighbor not of an isolated Canada, Australia, New Zealand, but of a series of federated democracies. Are we to ignore them, or worse still to challenge them? Are we to follow the advice of our militarists and build a navy to compete with theirs? If we do, we are preparing a disaster and conspiring against liberty. A schism of the English-speaking world would leave all its parts exposed to attack. It would leave us in a state of armed and terrified isolation. It would drive the British either to misalliances with the conquering empires of the East, or lay them open to destruction. For if liberalism divides its forces in the next generation, it will be cutting its own throat. England cannot alone continue to pay the financial and human cost of defending the Empire. We cannot alone pay the cost of isolation in a world where we have no ally. Whether we desire merely the safety of our own territory, or the safety of this hemisphere, there is, it seems to me, no choice but to come to a definite agreement with Great Britain.

That is the policy upon which our international program must rest. The kind of world we desire, a world of stable, autonomous, interdependent democracies acting as the guardians of less developed peoples—that vision depends upon the coöperation of the United States and Great Britain. France and Latin America, perhaps Italy, too, would be magnetized to it, and we should have established a mighty area of security. No one need pretend that

within it complete justice would prevail. The American negro, the Hindu, the Irish, the Egyptian would still suffer oppression. But if there were enough freedom from external danger, the mind of the west would be freed for the solution of those questions.

V

Perhaps the greatest political problem of the future is being prepared in China. A great but weak people is on the verge of conquest and exploitation. If that calamity is engineered, John Hay's prophecy will come true. The storm center of mankind will pass from Turkey and the Balkans to China, and for generations the nations will be convulsed. A quarter of the human race is involved, and every power has a stake in China. If internationalism means anything real, it means above all that China must not be disintegrated and destroyed. What China needs is time to develop, time to modernize herself, time to find her own strength. The kind of work we are pledged to do in Latin America needs to be done on a much greater scale in China. But we cannot do it alone. We cannot from our isolation challenge the ambitions of Japan. That must be done if at all by the united western nations, and the core of that unity is Anglo-American coöperation.

The question of whether or not to hold on to the Philippines is primarily a factor of this larger problem. If we fail to unite with the British Empire, then we must withdraw our aid from China, and that means that we must for our own safety withdraw from the outpost at the Philippines. If China is to fall to Japan, then the Philippines should go with it. If Japan is to have complete dominion, we cannot afford to leave an indefensible possession lying across her path. But if in coöperation with England and France we propose to protect China, then the retention of the Philippines is a risk we can afford to take.

VI

I realize that to talk of Anglo-American coöperation in the midst of this war seems like trying to organize the world in a permanent alliance against Germany. Yet I believe that just the opposite result is likely to follow. For Germany will not be eliminated as a great power. In so far as the war is a struggle between Germany and England no permanent decision is likely to be reached.

Realizing this, responsible British officials have begun to talk about a permanent economic entente against Germany. They feel that if Germany is allowed to recuperate, she will challenge the Empire in a generation or two.

This is a prospect to make men shudder, and it is one which from every human point of view is intolerable. Whatever influence we have should be used to prevent it from happening. But how? It seems to me that in an Anglo-American alliance, Great Britain and France would find so much safety that they could risk a conciliatory policy towards Germany after the war. I for one should be inclined to say that the United States must insist on that as one of the terms of our bargain. Take away from England the fear of destruction, an alliance with us would do that, and the foreign policy of England after the war will be directed by liberals instead of jingoes. Take away from Germany the possibility of a standing grievance, and liberal Germany may come to the top. For when the costs of this war come to be assessed in Germany, there is, I believe, nothing that can preserve the present ruling classes except a fear on the part of the people that the world is conspiring to crush them. After the war, the best allies the German oligarchy will have are the bogeys of England and Russia. Dispel those bogeys by a generous policy like that dealt out to the Boers, give the German democracy air, and instead of a Germany frightened into aggression, there may arise a new Germany with which the western world can live at peace. To that great end we can contribute by the right kind of understanding with Great Britain.

VII

But understanding is not an easy thing to create, and unhappily there is not much of it at present. Our neutrality has made us no friends except in Belgium; and the kind of coöperation I have suggested cannot be reasoned into existence. It must be warmed and illuminated by some dramatic and gallant action.

There is, I think, one thing the United States might do which would give to Anglo-American and Franco-American friendship the impetus it requires. Belgium is the opportunity. A large number of people in England, France, and the United States, I think an increasing number, believe that we missed a great moral opportunity in failing to stamp our disapproval upon the violation

of Belgium. It was a missed opportunity, I think, but it is one for which it is hardly fair to blame the administration. The fact is no one seems to have thought of it at the time. At least no one thought of it out loud. Mr. Roosevelt's first utterance so far as I can discover was on November 8, 1914, three months after the crime.

Yet the feeling exists today that we should have done something about Belgium. It is not too late to do something. After the war, Belgium will again have to be neutralized by the Powers, and I suggest to you that the United States might become one of the guarantors. Politically this would accomplish two great things. It would give Belgium an unquestioned international status, and so dispel that modicum of honest German sentiment, mistaken I believe, which says that Belgium was a potential ally of France and England. Secondly, it would be a real protection to France and England—we should be offering them something very tangible, and in return we could in self-respect ask them to open negotiations for an agreement about Latin America, the Far East, a naval and an economic arrangement. Belgium, which is the rallying point for liberal sentiment in the western world, may become the pledge which unites it.

VIII

But the real bond of unity is an agreement about sea power, a thing which cannot be insisted upon too much. The future of America is bound up with the future of sea power. Our security from invasion exists so long as no potential enemy can command the seas against us. The security of the Monroe Doctrine, or of the new Pan-Americanism depends upon the control of the seas. The future of China can be decided by the nations which control the seas.

This control was exercised for a long time by Great Britain. But towards 1900 the face of things changed when Germany began to build a challenging navy. England found that she could no longer dominate all the oceans, and there followed what might be called the partitioning of sea power. The British fleet was concentrated in the North Sea, the western Pacific was turned over to Japan, the Mediterranean to France, and the Caribbean to us. The arrangement has worked fairly well during this war in the sense

that except sporadically the highways of the world have remained open. No man can calculate the benefit to peaceful civilization which has come from the fact that the Allies have had a clear dominion of the seas. It has given us a security which we should never have enjoyed if Germany had been able to make the ocean a battle ground. Sea power has held together, and that is why we in America have been able to escape the worst ravages of the war. Had the Allies lost command of the seas, the suffering of America and most of the neutral world would have been enormous.

The Germans speak of sea power as a tyranny. And in a sense they are right. It has enabled a little island to play the leading part in world politics. The possession of sea power is the ability to exert tremendous pressure on every other nation. But though it is autocratic, sea power differs radically from a conquering army. Its power is in the main bloodless—it doesn't overrun and burn and destroy, and lay waste the homes of men. If sea power is sufficiently strong it wins victories without fighting battles. The effect of it may be cruel in that it can be used to starve a people, but it hasn't the quality of immediate, murderous violence which belongs to militarism on land. It can be employed with deliberation, with regard to non-combatant life. It is force, but force tempered so that civilized men can use it with discrimination.

Of all forms of armed coercion it is the most decent and the most effective. It is the ideal weapon for international policing. It can be used at the least cost to humanity. But the humanity of sea power and the effectiveness of it depend upon its unity and its supremacy. A divided sovereignty of the seas means a cruel anarchy of the seas. It means a ruinous competition in armaments and endless warfare by rivals for sea power.

It is better for the world, I think, to endure a tyranny like England's than to relapse into an anarchy such as the Germans plan. It is better that one power should be the master than that three or four should be fighting for mastery, just as it is better to live in a country ruled by an efficient autocracy than in one where a number of factions are struggling for supremacy.

But as things stand now, England can no longer maintain the command of the seas. She has already partitioned it among her allies. She is challenged by Germany. If the worst happened she might be challenged by the United States. And all observers

know that the alliance with Japan is likely to prove a rope of sand. We are face to face, therefore, with the most serious calamity that could happen to our civilization—the disintegration of sea power.

To that supreme fact American foreign policy must be adjusted. All else is trivial in comparison to it. I submit to you that the whole internal democratic program of the United States, the program for Latin America, the program for the preservation of China is endangered now, and will be wrecked, if the unity and supremacy of sea power are destroyed.

We must do our part in preserving it, we and the self-governing dominions of the Empire. The British Isles, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the United States must share and preserve the command of the sea. If that command is maintained, it will grow stronger by its own strength. France and Italy and Pan America will gain by it and support it if it is strong. But if it is weak and faltering, we shall all be drifting in different directions, and an endless confusion and intrigue of world politics, of shifting alliances, of panic armament will plague us. It is in the power of the United States and Great Britain to establish such an area of security that the unaggressive nations will be drawn towards them.

The variety of the peoples involved in such an alliance is so great that it would have to exercise its power in a liberal way. Within it would be all races, religions, languages, and grades of civilization, and that is the stuff of which liberalism is made. Such an alliance could not be autocratic in its policy because the people composing it would be too heterogeneous. It would not always be wise or just, but in the long run it would not dare to be too harsh or too selfish. It would touch all humanity at too many points for it to adopt the dangerous morality of a narrow nationalism.

IX

I hope I have no illusions about the difficulties of such an alliance, the problem of converting Americans to it, the problem of finding the concrete basis of agreement with Britain, or of creating the machinery of conducting a common policy. But what alternative is there? What has anybody to offer that is less dangerous and less difficult? Surely, no one will dare to come before you urging us to a policy of armed isolation. For isolation is out of the

question because it postulates an impossibility. It assumes that we can somehow or other ignore the fate of the British Empire; it assumes that somehow or other we are not concerned with the disintegration of sea power; it assumes that we can compete with British trade, the British marine, and the British navy without bringing disaster upon ourselves. Those who talk of isolation merely reveal their indifference. They simply refuse to face the stern realities which a change in world conditions has revealed to the imagination. We are in a time when the inadequacy of language is a cause of despair. For all that we care about hangs upon a vision of what sea power means, and upon the will to act upon that vision.

X

All larger schemes, such as those for a League of Peace with Permanent Courts of Arbitration and Conciliation must rest it seems to me on the unity and supremacy of sea power concentrated in the hands of the liberal powers of the west. They may be workable, but they will be workable only if the British Empire, the United States, France, Pan America, and ultimately Germany are knit together, their economic conflicts compromised, their military resources pooled, their diplomacy in a league of the west. For what the world needs is not so much international machinery, as a cohesion of power. Without that we shall be like the doctrinaires who write perfect constitutions for Haiti instead of uniting the factions which disrupt it.

The task of the liberal in international affairs is to rivet together the liberal states, to focus within them overwhelming power, and by the majesty of their strength and the wisdom of their policy to seduce the empires into friendship. No machinery we can suggest, no rule of international law is likely to survive, unless the liberal world represents a sufficient union of power to make it a shield for men's protection, and a standard to which the people can rally.

AMERICA'S INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND FOREIGN POLICY

BY GEORGE LOUIS BEER.

The present world-wide war has brought home to all thinking men the firm conviction that the existing system of international relations is out of harmony with the fundamental facts of modern life. As a result of the application of scientific discoveries to means of communication, mankind has, during the past hundred years, become a unit in a concrete sense never before realized. But within this all-embracing unity there is a considerably more clearly defined entity composed of the states of western civilization. Despite marked differences of gravest significance, these states have been developing on parallel, and even on converging, lines. Art, science, literature, and philosophy have become international, but far more binding than the ties thus established are those resulting from the commercial and financial interdependence of the western world. These ever growing relations necessitated some regulation, and the system slowly elaborated in response to this need is embodied both in a vast series of specific treaties and in the ill-defined precedents of interstate usage known as international law. The present war, both in its outbreak and in its course, has furnished concrete proof that this system is woefully inadequate.

The essential difficulty is that the underlying facts of interstate relations find inadequate expression in existing international institutions. While the world has become in an actual sense a unit, there is no real organization binding together the constituent aggregates.¹ In the political world of today, the state is the final reality, and the prevailing concept of its nature must be radically changed before the inchoate world-community can take effective shape. There is no *vinculum juris* binding the sovereign states together. Anarchy is still the dominant characteristic of interstate relations. For, according to the current doctrine, the state is

¹ "Idealists sigh for the Comity of Nations. But it is already in existence. It is only the Comity of States which seems impossible." C. Delisle Burns, *The Morality of Nations*, pp. 228, 229.

responsible to no superior and because of its sovereignty—naturally unlimited—it is the sole judge of its actions. The repudiation of a solemn treaty or the violation of clearly-defined precepts of international law are justified on grounds of necessity. These admittedly illegal and immoral acts are considered as injuries solely by the states immediately concerned. They are not regarded as offences against the unorganized society of nations and hence the states not adversely affected do not feel justified, provided they even be so inclined, either to raise their voices in protest or, still less, to use economic pressure or force against the offender.

This concept of state sovereignty is a predominant characteristic of modern nationalism. It is to a great extent a philosophical and legal fiction inherited from a different past and out of accord with modern facts.² It divides the world into sharply segregated—and from the social and economic standpoint, largely artificial—politico-legal units. Under its sway each one of these states is primarily, if not exclusively, interested in its own welfare and, in pursuing it, tends to disregard the rights and interests of its fellows and to ignore those of mankind as a whole. All states are in varying degrees infected with this self-regarding nationalism, which is the fundamental cause of the present war and which will cause further catastrophes in the future unless the state can be effectively controlled by some form of world-organization. Apparently such a consummation cannot be fully realized for a considerable time, because the sense of international obligation and responsibility—the willingness to forego or even to jeopard national advantage in mutual service for mankind as a whole—is more or less undeveloped in all states.

At one extreme in the world of today is a state like the German Empire which, impelled by the aggressive doctrines of a reactionary economic philosophy and by an almost pagan worship of the God of War and at the same time impressed with its self-imposed task to redeem a decadent world, rides rough-shod over the rights of others. But almost, if not equally, as disastrous to the civilization of the world is such an attitude as that of the United States which, immersed in concern for its own peace and liberty, has adhered to a

² Cf. C. Delisle Burns, *The Morality of Nations*, *passim*; Ch. Seignebos, 1815–1915 (English translation), p. 34; Roland G. Usher, *The Challenge of the Future*, p. 193; John Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, p. 131.

policy of "no foreign entanglements" outside the western hemisphere that is tantamount to a repudiation of all responsibility for maintaining justice and right in interstate relations other than such as directly affect the American continents.

It follows ineluctably from these premises that we of the United States cannot escape a certain degree of negative responsibility for the deplorable chaos into which western civilization has fallen. Although German political philosophy has been widely taught in America by scientists trained in German universities, it cannot be said that its doctrines have become an integral part of general thought. While the organic theory of the state is, as a rule, not questioned, the conclusions that may be drawn from it have not been pushed to their logical extreme. Above all, the complete subordination of the citizen to the state is repugnant to American individualism. Furthermore, in the eyes of most Americans, the German concept of the state as a living personality, with no moral responsibility but to itself, is a metaphysical abstraction corresponding in no degree to actuality. Nor is the German visualization of the world as a group of inherently antagonistic and morally self-sufficient states, each a law unto itself, in accord with American political traditions and ideals. American political thought does not emphasize the value of the state and ignore the rights and importance of mankind as a whole. It inclines towards the concept of a morally responsible state conforming to the public opinion of the as yet unorganized world-community. There is implicit in it the ideal of such an ultimate community based on the essential unity of humanity. Practically nothing effective, however, has been done by the United States to make this ideal an eventual possibility.

By our traditional policy of aloofness from European affairs, we have deliberately refused to assume those obligations that every state owes to mankind. This policy may have been expedient in the days of our weakness, but even then it had some unfortunate consequences that in our provincial outlook are frequently ignored. Absorption in our own development was an unquestionable factor in protracting Europe's struggle against the domination of Napoleon. Writing of that period, Admiral Mahan with characteristic insight pointed out: "The United States, contrary alike to the chief interests of mankind and to her own, sided upon the whole,

though by no means unanimously, against Great Britain."³ The only legitimate defence for such a policy of deliberate isolation is impotence, but the United States steadfastly adhered to this attitude even after it had become one of the Great Powers and it thus forfeited the influence it could and should have exerted upon the affairs of mankind.

It is true that we have in various directions attempted to exert our influence for the advancement of humanity, but except to a limited extent, and then well-nigh exclusively in Central and South America, we have refused to assume any obligations for the application of our political ideals. One does not have to be an adherent of the German theory of force to realize that in international relations, as at present regulated, mere words, unless there is a willingness if necessary to back them up by deeds, are futile. Force alone leads to Prussianism, to the doctrine that might makes right, with its dire consequences both to victor and victim. Words, no matter how cogent be the moral arguments, are on many occasions totally ineffective especially when it is known that there is no intention whatsoever of wielding anything more warlike than the pen. The futility of such a course in the unorganized world of today was sadly realized by Secretary Hay when he was obliged to witness the breakdown of his Chinese policy by Russia's action in Manchuria. In 1903, he wrote to Henry White:

The Chinese, as well as the Russians, seem to know that the strength of our position is entirely moral, and if the Russians are convinced that we will not fight for Manchuria—as I suppose we will not—and the Chinese are convinced that they have nothing but good to expect from us and nothing but a beating from Russia, the open hand will not be so convincing to the poor devils of Chinks as the raised club. Still, we must do the best we can with the means at our disposition."⁴

In that the United States resolutely refused to become involved in any European matters and, furthermore, in that, because of its patent unwillingness to use more than moral suasion, it left to

³ Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution*, II, p. 285. Twenty years ago, Prof. John W. Burgess took American historians to task for passing over "our partiality for the French in the struggle to place a Napoleonic despotism over all continental Europe, which Great Britain was using all her powers to prevent." *Political Science Quarterly* XI, p. 64. See also Richard Olney's remarks in the *Atlantic Monthly* for March of 1900.

⁴ W. R. Thayer, *Life and Letters of John Hay II*, p. 369.

others the protection of its policies in the Far East, we cannot escape a degree of negative responsibility for the existing world-war. An examination of recent international history and of the fundamental aim of German world politics will make this nexus apparent.

There is a disconcerting vagueness about Germany's ambitious plans, but the general underlying thought is unmistakable. When the German statesmen, economists, and publicists tried to pierce the veil of the future and to picture the world toward the end of this century, they saw three great political aggregates—the American, the British, and the Russian—outranging in cultural influence and potential strength all other states of western civilization and dwarfing a Germany whose political growth under existing territorial arrangements could apparently not compete with theirs.⁵ Hence the insistent striving for a repartition of the world in conformity both with Germany's actual military strength and with some hypothetical future need for more land for her growing population as well as for new markets and fresh sources of supply for her expanding industries. There was no question either of any real need or of any actual handicap under existing conditions. As these plans for expansion could be realized only at the expense of the British Empire or of the Monroe Doctrine, the enemy of enemies in German eyes appeared to be the so-called "Anglo-Saxon block." The Anglo-Saxon, says Paul Rohrbach in his widely-read book *Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt*, "have spread over such vast expanses that they seem to be on the point of assuming the cultural control of the world, thanks to their large numbers, their resources and their inborn strength."⁶ Similarly, Maximilian Harden pointed out that "Great Britain and North America tend to form a community of interests. On the two oceans, the Anglo-Saxons of the two continents group themselves together in unity of will. The hegemony of the white race will be theirs, if we do not make up the old quarrel. United with France, we should be invincible on land and sea."⁷ Not only is the cultural solidarity of English-speaking peoples fully recognized, but also the fact that their separate developments have

⁵ On the extensive, but undeveloped, economic possibilities of Germany's African possessions, see Sir Harry Johnston's "The German Colonies," in the *Edinburgh Review* of October of 1914.

⁶ Rohrbach, *German World Policies*, p. 5.

⁷ *Zukunft*, July 1, 1911, quoted in Ch. Andler's *Pan-Germanism*, p. 53.

formed part of what is essentially one historical process. Briefly, the broad purpose of German imperialism is to eject the English-speaking peoples from the prominent positions they have acquired in all continents. What English-speaking pioneers—discoverers, adventurers, traders, and settlers—have slowly and laboriously accomplished largely by individual enterprise, the German Empire with its consciousness of military strength planned to duplicate in a few decades.

This hostile purpose toward the English-speaking peoples first manifested itself plainly during the years when the difficulties between Briton and Boer in South Africa were reaching a climax and when Spain was forced by the United States to relinquish the last remnants of her old colonial empire in the East and West. One direct result of this menace was the significant movement for greater cohesion that has made the British Empire a unit during the present war and which promises, after its conclusion, to lead to the creation of adequate political machinery for the continuous expression of this solidarity. Another simultaneous result, just as truly although somewhat less obviously traceable to the German peril, was the marked increase in friendship between England and the United States and their cordial coöperation in some international questions. A few, very few it is true, isolated Americans urged that this friendship should ripen into an alliance, but against such a proposal stood not only the traditions of aloofness inherited from "The Fathers of the Republic," but also the prejudices of some elements of America's heterogeneous population.* The great mass of the people were immersed in their own diverse affairs and had only the most superficial knowledge of international politics, while their leaders, with lack of courageous foresight, refused to question the traditional

* On June 23, 1900, John Hay wrote to John W. Foster: "What can be done in the present diseased state of the public mind? There is such a mad-dog hatred of England prevalent among newspapers and politicians that anything we should now do in China to take care of our imperiled interests, would be set down to 'subservience to Great Britain'. . . . All I have ever done with England is to have wrung great concessions out of her with no compensation. . . . Every Senator I see says, 'For God's sake, don't let it appear we have any understanding with England.' How can I make bricks without straw? That we should be compelled to refuse the assistance of the greatest power in the world, in carrying out our own policy, because all Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are fools—is enough to drive a man mad." W. R. Thayer, *loc. cit.* II, p. 234.

policy. It was realized by only an infinitesimally small fraction of the American people that what was protecting South America from German ambitions was not so much the Monroe Doctrine as, primarily, British sea power. Had the United States entered into such an alliance, it is more than probable that Germany would have realized the futility of attempting to change the course of history. As a cultural entity "the Anglo-Saxon block" did not seem an insuperable obstacle, but a clearly defined alliance upon this foundation would have given Germany pause. Had such an alliance been consummated some fifteen years ago, the entire course of world history would have been far different and far more conformable to American ideals and interests; and its crowning climax, the present European agony, would in all probability have been avoided. It is for us Americans to ponder over these facts and to ask ourselves whether we can claim entire dissociation from the slaughter on Europe's blood-stained fields. The world is so closely interrelated that no great state can selfishly decline to assume the obligations resulting from membership in the world-community without disastrous consequences not only to others but in the end to itself as well.

Great Britain is the centre of a vast political aggregate, misleadingly designated as an empire but rapidly developing into a genuine commonwealth of diverse nations and races.⁹ It covers approximately one-fifth of the world's area and includes somewhat more than one-quarter of mankind. Its foreign commerce is in volume even more than proportionately extensive. On account of these facts every political change throughout the entire world must necessarily in some way or other affect the British Empire. Its foreign policy during the past fifteen years has been completely dominated by the German menace. This has been the determining factor in recent international history and explains many apparently unconnected events in Africa, China, Persia, the Balkans, and Asiatic Turkey. The main object of British policy was security and all efforts were made to avert a European war into which the British Empire would inevitably be drawn. The plan adopted to prevent the impending German attack was to settle all outstanding disputes with other states and to create a diplomatic combination that would hold Germany back. At the same time, a conciliatory policy

⁹ See Philip H. Kerr's "Commonwealth and Empire" in *The Empire and the Future* (Macmillan, 1916).

was pursued toward Germany and extensive concessions were made to her.

After the Agadir crisis of 1911, which had brought Europe to the verge of war, England set seriously about the task of meeting Germany's demands for expansion. As the Belgian Minister in London at that time wrote: "Ce qui est certain est que le but que l'on a en vue est pacifique. On voudrait à tout prix diminuer la tension existante entre les deux pays. . . . L'Angleterre est disposée à ne plus contrecarrer l'Allemagne dans les questions secondaires, mais on ne doit pas lui disputer la suprématie sur mer."¹⁰ The negotiations were carried on in this spirit and shortly before the outbreak of the war there had been concluded agreements that gave Germany practically a free hand in the economic exploitation of Mesopotamia,¹¹ and removed British opposition to a rearrangement of the African map to meet Germany's ambitious requirements. Even so ardent an expansionist as Paul Rohrbach was jubilant and surprised over the outcome of these negotiations.¹²

In the course of this policy many important British interests were sacrificed and some political principles were jettisoned, but apparently the only other alternative was a world-war, and that was England's nightmare. This was of course patent to Germany but, in addition, Britain's friends and allies fully realized it and some did not hesitate to take advantage of the situation. In 1911, Russia unquestionably violated the spirit of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, whose intent was to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia in their then existing status, and she was able to do so with impunity because tension at that time between England and Russia would have been Germany's signal for bringing about a general European war. W. Morgan Shuster's brief and tumultuous career in Persia was exactly synchronous with the Agadir crisis in Europe. Similarly, the German peril tied England's hands when, prior to the present war, Russia and Japan were firmly establishing themselves in Mongolia and in Manchuria.¹³

¹⁰ Belgische Aktenstuecke, 1905-1914, p. 105.

¹¹ Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, June 29, 1914.

¹² Rohrbach, *Zum Weltvolk hindurch!*, pp. 47, 48; Rohrbach, Germany's Isolation, pp. 130, 131. See also "The Anglo-German Negotiations in 1914," in *The New Republic* of December 18, 1915.

¹³ J. O. P. Bland, "The Future of China," in the *Edinburgh Review* for October of 1914; J. F. Abbott, *Japanese Expansion and American Policies*, pp. 66-71.

The entire policy of England during the past decade was unquestionably what Professor Keutgen of Hamburg dubbed it: "Eine Politik der Schwaeche." Its very weakness, its almost openly avowed pacifism, convinced Germany that England was a negligible factor and in this way it conduced to bringing about the war whose fundamental purpose it was to avert. On the other hand, Sir Edward Grey's policy of a defensive coalition was based upon a fuller realization of the imminence and gravity of the German menace than obtained in most well informed quarters in England and it succeeded in keeping intact a diplomatic group of such strength as will in all likelihood be able to thwart the German plan of world domination.

During the course of these vicissitudes of the past decade, not a few things were done which were repugnant to the American conscience. But our government, pursuing its traditional course, was silent; and the vehement complaints of a few individual Americans totally ignored the question whether or no their country might have had some duty in the premises. In the complacency of our negative rectitude, we have never contemplated the undeniable fact that those who might have prevented these deeds in the Balkans, China, Persia, and elsewhere were wellnigh helpless so long as the United States adhered to its policy of self-regarding isolation. In addition, definite American interests were prejudiced. The policy of the open-door in China could not be maintained by England alone without breaking up the European defensive combination against Germany and the knowledge that we would under no circumstances use more than moral suasion rendered our advocacy of this policy ineffective. A reconstruction of what the past might have been had we been willing to assume obligations for the welfare of the world is not a futile pastime but a valuable object lesson for the present and for the future.

Today Europe is in the throes of an agonizing war, in which the future of civilization is at stake. All the fundamental questions arising from artificial boundary lines based upon political and military considerations and resulting in suppressed and exploited nationalities are in the crucible. In the days of Louis XIV and of Napoleon, the fundamental issue was whether or no Europe, primarily, was to be saved from the domination of one supreme military power. But the present struggle involves not only the freedom

of Europe, but in addition, that of the whole world, for the attempted hegemony of Europe was to serve as the basis for German mastery of the other continents. German ambitions avowedly looked to an extra-European goal. Furthermore, although it cannot be said that the war is one of autocracy upon democracy, for Russia is allied with the liberal Great Powers, yet the future of democracy is vitally involved in the outcome. For, in a world so unorganized politically that its peace is at the mercy of one Power, the crucial test of any form of social organization cannot be the more or less satisfactory character of its internal political life, but must perforce be its ability to defend itself and to survive in a struggle imposed by others. Were European democracy to fail in this crisis, its fate would be sealed and America would become the last bulwark of free government. For this fundamental reason, there is an almost literal truth in the statement that the Allies are fighting America's battles.

The American people has some vague perception that the most far-reaching issues are at stakes, but it has seemingly only the faintest realization of the extent to which the future of the United States is contingent upon the defeat of German ambitions. As a result Americans, although predominantly pro-Allies in sentiment, do not see that their own interests not only warrant but even demand participation in the struggle. Naturally, with the still undeveloped sense of responsibility for the welfare of the rest of the world, the cause of civilization in itself makes no compelling appeal. Hence the United States is overwhelmingly averse from being drawn into the war, and the official neutrality maintained by Washington is an accurate expression of the will of the great mass of the people. In the eyes of not a few there seems to be something dignified in this neutrality, as if the United States were placed in the position of a judge appraising the actions of the warring nations. Others pride themselves on some moral quality supposedly inherent in an attitude of neutrality. A little reflection would, however, demonstrate that there is no warrant whatsoever for such sentiments. Neutrality is essentially passive and is a right or privilege sanctioned by international usage, but it is in no sense a moral duty. Obviously, a great Power which, in a crisis that is determining the destiny of the world, and hence also its own future, deliberately remains passive and refrains from aiding what it considers to be the cause of civilization is by this inaction placed upon the moral defensive. Its neu-

trality, instead of being, as is generally assumed, *a priori* meritorious, requires justification if it is to escape condemnation. Whether this justification will commend itself to the judgment of the future is another matter. At all events, a daily increasing number of those Americans that can think independently have reached the conclusion that the rigidly negative neutrality of our government is doing violence to the best instincts of American idealism and is causing progressive demoralization.

What has been neglected in the past cannot be altered; nor can a nation trained for generations to look within change its self-centred attitude in a day. But the past and present may serve as warnings to make America's future part in the world a more useful and ennobling one. The war has directed the attention of thinking America to problems that formerly seemed almost academically remote. In some, the horrors of the war have produced such a revulsion that they are seeking what seems to them to be salvation in a Pan-Americanism which in their eyes means renewed and reinforced isolation in this hemisphere. They are ready to relinquish the Philippines, to abandon China to whatever fate the ambitions of others may allot to her and, under the spell of a somewhat fetichistic republicanism, they desire "to complete and round out the immunity from entangling foreign alliances proposed by Washington and Monroe, by asking our European friends to liberate all territory in any of the Americas now held by them."¹⁴ Canada, of course, is excepted. They wish to carry to its logical conclusion Secretary Olney's dictum that any permanent political union between a European and an American state is "unnatural and inexpedient," and to make real the Pan-American unity that John Quincy Adams and Clay planned and which Blaine energetically fostered. But the solidarity upon which this unity is premised is largely fictitious in its spiritual, cultural, political, economic, and even in its geographical elements. The cultural and economic ties between Europe and America are far stronger than those binding together the Americas.¹⁵ English-speaking, the so-called Anglo-Saxon, America and Latin America are not mere geographical terms

¹⁴ Charles H. Sherrill, *Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine*, p. 139. Cf. pp. 136, 137.

¹⁵ Cf. James Bryce, *South America*, chap. XIV; F. Garcia Caldeón, *Les Démocraties Latines de l'Amérique*, *passim*.

but express vital social facts. To ignore this is to court disaster. Hence many, while favoring Pan-Americanism as a step forward toward internationalism, deem it dangerous to the extent that it tends to ignore the interdependence of Europe and America. This interdependence has been conspicuously emphasized by the war. As a consequence, ever growing numbers of Americans have rejected the gospel of renewed isolation and of artificial seclusion in the western hemisphere, and have reached the conclusion that the policy of aloofness from European affairs is obsolete and that we must in the future assume our share of the burden of upholding the public right of the world. Various influential movements, such as the proposed "League to Enforce Peace" and the widespread demand for military and naval preparedness, indicate a radical change in our attitude toward foreign policy and a deeper insight into the dynamics of international relations. But while it is generally assumed that we are destined, whether we like it or not, to be drawn more and more into the international field, there has been little discussion of the part that we are to play. Shall we remain free from all entanglements, shall we merely promise diplomatic support in certain contingencies, or shall we enter into definite alliances? Furthermore, shall our future military preparations be merely sufficient to prevent a successful invasion of the United States, or shall they be adequate to protect our growing interests in foreign lands?

Naturally the decision on all these points will be vitally affected by the future course of the war and by the settlement that follows it. Whatever these may be, it seems certain that the present general alignment of the Powers will for some time after the close of the war be continued in the diplomatic and economic spheres and that, if the United States is to have an effective voice and its interests are to be adequately considered, we must join one or the other group. Isolated, the United States would be defenceless and without influence. It would be folly to overlook the fact that the part played by a neutral in a world-wide internecine war cannot arouse friendly feelings among any of the belligerents. The Central Empires are unquestionably incensed at the purchase by the Allies of supplies in America, and there is this to be said for their attitude that, already before the war, they had held that a non-combatant state could not become an extensive source of such supplies without violating its

neutrality.¹⁶ Furthermore, these Powers have protested against our not obliging the Allies to permit American raw materials and foodstuffs to reach them and their case is strengthened by the fact that we have to some extent accepted their view of the international law applicable in these instances. According to not irresponsible reports, that are inherently far from improbable, a bill of damages is being prepared in Germany which will make even the indirect Alabama claims as massed in Sumner's exuberant imagination appear insignificant. On the other hand, while the Entente Allies are grateful for sympathy and fully appreciate the personal services rendered by many Americans both in the field and in relief work, they realize how insignificant all this is in view of the importance to America of their ultimate victory. Nor do they feel under any obligation for our selling to them at enormously inflated prices arms and amunition, as well as raw materials, whose proceeds are not only enriching us but also bringing about a virtual economic revolution to their detriment. Furthermore, they resent that they have had somewhat to restrict the full pressure of their sea power out of deference to our rights as neutrals. In a conflict of this scope and intensity, the belligerents cannot, without doing violence to human nature, nourish kindly feelings toward the neutral who profits by their distress.

If the United States should be thus friendless and isolated after the war, the consequences would certainly be serious and might possibly be disastrous. Our foreign policy is preëminently devoted to two objects, the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and the maintenance of the open-door in China. Both have idealistic as well as economic phases. Our aim is to preserve South and Central America free from foreign domination so that the twenty republics located there may develop their characteristic institutions unhampered by outside dictation. The corollary to the Monroe Doctrine is Pan-Americanism, which is not a national policy of the United States but an American international movement to foster closer spiritual, political, and economic relations between all the

¹⁶ The German *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege* states this explicitly. See J. H. Morgan, *The German War Book*, p. 148. This contention was the basis of the Austro-Hungarian protest of June 29, 1915. Department of State, *European War* No. 2, p. 193. See also the German Memorandum of April 4, 1914. *Ibid.*, No. 1, pp. 73, 74.

Americas. Similarly, in China, our aim is not merely to preserve and widen a market for our goods, but to keep intact the political independence and administrative integrity of that backward country with its swarming millions.

The most disturbing feature about Germany's much advertised "place in the sun" was its apparently deliberate vagueness. It was nowhere and everywhere. Whenever in any quarter of the globe the political waters became troubled, Germany extemporized vital interests in whose protection she was ready to shake the mailed fist. The policy of Napoleon III in demanding compensation for France whenever Prussia added to its power, has been justly denounced by German historians as vicious, but the same policy has in turn been adopted by United Germany and has kept the world in a continuous ferment. German militarism and diplomacy have for two decades been the incubus of Europe. It is obvious that if ever a new Germany over the seas is to arise, the most likely, if not the only possible place is Brazil, in whose southern states there is already a considerable German nucleus around which to build such a daughter-nation. German economists and publicists have persistently painted this dream.¹⁸ Against its realization, however, stood as insuperable barrier, not alone the Monroe Doctrine, but in first line, the British fleet. The grave danger is that after the war, an unchastened and unbeaten, though not victorious, Germany may seek to retrieve its fortunes by annexing Southern Brazil. A well-known English historian, J. Holland Rose, has already spoken sympathetically of this plan¹⁹ and it may be that England, weary of the incessant wrangling and not averse from having German ambitions deflected from Africa and Asia, will no longer interpose her fleet as barrier. As Professor Usher has said, "the easiest concession for the Allies to make will be the control of Asia Minor by Germany and Austria and a free hand for both in South America, leaving Great Britain and France still supreme in Africa and Asia."²⁰ What Americans must bear in mind is

¹⁸ For some details of the voluminous literature on this subject, see: *German Ambitions* (New York, 1903); Ch. Andler, *Pan-Germanism*; F. Garcia Calderón, *Les Démocraties Latines de l'Amérique*, pp. 269-273.

¹⁹ J. H. Rose, *The Origins of the War*, p. 188. See also Moreton Frewen's "The Monroe Doctrine and the Great War" in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, of February, 1916.

²⁰ R. G. Usher, *The Challenge of the Future*, p. 231. See also pp. 314, 315.

that their country as a body politic has as yet done nothing during the war which entitles it to special consideration from the belligerents.

Such difficulties and others of a similar nature in the Far East confront us unless we emerge from our voluntary isolation and join hands with other nations. But more than mere general moral coöperation and more than mere active support in specific instances are necessary if in the future war is to be avoided and at the same time our interests and the independence of South America and of China are to be preserved. It is plain even to the most casual observer that Japan is at present attempting to gain a predominant economic and political position in China. The ultimate success of this attempt will depend primarily upon whether or no England after the war will be in such a position that in opposing Japan she can afford to run the risk of that country joining the Central Empires. In making her decision, our attitude in this special instance will count for little or nothing with England; the main consideration will be the general balance of the Powers in Europe. Our active support merely in one isolated case, with otherwise a general adherence to our policy of aloofness, would be no compensation for a possible defection of Japan to the Teutonic Powers. Whether or no China's fate is to be determined by the same circumstances as was Persia's rests mainly with us.

It is obvious that the only Powers with whom our political traditions and our material interests would permit active coöperation are the present Allies of the Quadruple Entente and among them England would naturally be the one to whom our common civilization would draw us most closely. An alliance of the United States with the British Empire on clearly defined terms, made in the open light of the day, would effectively secure the future peace of the world and its development along progressively democratic lines. Continuous coöperation is necessary, but a mere entente would not be sufficient, as has been proven by this war. For, had Germany been faced with the certainty of England entering the war, she would probably not have forced matters as she did. Similarly, the expression "British Empire" is used advisedly, as one of the results of the war bids fair to be such a reorganization of this vast commonwealth as will give the great self-governing dominions—of which New Zealand and Australia are the world's most ad-

vanced democracies²¹—an important part in the framing of foreign policy.

For such a defensive alliance, clearly defined as to its scope, there are firm spiritual and political foundations. Both branches of the politically separated, but culturally united, English-speaking race have essentially the same political institutions and ideals. In both an unfettered public opinion, basing its judgments upon the dictates of personal morality, as a rule obliges the government in its conduct of foreign affairs to conform to standards that are not generally recognized elsewhere. Without disparaging any other state, it may be confidently said that of all the Great Powers these are the only ones not infected with dreams of military glory or with ambitions of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of others. With them alone is peace the genuine goal of policy. As a result, the general foreign policy of the British Empire and that of the United States follow parallel lines. The fundamental aim of both states is security, but security does not mean merely safety from invasion. In these days of rapid communication and of ever closer economic interdependence of the world, security implies in addition the protection of a nation's interests in other countries.

For the United States, security both in the narrower and in the broader sense is obviously contingent, in the main, upon sea power. But this power is an economic fact that cannot be improvised. It may be most readily secured by an alliance with the British Empire whose control of the seas rests, in ultimate analysis, not upon a navy that any nation sufficiently rich might duplicate, but upon the fact that its mercantile marine is somewhat in excess of 43 per cent of the world's total tonnage.²² As a result of this fact alone, apart from the existing economic interdependence and the extensive common frontier, friendship and coöperation with the British Empire is imperative. When Canning suggested to Rush, our Minister at London, the policy that led to the formulation and enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, he said that he did not think that concert of action would be necessary, believing that the knowledge that Great Britain and the United States were of the same opinion would by its moral effect prevent European interference in South America.

²¹ Cf. Franz Oppenheimer, *The State* p. 19.

²² American Whitaker 1916, p. 74. For further details, see *ibid.*, pp. 215 ff; *Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich 1915*, pp. 50* ff; *Statesman's Year Book 1915*, pp. lv, 81 ff.

This belief was founded, Canning said, "upon the large share of the maritime power of the world which Great Britain and the United States shared between them, and the consequent influence which the knowledge of their common policy could not fail to produce on the rest of the world." When at this time, Monroe turned to Jefferson for advice, the aged statesman replied: "Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one or all on earth, and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world." The situation is essentially the same today.²³ The successful and peaceful maintenance of our policies toward Latin America and toward China depends largely upon British support.

"Man is a creature," said Robert Louis Stevenson, "who lives not upon bread alone, but principally by catchwords," and we as a nation have been markedly prone to believe in the efficacy of phrases. The strength of the Monroe Doctrine has from the very outset been derived from British sea power. Whether it will continue to do so depends largely upon our willingness to form an alliance with the British Empire. In so far as this doctrine is concerned, the general interests and political ideals of both countries coincide. There is no likelihood of friction provided we do not adopt the reactionary policy of using the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism to secure by treaty or otherwise special and exclusive privileges that would shut the door to British commerce.²⁴ If we frankly agreed to a self-denying ordinance to this effect and at the same time assumed responsibility²⁵—as apparently we are to do—for some measure of order and justice in the disturbed parts of Central and South America, England's extensive economic interests in those regions, created by centuries of enterprise, would be amply

²³ "While England as the mistress of the sea would be our most formidable adversary, she could also be our most useful friend and her friendship is of as much importance to us as is ours to her." *American Foreign Policy*. By a Diplomat (Boston, 1909), p. 49.

²⁴ Such a perversion of Pan-Americanism would probably have serious consequences. See Sir Harry Johnston, *Common Sense in Foreign Policy*, pp. 15, 16, 88 ff.

²⁵ In 1895, during the Venezuela difficulty, Salisbury denied that the United States was "entitled to affirm as a universal proposition with reference to a number of independent States, for whose conduct it assumes no responsibility, that its interests are necessarily concerned in whatever may befall those states simply because they are situated in the Western Hemisphere."

safeguarded. Under such conditions, the Monroe Doctrine would unquestionably secure the British Empire's full support.

Nor is there any conflict between an Anglo-American alliance and Pan-Americanism. When, some ninety years ago, this vision first took hold of men, one of its ardent advocates, the great liberator, Bolivar, believed that England should take a prominent part in any union of the American nations.²⁶ And today a Pan-Americanism that excludes the British Empire—an American power of rank second only to the United States—is unwisely narrow. Similarly, in China, there are no prospective points of friction. Apart from the disinterested desire of both peoples to see the hitherto stationary civilization of that backward country conform to progressive standards, British and American interests are limited to seeing that their commerce is not discriminated against by tariffs and railway rates that give an unfair advantage to their competitors.

But aside both from the general obligation of every state to see that justice and order obtain in the world and also from the demands of national self-interest, there is one additional most potent argument for an Anglo-American alliance. Hitherto, not as a result of any virtues innate in them, but rather by the fortunate accident of position, the English-speaking peoples have been able to escape the burdens and dangers of large military establishments. Apparently if they do not coöperate in protective measures, neither will be thus fortunate in the future. The tendency of every human instrument is to seek occasion to demonstrate its effectiveness and the existence of a powerful army leads insensibly to an aggressive attitude toward other states. It also inclines toward the establishment of a military caste that is not subject to the civil law. Furthermore, it frequently results in the subordination of policy to military considerations and to the control of the body politic by the military authorities. These evils of militarism are most clearly exemplified in modern Germany. The notorious Zabern affair²⁷ was an inevitable manifestation of a system that gives the Reichstag virtually no control over the army.²⁸ In 1906, Colonel von Deimling frankly told the Reichstag that its decision counted for

²⁶ Bolivar's Code of Pan-Americanism, in *New York Times Magazine* of March 26, 1916.

²⁷ W. H. Dawson, *What is Wrong with Germany?* pp. 124-130.

²⁸ Hans Delbrueck, *Regierung und Volkswille*, p. 136.

naught and that he would never withdraw a single soldier from South Africa, "unless my Emperor issues a command to that effect."²⁹ Equally significant is the fact that the German Foreign Office, had it been so inclined, was powerless to prevent the invasion of Belgium after it had become apparent that such action would bring England into the war. On August 5, 1914, the German Under-Secretary of State informed the Belgian Minister at Berlin that "le Département des Affaires Etrangères était impuissant. Depuis que l'ordre de mobilisation avait été lancé par l'Empereur, tous les pouvoirs appartiennent à l'autorité militaire. C'était elle qui avait jugé que l'invasion de la Belgique était une opération de guerre indispensable."³⁰

Militarism is of course not synonymous with preparedness, but the menace of the former is inherent in the latter. Already we are told that civilians should unquestioningly and uncritically accept the decisions of the General Staff as to the requisite size of our army. The great advantage of an Anglo-American alliance is that its main reliance would be an invincible sea power. Except to a very minor degree, none of the insidious dangers of militarism are to be feared from a strong navy. Even in the most powerful navies, comparatively few men are required. The British Navy, abnormally enlarged as it was already before the war by the German peril, included then only 150,000 men. Hence its political influence must be relatively negligible. Moreover, a fleet is essentially a defensive weapon. Sea power can prevent an opponent from being victorious and is thus frequently the decisive factor in hostilities, but in an offensive war it is merely the adjunct of the army. "Navalism" and "Marinism" are misleading—and incidentally barbarous—expressions that have been invented since the war to divert attention from something radically different—German militarism.

It is almost axiomatic that the military and naval forces of any nation should be commensurate not only with its policies but also with its alliances and less formal understandings with other states. It is evident that if the United States remains in isolation and free from what are popularly known as foreign entanglements, the extent of its military preparedness must be far greater than if it were allied

²⁹ Evans Lewin, *The Germans and Africa*, p. 123.

³⁰ *Royaume de Belgique, Correspondence Diplomatique 1914-1915, II*, p. 45. See also Baron Beyens, *L'Allemagne avant la Guerre*, p. 112.

with the British Empire. England is in a similar position. In any eventuality, the old days of comparatively light burdens will probably not return for some time. But the weight of the future load will largely depend upon whether such an alliance is made. Only in this way can security be safeguarded with armaments of such an extent as not to endanger the political institutions typical of English-speaking peoples. With the aid of comparatively small armies recruited from a manhood extensively trained to arms, their joint navies should be fully able not only to protect them but to secure the general peace of the world. Local wars may still occur in Europe (and elsewhere as well) but as in the case of the existing conflict, so in all probability also in all future international difficulties tending toward world-wars, the fundamental causes will lie in extra-European conditions. Before the war, the French of Alsace-Lorraine, the Danes of Schleswig, and the Poles of the eastern provinces had taught Germany the futility of annexing unwilling European peoples. The course of military events may forcibly close Germany's eyes to this lesson and, by proving how impossible is her dream of world-empire, may divert her restless energies toward the East and Southeast of Europe. If so, the old lesson will probably have to be learned anew.

An effective alliance between the British Empire and the United States would mean the harmonious coöperation of one-third of the population of the globe, of whom about 155 millions are Caucasians of the most progressive and democratic type. When, about a year ago at Oxford, Lord Milner advocated such an alliance before an American audience, one of his auditors is reported to have objected that it would be unfair to the other nations. Unquestionably in the case of aggressive peoples, such a combination might be a menace. The argument, however, would have been more cogent before the events of the past twenty months. In view of the military developments during this interval, it is quixotically absurd. Until some system of world-organization is established, the English-speaking peoples must place main reliance upon their united strength to withstand the dangers to which their common civilization is still exposed.

Such an alliance made merely for defensive purposes and seeking to secure peace, order, and justice throughout the world would facilitate the formation of some organization for the still inchoate

world-community. It would naturally attract to itself the nations of like mind and could be made the foundation-stone for that federation of all the world of which statesmen, philosophers, and poets have dreamt. But before such an event can even come within the range of practical politics, the prevailing concept of unlimited state sovereignty must be greatly modified. Though the individual's complete liberty of action is theoretically restricted by his membership in the state, it is only by means of it that he can find the true freedom essential to his fullest development. Similarly, the state is part of a real but still unorganized world-community and it cannot without devitalizing its life seek to evade the responsibilities resulting from this fact.³¹ Ultimately, it is hoped, Mazzini's dream will come true and the self-regarding nationalism of the present day will be replaced by a world-system of which each unit shall be dedicated to the mutual service of mankind as a whole.³² The initial step toward this goal cannot, however, be said to have been taken until Great Powers like the United States are ready to emerge from their self-regarding isolation and to contract binding and durable ties with those of like mind for the maintenance of the public right of the world.

³¹ "Present facts, then, demand the recognition of continuous and normal interdependence of States. The nature of the State is to be understood, at least in part, from its relations with other States: and all philosophies which even imply that the State is isolated are out of date. Indeed, one may say that the modern State *must* be understood by this external reference. In the same sense the individual cannot be understood in isolation, but only by continual reference to society or to his relations with other individuals." C. Delisle Burns, *The Morality of Nations*, p. 50. See also p. 158.

³² Although no writer of modern times has done more to glorify the nation, Mazzini did not regard it as the final unity. In his eyes "a nation is guilty of 'the grand refusal' if it do not stand forward and take its place, to the limit of its power, in international politics. In this, and nothing short of this, lies for him the final justification of national existence. . . . Hence his exhortations to the United States (in 1854) to play its part in world politics." J. Maccunn, *Six Radical Thinkers*, pp. 208, 209.

AMERICA'S NEED FOR AN ENFORCED PEACE

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The program of the United States must be decided by the experience of the past generations and the prospect of the future. The world, large and small countries together, has become predatory. From the discovery of America, 1492, to the Congress of Berlin, 1878, the lands of Europe had acquired and held 14,000,000 square miles of colonial territory. From 1878 to 1914, these countries had added 13,000,000 square miles of colonies. Add "spheres of influence" and the colonial area acquired from the Congress of Berlin to the ravage and rapine of Belgium had equalled the area acquired of in four centuries from Columbus to Bismarck.

The European world has not only become predatory in the last generation, it has all there is to be had except three areas. The first of these is the Moslem area from Morocco across the south coast of the Mediterranean, the Balkans, Turkey, Arabia and Persia to Afghanistan and Beluchistan.

The present war is, in large measure, being fought to decide the final fate of this area, much of which has already been staked out, Morocco, Algeria and Tunis to France, Tripoli to Italy, Egypt to England, Persia divided between Russia and England; but any and all these territories may be shifted when the conflict is won. China is the second area which is within the ambition and calculation of the lands engaged in this war from Germany to Japan, with all that falls between. The third area whose possible acquisition the colonial and predatory publications and newspapers of Europe discuss is Latin America from the Rio Grande south to Cape Horn.

Of these three areas, the Moslem tract from Cape Spartel to the highlands that look down on the valley of the Indus, has been preserved by the jealousies of predatory Europe. Whichever party to the present conflict wins will divide the region. But for the United States, and the differences between European countries, China would have been divided in 1900. But for the United States, and the United States alone, Latin America would have been con-

quered as easily as was Mexico half a century ago. Until the United States intervened, Maximilian seemed secure in his Mexican Empire.

This predatory appetite which has doubled European colonies in the last 38 years will neither change nor be satisfied with current colonial possessions. The same forces which have rolled resistless over 13,000,000 to 14,000,000 square miles in the past generation, will dispose of 12,000,000 square miles, now left, whose populations are unable to defend the lands in which they live, exactly as, since 1878, a like area has been annexed. Of the 12,000,000 square miles still open, two-thirds, 8,000,000 square miles, stretch from Patagonia to Mexico. Two years ago, two short years ago, people would have argued that treaties, civilization and Christianity would protect these weaker lands. No one will urge this today. The vast movement of troops across the seas, world-wide campaigns have shown that all the earth is open to the armies of Europe.

The United States has protected Latin America for 95 years, and the centennial of the Monroe Doctrine will find it needing defence more than in 1821. The United States itself will be left more accessible to invasion than in all its history. If troops can be carried from Vladivostock to Marseilles, what a trifle to carry an army across the Atlantic.

But the United States should not arm for itself alone. If it does, its purpose must be selfish and may be, probably will be, futile. The peace of the world is the lofty end for which the United States should arm. Through a League to Enforce Peace, with an American army and navy sufficient to make such a league overpowering, the United States should have as its program in international relations not its own narrow safety but the security of humanity. Secure this and all is secure.

In July, 1914, war and peace quivered in the trembling balances of fate. Had the United States and all nations now neutral been ready to demand that Serbia be given the investigation and arbitration this little land demanded, the Austrian troops would not, in all probability, have crossed the Danube. Had the powers today neutral been so organized as a league that they could unite in demanding that a neutralized state, like Belgium, must not be attacked, German troops would have hesitated at the Belgian frontiers, and this hesitation would have given peace more friends than had war in each and all the lands now at strife. The Monroe Doctrine is noth-

itng but neutralization against Europe. As a military proposition, would be cheaper and safer for the United States to underwrite the risks of the world against war, than to insure all the risks of two continents, as for a century past, and infinitely nobler. Mere national safety, while all the world is ablaze, is ignoble. The only program in international relations which is worthy of the United States is the peace of the world, through a League to Enforce Peace such as is urged by a growing organization in this country and has support and advocacy in every belligerent and neutral country.

THE ECONOMIC CONFERENCES OF PARIS AND THE UNITED STATES

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The world war was started by the German Empire through the conquest of Belgium in violation of treaty rights guaranteed by the conqueror itself. The subsequent invasion of France checked at the battle of La Marne is more than a war, even if of conquest; and should be viewed with regards to its far-reaching importance as one of those millennarian upheavals by which humanity gradually rises to better organization and civilization. It points to the final passage from the low-middle-ages conception of force as morally superior to human rights and liberties—of which, whether in diplomacy or on the battlefield, the teuton race guided by Prussian imperialism to conquest, is today the open champion. But the passing of this conception cannot take place until the allied nations of Europe shall have completed the absolute destruction of German imperialism.

The struggle may, however, prove a long one before the certain victory of civilization, of right over might, for the teuton race represents in the present European conflagration a mechanic brute force of great power and efficiency, mainly in destruction. Since the teuton race is bent on assuring to themselves the supremacy of Europe and of the world "the establishment of power," according to the characteristic phrase of Von Moltke—German power—over democracy, no truce, no peace of any duration could, in our estimation, be possible today; nor until the final victory of the allies over the armies of the central powers. Then only will the spirit of civilization rule supreme in international laws and treaties over the spirit of conquest. Thus it is that, while military operations had been going on since 1914 from the north of Scotland to the Dardanelles and beyond, a parallel movement of vast economic international significance was arising among the allied nations, in completion of the Pact of London, with a view to check German penetration after the war and to regulate their national interests in

their relation with the neutrals. Under such premises it would seem to us the work of timely wisdom for the neutral nations of Europe and of America to concur in the solution of the economic problem of the future in the proper spirit of coöperation. And the sooner the wiser, for the aforesaid movement will eventually reach all national activities such as trade, commerce, industries, finance, transportation, emigration and navigation. Moreover, the commercial and international treaties of the future will be subject to this economic league of the allied nations (the United States of Europe), on the structure of which will obviously depend the whole intercourse between the United States of America and Europe in their dual capacity of producer and consumer. When the time will come for such new treaties Europe will eventually find itself divided into two groupings separated by an impassable gulf of conflicting interests and aims: the Central power group of about 150 million and the group of the Allied Nations with about 350 million including Russia and Japan. The logical consequence is that after the war, in the economic fields, the neutrals will have to face a totally new situation; that which will be prepared in the course of the Conferences of the Allied Nations (Italy, 1915, France, 1916, Rome, October 1916, and London, February 1917) under the following program subscribed to last month in Paris by seven nations and their colonies, *viz*: France, England, Russia, Italy, Japan, Belgium and Servia.

ECONOMIC PROGRAM OF THE ALLIES

CONFERENCE OF PARIS—APRIL 30, 1916

1. An understanding concerning all legislation intended to regulate commercial relations among the belligerents, such as the execution of contracts, the recovery of credits, sequestration of goods and the subject of patents.
2. Precautionary measures to be taken against invasion of allied countries by German products after the passage from the state of war to the state of peace.
3. Reparation of war damages.
4. Reduction of postal telegraphic and telephone rates among the allied countries.
5. Agreements relative to the international transport of goods.
6. Creation of an international patent office.

7. The commercial régime of the colonies of the allied countries.
8. Internationalization of laws concerning stock companies.
9. Measures intended to reduce metallic circulation through an international chamber of compensation and postal check system.
10. Uniform principles to be inscribed in the laws relative to false designation of merchandise.
11. Failures.
12. Legislation regarding the loss and theft of bonds payable to bearer.

Besides military preparedness, which in my estimation should proceed with the utmost speed throughout the country for the eventual affirmation of right as superior to might, preparedness for the defense of American interests seems to us the most effective to all intents and purposes; economic preparedness with a view to meeting the new situation to be offered by Europe after this war, as herein briefly indicated. And the best move towards that aim would undoubtedly be that of joining the Allied Nations of Europe in their Conferences, before economic lines are drawn between themselves and for themselves as a league with regard to other nations. The accession of the United States to the Allies Conferences is much desired. Expressions to that effect have recently been made in London and repeated in France and Italy. In the event that the government of Washington, owing to neutrality, should not seek admission, it is our conviction that nothing could prevent American Chambers of Commerce, Boards of Trade and other American business institutions from participating in the general discussions of the Allies with great benefit both to themselves and to the United States. This is particularly true because, until other merchant navies will have come into existence, the carrying power of the world will remain with the Allied Nations of Europe.

ISOLATION OR COÖPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS?

BY SAMUEL McCUNE LINDSAY,

Professor of Social Legislation, Columbia University.

A large and articulate section of American public opinion today seems to have learned nothing from the startling events of the present great international conflict, nothing from our experiences in the Spanish-American war, nothing from our success in transplanting the principles of democracy and civil liberty in the Philippines, Porto Rico and Cuba, nothing from the changed conditions of foreign trade, and is wholly unconscious and unmoved by the world forces that are making for internationalism in trade, culture, law and religion. If this is the real voice of America, or is to become such, there is very little use to talk about any program in international relations because we could hardly expect to participate in the making of a program which we consider remote to our interests and for which we assumed no responsibilities. Such an attitude unfortunately seems to have the sanction of good tradition and unhappily it harmonizes all too well with the selfish indulgences, the slothful intellectual perceptions and the benumbed moral senses of those elements of our population that have the largest share of the easily acquired and often illy-gotten gains of a period of great material prosperity. That such persons are living in a fool's paradise without security of tenure and with no guarantee of rights which others are bound to respect seems to make little difference.

When this nation was in its infancy with only a little over three millions of people occupying an undeveloped continent in very great physical isolation from the rest of the world by reason of the then existing means of communication, the great American patriot, Washington, solemnly advised against entangling European alliances and wisely regarded the business in hand of developing our own resources and building a nation as of such overwhelming importance to us that the dynastic quarrels and the political conflicts of the old world might well be considered no concern of ours. That advice, good as it was at the close of the eighteenth century, has become a

tradition, and, with but slight modification through the development of the Monroe doctrine which would seem to have brought at least the other countries of the two American continents within the scope of our legitimate international interests, it is now considered by some as a sanction for an American policy of isolation in world affairs at the beginning of the twentieth century.

However, we have not yet begun to think about international duties and responsibilities in a way that gives us any basis for an international policy. We have played too often the part of an irresponsible bully in our dealings with other nations and when they have tried to ascertain what we really seek to accomplish our only indication of a policy has been that we want to be let alone. The only reason we have not been treated as a bully deserves to be has probably been because the stronger nations of Europe have been too fully engrossed in watching each other to spare the time and effort to bring us to account. The isolation which we are supposed to stand for has become too artificial under conditions of modern communication and intercourse to be tenable even if it were justified by the most literal application of the traditional doctrines of Washington. It is high time that we reëxamine the premises on which Washington based his doctrine and apply the high patriotic spirit and insight of Washington to the complex situations in world affairs of today.

What we need in America just now, more than anything else, is a rebirth of patriotism, of love of our institutions, of devotion to individual liberty and the principles of democracy and of a desire to make these things live forever in the world and a determination to fight for their preservation in whatever quarter of the globe their permanency for us and for our children is assailed. We need a rebirth of just the kind of patriotism that Washington and those who had with him shared the sacrifice and the cost knew how to appreciate at its true value.

We are not yet a nation in much more than the outward appearances of nationality and some of the material resources for concerted action. We are still altogether too much a mere aggregation of discordant elements of various nationalities but with the richest possibilities of amalgamation which, once America responds to the call of nationality and comes to feel strongly for concerted action, may in a remarkably short time make her the dominant

exponent of democracy in the affairs of the whole world. This will not be the case, however, until we face about squarely in the matter of seeking a selfish isolation from the troubles of the old world and find in our own sense of growing power a willingness to serve the cause of humanity and to make the struggles of democracy akin throughout the world.

This does not mean that we are to flatter ourselves that we are entitled to assert any superiority of achievement in the working out of democracy in our own land or that we seek to impose on the world any obligation to conform to our institutions. We certainly have enough yet to do and territory enough of our own to conquer to make us humble and truly void of envy of the lands or the problems of other nations but we have had peculiarly favorable conditions for national growth and the results have abundantly justified our faith in the seeds of democracy and civil liberty that have been sown on our soil. We are expanding in our commerce and producing more than we need of an increasing variety of goods which meet human needs while at the same time our expanding culture is creating an increasing demand for products from the remote parts of the world which we can acquire only by trade and exchange of products. All of this is bound up intimately with our democracy and my sole contention in this connection is that we cannot develop the sort of civilization that these economic changes, partly of our own creation and partly due to world changes which we would be powerless to alter if we would, impose upon us if we imagine that it is possible or to our interest to try to build a Chinese wall around America and protect it from invasion from without or revolution from within. What is even more important, the sort of intercourse with the rest of the world which will promote our own development most will be that with democracies—industrial democracies—like our own, and hence we should lend every possible aid to the growth of industrial democracy, in every quarter and in every form it presents itself, in a spirit of international coöperation in the common tasks of democracy. This means an eventual program of peace, of course, because only under organized coöperation of the highest order in which conflicting interests are harmonized can democracy succeed, but it may mean a program of war in which democracies must prove their ability to defend their rights against exploiters and the champions of special privilege before a sufficiently large area of international

coöperation can be created to allow of the continuous peaceful growth of democracies. We shall need here in America to make common cause with the real democratic elements in European nations so as to assist those elements to become dominant in the public policies of their respective nations and to shape international relations in harmony with the conditions of growth in democracies. Those conditions involve increasingly, factors which are international in character and are already beyond the power of any one nation to control. International coöperation seems, therefore, essential to freedom of trade and intercourse on which our American democracy will increasingly depend for its very existence and the conditions which a century and a quarter ago may have justified a policy of isolation have so completely changed that they no longer play an important part in our national life. The very same reasoning that led us to that conclusion then will now dictate, on the premises of the world conditions of today, a policy of international coöperation and a new sense of international responsibility which America must assume in order to be true to her traditions and to preserve her institutions. We shall not concern ourselves any more now than heretofore with old world dynastic quarrels and European politics based on the intrigues and diplomacy of the past but we shall have to do our part to shape the new world-politics and bear our share of the burden of enlarging the scope of genuine democracy which requires ever an enlarging area in which to develop, if it is to endure and serve the needs of mankind.

GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

BY DR. M. J. BONN,

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The Monroe Doctrine can be approached from a purely theoretical point of view: the question can be asked whether it has any legal force; whether it is binding on other countries; whether it is right and justifiable that a sovereign country like the United States is acting as the guardian of other sovereign countries without any request from them. German lawyers and political philosophers have been greatly interested in these questions. I have to acknowledge openly, that such is not the case with me. I look upon the Monroe Doctrine as a policy proclaimed and acted upon by the United States in their own interest, and I am discussing that policy as a policy and not as a treaty. From that point of view the question I have to answer is very simple. Is Germany willing to respect the policy of the Monroe Doctrine? Or she is going to try and effect a permanent settlement in South America?

There are a great many people who believe in the existence of German plans of colonization in South America. Germany, they explain, is very densely populated. Her African colonies, even if she were to retain them after the war, cannot be settled by white people; but South America is a country where a superabundant white population from Germany might be settled.

Such ideas might have had some weight thirty years ago, when there was a big German emigration. Though the population of Germany has increased by nearly thirty millions, emigration has come to a standstill; there is even a yearly immigration of seasonal laborers of nearly three quarters of a million. For the purpose of settling a superabundant population, Germany does not want South America today, for she has no such population to settle. There will be no such emigration in the future, as long as German trade and German industries go on. If that trade was ever stopped permanently, even the excellent social organization of the German people could not prevent emigration. There is a movement abroad to bring about at the conclusion of the war a permanent commercial

isolation of Germany; if that could be done, Germany would be in a very bad position. There would be permanent unrest in Europe and probably a very great emigration from Germany. It would scarcely settle in South America, but rather direct its course towards the United States. People in the United States, who are afraid of an increased German immigration, have a great interest in the continuation of German commercial activities after the war.

As far as the social and economic problems of Germany are concerned, they do not impel her towards an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine. They drove her to do business with South America, but that business was done on competitive lines, not based on monopoly, and she could go on doing that business peacefully, for the existence of the Monroe Doctrine prevented a scramble for South America, and maintained the principle of the open door.

It has often been said that in times passed the chief defense of the Monroe Doctrine has been the British Fleet. A permanent settlement in South America in opposition to England's wishes, would have been impossible to any nation. But England had really no reason to object to a permanent German settlement in South America. In fact, she would have liked it. It would not have taken anything away from her that she owned, nor that she was ever likely to get. It would have embroiled Germany with the United States and saddled her permanently with a problem, which would have kept her busy for many years. There were many hints in the British Press during the last fifteen years, that Germany might confer a benefit upon mankind, if she took up the control and the permanent reform of some South American country. England's goodwill could have easily been bought. It is different, of course, with the United States. Their friendship has been valued by the German government and the German people in times past; their desires have been respected. For after all that is the true meaning of the Venezuela incident as described so often lately. Germany declared explicitly that she did not want any permanent acquisition of Venezuelan soil. She considered it possible that during the blockade a temporary landing might be necessary. The United States, it seems, were afraid of a temporary landing being transformed into a permanent occupation. Whether the suspicion was justified or not, they resorted to what might be considered a threat. Germany gave in; she did not give in because she was afraid. Her

policy is not carried out in such a haphazard way as to omit an ample measure of preparedness, if she had meant to effect a permanent occupation; she gave in because she valued the friendship of the United States higher than the possible advantage of bringing President Castro to terms quickly.

The chief protection for the Monroe Doctrine and its real permanent guarantee is the nature of the South American problem.

If South America was an uninhabited country, it might be easy to start a settlement, which in due time would develop into a daughter state. As British colonization has shown in Australia, no great strain on military or financial resources would follow. If South America was inhabited exclusively by lowly native races, occupation and conquest would be easy. Three thousand white Germans ruled thirteen million natives scattered over one million square miles in Africa. But South America is settled by people of Latin origin, there is no large German element amongst them. Of four and one-half million immigrants arriving in the Argentine Republic, two and one-quarter million were Italians; only sixty thousand were Germans. Of the total immigrants to Brazil 3.4 per cent were German. South America has been a Latin-Indian country in the past; it is becoming more Latin every day. Even if there were no native born South Americans, German immigrants could not come in great numbers as they could not compete with the standards of living of the Portuguese, Spaniards and Italians. Any South American country would have to be conquered against the will of her inhabitants, many of whom are of European stock. It would have to be taken by force of arms. It would have to be held in the same way. A large army would have to be quartered permanently to subdue the natives, and the security of this army would depend upon the unhampered control of the sea. Its safety, so to speak, would be at the mercy of any sea power. It would be a task ever increasing in size, for the natives of the newly acquired South American colony would be of the same origin as their free neighbors. These would back revolution and rebellion and bring about a permanent fight, which could only be settled by the conquest of the whole sub-continent, or by the ejection of the would-be conquerors. England's experiences in South Africa have shown Germany the difficulty of such conquest. Though she had two

friendly colonies, Cape Colony and Natal, which she could use as bases, England needed an army of three hundred thousand men to defeat a few thousand Boers. And England's experiences in Ireland have shown Germany the difficulties of holding subject a race of European stock. Ireland is only two and three quarters of an hour from England today; she has been colonized three times by English settlers; her inhabitants are few in number, and she has always been a source of weakness to her conqueror. To try to rule permanently many millions of alien races many thousand miles away, would be a task no sane German statesman would care to undertake. For Germany is a country surrounded by mighty nations; she has a national army organized for home defense; she cannot send them away as England did her professional soldiers to occupy permanently faroff continents.

The difficulty of achieving a permanent settlement in South America, which would benefit and not burden Germany, is the real reason why South America need not be afraid of Germany. And the existence of the Monroe Doctrine, which would prevent other nations from trying to play a game which Germany is too wise to indulge in, obviates any scramble for South America. Germany went into China because she was sure a partition of China was imminent. As long as the Monroe Doctrine continues, she need not be afraid of such a settlement in South America.

As time goes on the states of South America are getting stronger and sounder. Their governments will become more and more reliable, and the sources of friction of the past will diminish in number. And with them will disappear any incitement which in days gone by might have made a permanent acquisition of South American territory appear easy and profitable to people who did not take the trouble to face the real difficulties of occupation or colonization.

WHAT PROGRAM SHALL THE UNITED STATES STAND
FOR IN HER RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND
CHINA—THE PROBLEM AND A PRACTICAL
SOLUTION

BY SIDNEY L. GULICK, D.D.,
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The international relations of the United States fall naturally into three principal groups: those, namely, of our relations with Europe, with Latin America, and with the Far East, and constitute three distinct problems. The right solution of each of these problems is of the highest importance to the welfare, not only of the United States, but to the other countries also. I confine my discussion to the third group, and shall consider only the question of our relations with Japan and China.

The great world-problem of the twentieth century is undoubtedly the problem of the contact of the East and the West. Whether it shall bring weal or woe depends largely on the United States. Shall our Oriental policy be based on national selfishness with race pride, arrogance and disdain? Shall it be devoid of sympathy? And shall we rely on military might for carrying it through? Or shall we above all things seek to give justice, courtesy and a square deal? Considering only our own interests and stampeded by ill-founded suspicion and falsehood, shall we set up our Oriental policy in complete disregard of their problems, needs and feelings? Or shall we remove dangers of conflict by a policy of friendly consideration and genuine helpfulness? Shall we observe both the spirit and the letter of our treaty obligations, or shall we continue to disregard both the spirit and the letter, holding as obligatory and sacred only such clauses as conform to our selfish interests?

To these questions America must give answer in practical shape in the course of the coming decade. If matters are allowed to drift and the natural impulses of the natural man control our national policies, the nature of our answers can be readily foretold. Only the nation-wide study of this new world-problem by millions of our citizens can develop such knowledge and conviction on these matters that right relations with Asia may finally be established.

Let me present with utmost brevity a sketch of the problem and of the method for its solution.

A New Asia

Mankind has entered on a new era. Races and civilizations for ages separated and self-sufficient are now face to face; their interests are rapidly commingling. New relations are being established between the East and the West, between the masterful white nations and the hitherto peaceful and submissive peoples of Asia. All great races whether of the East or of the West are proud, ambitious, determined. These qualities are part cause of their greatness.

Old and New Japan

When Japan first came in contact with the white man, 1550-1600, she welcomed him. She gave him full opportunity. About a million Japanese, it is believed, became Christian. Then when Japan learned of the white man's aggressions and ambitions for world conquest, she concluded that the white man meant a White Peril, to avoid which she turned him out, exterminated Christianity and for 250 years carried out her policy of exclusion most completely.

In 1853 Japan woke to discover how belated and helpless she was, due to her exclusion policy. She wavered for a decade, suffered revolution due to different conceptions as to the right policy to take in dealing with the white man and finally late in the sixties adopted her new policy,—that of learning the secrets of the white man's power, in order to maintain national existence and honor on a basis of equality with the white man. This has been Japan's controlling ambition for fifty years. Her success, her war with Russia proclaimed. Japanese cannon at Mukden were heard around the world proclaiming to the white man the end of his undisputed supremacy, and to the races of Asia the way in which to meet the White Peril. All Asia awoke to hope and effort.

Japan is Misunderstood

There is, however, wide misunderstanding as to what Japan asks. She does not ask for free immigration for her laborers. She recognizes that any large entrance of Japanese into California

would produce both economic and racial difficulty. She is ready to do whatever may be needful consistent with national honor and dignity to save America from embarrassment on both lines, as her faithful administration of the "Gentlemen's Agreement" witnesses and her recent adjustment of the laws dealing with expatriation. She is willing to continue holding back all Japanese laborers from coming to this country.

What Japan Earnestly Pleads For

What Japan does ask and asks earnestly is that there shall be no invidious and humiliating race legislation which shall involve her fair name. Japan stands for national honor in international relations. For this she has been strenuously striving for half a century. Is the maintenance of friendship possible between two nations when one insists on humiliating the other?

Old China

For ages China was so vast, preponderant, self-sufficient and self-satisfied that she simply ignored the white man when he appeared on her horizon. Even the wars by which England forced opium upon her did not apparently disturb her much.

But when port after port was taken by foreign powers; when Germany took Kiao Chao for the killing of two missionaries; and when Russia took Port Arthur after it had been forced back from Japan; when England took Wei-hei-wei and France Kwan-chau-wan; and when foreigners were gaining mining rights and railroad concessions throughout China, Chinese began to realize that something must be done, or they would soon cease to exist as a self-governing people.

China's first reaction was like Japan's, namely, demand for a policy of exclusion. That brought on the Boxer uprising (1900). It was, however, too late. The armies of the Allies relieved Peking and proved to China that the white man and Western civilization could neither be excluded nor ignored. They imposed upon her as penalty an indemnity, far in excess of expenses, amounting to \$687,566,705.

China Learns from Japan

After a few years of vacillation, confusion, turmoil and revolution, came Japan's victory over Russia (1905), which announced to the world that an Asiatic race can hold its own against the white

man and that the way by which to do it is to learn all that the white race knows. China listened and learned.

One month after Japan made peace with Russia, China abolished her system of classical education, over two thousand years old, and started on the new policy. Since then China has been introducing western education, western science, western political life at a tremendous rate. The Manchu dynasty is gone. The characteristic Chinese queue is gone from large sections of the country. We now have a new China, ambitious, energetic, resourceful, progressive and becoming self-conscious. Her young men by the hundred thousand are learning western ways. As a short cut to western knowledge tens of thousands of Chinese students have been in Japan.

Some decades will doubtless be needed before China will reach the stage of political stability and occidentalization already reached by Japan. But she will get there as surely as time moves onward. And when that time comes her demand for "most favored nation treatment" will be loud and insistent.

Asia's Appeal to America

Both China and Japan are facing mighty problems. The early solution of those problems concerns, not themselves alone, but all the world. Our fate is in truth involved in theirs. The urgency accordingly of their appeal should command our earnest and sympathetic attention and secure our action. Our own national welfare through the long future, no less than our national character, are intimately involved in our response to that appeal. China's appeal for justice and friendly treatment was made decades ago, but has been completely ignored by the statesmen and Christians of America. Japan's appeal is more recent. Will America heed it any better?

The story of our dealings with China is, as a whole, one of which we need not be ashamed. We have not seized her territory, bombarded her ports, extracted indemnities or pillaged her capitals as have other nations. On the contrary, we have helped preserve her from "partition" at a grave crisis in her relations with western lands. We returned a considerable part of the Boxer indemnity that came to us. We have stood for the open door and a square deal. Our consular courts have been models of probity

and justice. The work of our missionaries in hospitals, education, and in famine and flood relief has been highly appreciated.

In consequence of such factors the Chinese as a nation hold today a highly gratifying attitude of friendship toward us.

America's Treatment of Asiatics

When we turn, however, to the story of what many Chinese have suffered here, our cheeks tingle with shame. The story would be incredible were it not overwhelmingly verified by ample documentary evidence. Treaties have pledged rights, immunities and protection. They have, nevertheless, been disregarded and even knowingly invaded; and this not only by private individuals, but by legislators, and administrative officials. Scores of Chinese have been murdered, hundreds wounded and thousands robbed by anti-Asiatic mobs, with no protection for the victims or punishment for the culprits. State legislatures, and even Congress, have enacted laws in contravention of treaty provisions. Men appointed to federal executive offices have at times administered those laws and regulations in highly offensive methods.

The Scott Law of 1888 and the Geary Law of 1892 are still in force, though the essential injustice of some of their provisions and their disregard of Chinese treaty rights have long been recognized. They are producing constant anti-American feeling among Chinese legitimately in America.

With regard to the Scott Law, Senator Sherman said that it was "one of the most vicious laws that have passed in my time in Congress." It was passed as a "mere political race between the two houses . . . in the face of a Presidential election." Senator Dawes sarcastically referred to keeping the treaties as long as we had a mind to. The law was "a rank unblushing repudiation of every treaty obligation . . . unwarranted by any existing danger—a violation such as the United States would not dare to commit toward any warlike nation of Europe."

The Chinese Minister steadily protested against the plain violation of treaty; just preceding the Geary Act, he wrote six letters to Mr. Blaine, only two of which were so much as acknowledged. He declared that the Geary Act was worse than the Scott Act, for it not only violated every single article of the treaty of 1880 but also denied bail, required white witnesses, allowed arrest without

warrant and put the burden of proof on the Chinese. He quoted our own statement on the harsh and hasty character of the act, not required by any existing emergency, whose political motive was well understood both in China and the United States. In his final protest he said: "The statute of 1892 is a violation of every principle of justice, equity, reason and fair dealing between two friendly powers."

Believing that the law would be pronounced unconstitutional because of its plain contravention of the treaty, the Chinese carried their case up to the Supreme Court.

Judge Field, who presented the judgment of the court, said: "It must be conceded that the act of 1888 is in contravention of the treaty of 1868 and of the supplemental treaty of 1880, but it is not on that account invalid. . . . It (a treaty) can be deemed . . . only the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the pleasure of Congress. . . . It is the last expression of sovereign will and must control." "The question whether our government was justified in disregarding its engagements with another nation is not one for the determination of the courts. . . . This court is not a censor of the morals of the other departments of the government."

This makes it clear that a treaty is not the "supreme law of the land," except as Congress makes and keeps it so.

An Ominous Situation

If the faithful observance of treaties between the nations of Europe constitutes the very foundation of civilization, as we are now vehemently told, is not the faithful observance of treaties with Asiatics the foundation of right relations with them? Do not treaties have moral aspects which should place them on a higher level of authority than the ordinary acts of Congress. Disregard of this fundamental principle for the maintenance of right international relations is fraught with ominous consequences. Congress, of course, has the power to abrogate a treaty, but there is a right and also a wrong way to do it. Is it right for a nation to abrogate an inconvenient treaty by simply passing laws in contravention to certain of its pledges? Is it conceivable that Congress would have treated China as it has, had she been equipped as Japan is today, with the instruments of occidental civilization?

Now when China becomes equipped with a daily press and adequate world news, when her national organization becomes better unified, more efficient and better equipped, when her self-consciousness is more perfectly developed, and when she learns that Chinese entering America have often suffered ignominious treatment, that Chinese lawfully here are deprived of rights guaranteed by long standing treaties, and that privileges granted as a matter of course to individuals of other nations are refused to Chinese on exclusively racial grounds, is it not as certain as the sunrise that Chinese friendship for America will wane and serious possibilities develop?

The situation is serious but there is no crisis. China and Japan have given up sending in useless protests. But I wish earnestly to press the point that before they feel impelled to raise the issue again we should ourselves voluntarily and without external pressure of any kind rectify our laws and our treatment. By so doing, the warmth and genuineness of their friendship which would surely arise cannot easily be estimated.

A New Oriental Policy

Is it not clear that America needs a new Oriental policy? The New Orient renders obsolete and dangerous our nineteenth century Asiatic policy. Let us promptly adopt *a policy which, while it will provide, on the one hand, for the just demands of the Pacific Coast States to be protected from swamping Asiatic immigration; will nevertheless also provide, on the other hand, for full justice and courtesy of treatment and for complete freedom from race discrimination which is inevitably regarded as humiliating.* The new policy should provide for observance of the spirit no less than of the wording of our treaties, and be thus in harmony with the principles of good neighborliness.

America's crucial problem with Asia lies, not in Asia, but in America. Not our diplomacy in the Far East, but our treatment of Asiatics in the Far West is to be determinative of our Oriental relations. I therefore omit altogether from consideration in this necessarily brief paper the question of our foreign diplomacy and confine my discussion to practical suggestions for the solution of our domestic problem.

All this means that we need comprehensive immigration legislation dealing with the entire question in such a way as to conserve American institutions, protect American labor from dangerous

economic competition, and promote intelligent and enduring friendliness between America and all the nations, East and West, because free from differential race treatment.

Outlines of a Comprehensive Immigration Policy and Program

Let me give in briefest outlines a policy and a program that seems to fulfill the requirements.

1. *The Control of Immigration*

Immigration from every land should be controlled, and, if excessive, it should be restricted. The principle of restriction should be applied equally to every land, and thus avoid differential race treatment.

2. *Americanization the Principle of Control*

The proven capacity for genuine Americanization on the part of those already here from any land should be the measure for the further immigration of that people. Newcomers make their first contact with America through those who speak their own language. The Americanization, therefore, of newcomers from any land depends largely on the influence of those already here from that land. The number of newcomers annually admissible from any land, therefore, should be closely dependent on the number of those from that land who, having been here five years or more, have actually become American citizens. These know the language, customs and ideals of both peoples, ours and theirs.

America should admit as immigrants only so many aliens from any land as she can Americanize.

3. *The Proposed Restriction Law*

Let, therefore, an immigration law be passed which provides that the maximum permissible annual male immigration from any people shall be a definite per cent (say five) of the sum of the American-born children of that people plus the naturalized citizens of the same people.

The grandchildren as a rule do not know their ancestral language, and therefore do not aid particularly in the Americanization of newcomers.

In general there would be no restriction on immigration from

North Europe. The reverse, however, would be the case for the countries of South Europe. The permissible immigration from China and Japan would be less than that which has been coming in recent years.

Provision should be also made for the protection of all newcomers from ruthless exploitation and for their distribution, employment and rapid Americanization. To aid in the accomplishment of these ends, the federal government should establish—

4. *A Bureau of Registration*

All aliens should register annually until they become American citizens, and should pay an annual registration fee, of say ten dollars. We need to know who the aliens are and where they live, and they need to know that we know these facts about them. A system of registration could be worked out in connection with a National Employment Bureau as suggested by the late Professor Henderson that would not involve police surveillance. This Bureau should be regarded as a method for friendly aid, not of hostile and suspicious control.

5. *A Bureau for the Education of Aliens for Citizenship*

This Bureau should set standards, prepare textbooks, promote the establishment of night schools by states, cities and towns—which might receive federal subsidies—and hold examinations. The education and the examinations should be free. Provision should be made for the reduction of the registration fee by, say one dollar, for every examination passed. The education should be simple and practical, avoiding merely academic proficiency. Let there be six examinations, three in English and one each in the History of the American People, in the Methods of our Government, local, state and federal, and in the Ideals of Democracy. When all the examinations have been passed, there would still remain the annual registration fee of four dollars, so long as the individual chooses to remain an alien.

6. *New Regulations for the Bureau of Naturalization*

Citizenship should be granted only to those who have passed the required examinations provided by the Bureau of Alien Education and have maintained good behavior during the five years of probationary residence. The naturalization ceremony might well

take the form of a dignified welcome service—say on a single day in the year—the Fourth of July, with appropriate welcome orations, banners, badges and banquets.

7. *Citizenship for all Who Qualify, Regardless of Race*

Eligibility to naturalization should be based upon personal qualifications of intelligence, knowledge and character. The mere fact of race should be neither a qualification nor a disqualification.

Such are the main outlines of the proposed Comprehensive and Constructive Program here offered for the solution of the entire immigration problem, Asiatic as well as European. For an adequate understanding, however, of this general proposal we should consider many details which are here necessarily omitted.

Advantages of this Policy

Would not the above proposals for a Comprehensive and Constructive Immigration Policy coördinate, systematize and rationalize our entire procedure in dealing with immigration, and solve in a fundamental way its most perplexing difficulties? Such a policy would protect American labor from danger of sudden and excessive immigration from any land. It would promote the wholesome and rapid assimilation of all newcomers. It would regulate the rate of the coming of immigrants from any land by the proven capacity for Americanization of those from that land already here. It would keep the newcomers always in the minority. It would be free from every trace of differential race treatment. Our relations with Japan and China would thus be right.

Such a policy, therefore, giving to every people the "most favored nation treatment," would maintain and deepen our international friendship on every side.

An Objection

I am not ignorant of objections to these proposals that have been raised by a few critics. They assert that Asiatics and especially Japanese are not assimilable. They love to quote the famous lines from Kipling:

Oh, East is East and West is West,
And never the twain shall meet
Till earth and sky stand presently
At God's great judgment seat.

They, however, who quote these lines, forget or never heard the lines that immediately follow:

But there is neither East nor West,
Border nor breed nor birth,
When two strong men stand face to face,
Tho' they come from the ends of the earth.

There are indeed real differences between the East and the West, yet there is also real and still deeper unity.

This is a question of great importance and deserves careful study. I have not failed to consider it with some care in my volume on the "American Japanese Problem." But after all the question is not really relevant to the general proposals here put forward. The permissible immigration proposed would be considerably less than that which is now coming from Asia under present laws. The question of assimilability of Asiatics, therefore, cannot be raised as an objection to this 5 per cent restriction proposal. On the contrary, should not those who urge Asiatic non-assimilability advocate this policy rather than oppose it?

Conclusion

I return now to the questions with which we began. Shall America's Oriental policy be based upon national selfishness and race pride or upon the Christian ideal of universal human brotherhood and Golden Rule internationalism? That will depend largely on the character of the leadership of our nation in our international affairs. Will our most expert thinkers on the problems of political and social science grapple earnestly and scientifically with this problem of Oriental immigration and assimilation in the Occident? Will we lead our institutions of learning to devote their earnest thought and study to the promotion of wholesome thoughts and attitudes upon this entire question of races and their relations? Will we teach our people to discard antiquated or one-sided conceptions as to race biology and psychology which promote race arrogance and prejudice?

The problem of world-peace is not primarily the problem of treaties, arbitration provisions and Hague Courts, but of mutual goodwill and confidence among the nations. How can this spirit be developed? If Asia fears and distrusts Christendom because of continued injustice, Asia will arm. As Asia arms Christendom

will increasingly fear and distrust her. The way to establish goodwill and mutual confidence between the East and the West is for Christendom to act toward Asia in right and helpful ways. We must voluntarily do her justice, keep our treaties and deal with all Asiatics who come to our lands in ways that we ourselves would like to receive were we in their place.

In a word, the international relations of nations, as of individuals, must be Christian if there is to be world-peace and wholesome development. Nations must not only be just and honest, but they must be kindly and helpful. They must regard and treat each other on the basis of universal human brotherhood. This and this alone will evoke real goodwill and mutual trust.

As an American missionary long resident in Japan I appeal to the citizens of America on behalf, not of Japan alone, but also of Asia; nor yet on behalf of Asia alone, but of the whole world, including our own beloved land. For on the right attitude of the West to the East hangs the fate of the whole world for centuries to come.

WHAT NATIONAL POLICY SHALL WE ADOPT WITH REFERENCE TO MEXICO?

BY L. S. ROWE, PH.D., LL.D.,

University of Pennsylvania.

The questions involved in our relations with Mexico, while both serious and complex, lend themselves to satisfactory solution, provided we are willing to adopt a policy which will be sincerely and genuinely helpful to Mexico; a policy so formulated that it will contribute toward enabling her to solve her problems in her own way; in accordance with the genius, the political preparation and the social status of her people. Such a policy demands that we discard those mediaeval standards of vengeance which would lead us to visit upon an entire people, the misdeeds and crimes of a handful of bandits.

We must, furthermore, learn to deal with the Mexican situation on a basis of fact rather than through the intermediary of political phrases. It is astonishing to what an extent we are the slaves and even dupes of mere catchwords. We use the terms "democracy," "inalienable rights," "will of the people," as if they had no relation whatsoever to the social and political development of a people. We assume that the particular form of government and the particular type of institution that we have developed in the United States are not only the goal to which all nations should aspire, but are something which should be introduced immediately as a guarantee to their happiness, progress and prosperity.

It is this failure to face the facts of the Mexican situation that has prevented us from making our full contribution toward the reestablishment of order in that unhappy country. In fact, for a time it looked as if our policy, far from contributing to the reestablishment of order, would become a disturbing factor in the internal situation, perpetuating and even aggravating the conditions of anarchy that prevailed.

In any attempt to formulate a policy which will at once subserve our best interests as well as those of Mexico there are two or three cardinal facts which must ever be kept in mind.

In the first place, we must recognize that Mexico is living under a written constitution which is out of harmony with the basic needs of her people. In a moment of idealistic emulation of the United States, a small group of her leaders adopted a constitution based on the federal system of the United States. What Mexico needed and still needs is a unified national system sufficiently strong to make its power felt in every section of the republic, and thus capable of assuring respect for law and order. A strong and centralized national government does not necessarily mean a tyrannical government. No one would call the French system tyrannical, and yet it is highly centralized. In a sense it is true, therefore, that no president can ever hope successfully to govern Mexico in strict conformity with her present constitution. The twenty-six years of the administration of General Diaz, as compared with the long period of anarchy, from 1810 to 1879, furnish adequate and convincing proof of this fact. Until the provisions of the Mexican constitution are brought into harmony with the political needs of the nation there will be a wide gap between the real political system and that embodied in the written constitution.

The Mexican people are neither turbulent nor difficult to govern. From the time of the first movement for independence in 1810 until the present day, Mexico's difficulties are traceable to the ruthless conflicts of political factions. For over one hundred years, political agitation in Mexico has taken the form of armed conflict rather than of free discussion. In most cases these conflicts were due to the ambitions of local political leaders who made the ignorant and trusting Indians their dupes rather than their beneficiaries.

The Madero revolution of 1910, like the Juarez revolution of the early '60's, was an exception to this rule and assumed real national proportions; based on a real political, economic and social purpose. In spite of the remarkable progress of the country during the administration of President Diaz there is one fact which stands out with great clearness and which explains the opposition which gradually undermined his power and finally led to his overthrow. General Diaz fell into the error of confusing national wealth with national welfare. He assumed that the exploitation of the natural resources of the country, with its accompanying investment of foreign capital,

would inevitably lead to the betterment of the condition of the laboring classes. This was a perfectly natural error inasmuch as it represented the prevailing economic doctrine of the period. He failed to appreciate the fact that in countries in which the laboring population is ignorant and lacks all spirit of coöperation and combination, the exploitation of the laboring classes is an inevitable accompaniment to the exploitation of natural resources. National wealth may advance by leaps and bounds, but the position of subjection of the working classes prevents them from securing a fair share of the national surplus. This is precisely what occurred in Mexico. The fact that some real progress was made only served to awaken a spirit of discontent. The situation in Mexico is such that any national administration, in order to be really successful, must extend its protecting care to the masses of the working people. This means social legislation of a highly developed character, guaranteeing a minimum wage and adequate protection against exploitation through company stores, payment in kind, advances in anticipation of wages, etc.

Furthermore, if we really desire to avoid armed intervention, we must do everything in our power to assure the establishment of a strong, responsible government in Mexico. This means something far more than the formal recognition of this or that *de facto* government. It is a well known fact that the Texan and New Mexican borders are the favorite hatching places for conspiracies against established order in Mexico, and that most of the subversive movements have received either financial or other material support from American sources. If we are to assist Mexico in the solution of her problems, we must so guard our frontier that revolutionary movements hatched on American soil will not be permitted to develop, and that the American border will be closed in fact, as well as in law, to the furnishing of arms and ammunition to revolutionary leaders.

If we adopt as the cardinal principle of our policy the establishment of a strong and stable government in Mexico we must be prepared to assist her in the solution of the difficult problems involved in her financial reorganization. This does not involve the necessity of pledging the credit of the United States government, but it does mean that American financiers must be encouraged to assist Mexico in the rehabilitation of her national finances. This

financial coöperation is more important at the present moment than at any previous period in Mexican history owing to the government's dire necessity, on the one hand, and to the closing of European sources of credit on the other.

Finally, I desire to refer to the delicate question raised by the long series of border difficulties, and to the policy which we should pursue with reference thereto. If our instinctive reactions are to be mediaeval, if our attitude is merely to wreak vengeance on those who commit depredations without reference to the effect of such a policy on our relations with the Mexican people, we are on the high road not only to armed intervention but to war with Mexico.

I desire to make a plea for a different viewpoint, a different attitude, a different guiding principle in the formulation of our policy. Unless I am much mistaken, the President of the United States would never have sent a punitive expedition into Mexico if he had not feared that the Congress of the United States would force him to measures more radical and more drastic. If he had been in a position to depend on the self-control, the patience and forbearance of Congress, I believe he would have said to the American people:

The sending of a punitive force into Mexico will endanger the cardinal principle of our Mexican policy, namely the reestablishment of order within the republic. Such an expedition cannot help but undermine the *de facto* government by arousing a suspicion in the minds of the Mexican people that their government is a party to foreign invasion. It will make the reestablishment of order in Mexico more difficult because it will encourage revolutionary leaders to call upon the Mexican people to oust the invading foreigner. By sending our troops into Mexico we become the mere plaything of events; any untoward incident may precipitate a prolonged and bloody struggle with the Mexican nation.

The fact that we are encountering great difficulty in finding the leader of the brigands is an indication of the forbearance which we should show in giving to the Mexican government ample time to bring the outlaws to justice. It is unworthy of a great nation such as ours to engage in a mere man hunt on foreign soil. The *de facto* government of General Carranza is now in control, and we can well afford to leave with it the task of hunting out the wrong-

doers. He is in a far better position to do this than we. Let us by all means hold the Carranza government responsible for the punishment of the wrongdoers, but let us not embark upon a policy, the immediate consequence of which may be, that in endeavoring to wreak vengeance on a few outlaws we find ourselves forced to wage war on sixteen millions of innocent people.

Today when the real purpose of the punitive expedition has been accomplished, when the band of outlaws has been dispersed and so many of its members killed, the large and courageous thing to do would be to say to the country:

Our mission in Mexico, if a mission it was, is fulfilled. We withdraw our troops, satisfied that the Carranza government will make the best endeavor to fulfill its promises. We do not wish to endanger our amicable relations with the Mexican people by continuing the delicate and anomalous situation created by the presence of United States soldiers on Mexican soil.

While such a policy would arouse immediate criticism from the unthinking, especially in this year of presidential manouvering, I firmly believe that it would soon receive the approval of the sound and sober judgment of the American people.

There is no reason why we should not enter into a joint agreement with Mexico in order to establish an effective control of the border. A joint agreement would mean the coöperation of the Mexican army and the army of the United States, and would make impossible, or at least exceedingly unlikely, a recurrence of the unfortunate events which during the last few months have brought the two nations to the verge of war. Such coöperation would be deeply appreciated in Mexico and while its operation would, no doubt, meet with some difficulties during the early stages, it would ultimately become not only a safeguard to our border but an assurance to the Mexican people of the spirit of international helpfulness that is dictating American policy.

We can do much to assist Mexico in the solution of her grave domestic problems, but we must not delude ourselves with the thought that we are better able to solve them than Mexico herself, or that we can greatly accelerate their lasting solution through a policy of dictation or armed intervention. Mexico must make enormous sacrifices in order to educate her people and to increase

their industrial efficiency; she must make a stupendous effort to develop a small land-holding class, and she must provide a highly organized system of protective legislation for her laboring classes. No one who really knows the Mexican people and who has studied their characteristics with sympathetic interest, can help but feel that all of these problems are capable of solution, but that for their solution much time and endless patience will be required. There will be much groping, much stumbling, many false starts and endless discouragements, but it will be through the overcoming of these obstacles that the Mexican nation will develop the qualities necessary for self-government, and the Mexican administration will acquire the experience necessary to grapple with large national problems.

For the United States the choice lies between a policy of helpful coöperation and one of armed intervention. If a policy of helpful coöperation be adopted our government will prevent American soil from becoming the hatching ground of conspiracies against order in Mexico; our financiers will assist the Mexican government in the rehabilitation of her finances, and our capitalists, in the conduct of great Mexican enterprises, will have due regard for the welfare and for the economic and social advance of the Mexican people. With such coöperation the problems of reëstablishing order in Mexico, of maintaining a stable government and of governing a docile and peaceable people become comparatively simple. Through popular education and the adoption of measures designed to increase the industrial efficiency of the laboring classes, the foundations will be laid for the intelligent participation of the masses of the Mexican people in the political life of the country, thus enabling her to look forward to the development of something approaching democratic government.

The alternative to the policy of helpful coöperation is armed intervention. Through such intervention we assume the responsibility for a series of problems for which we are temperamentally unfitted. We introduce into our domestic political situation a disturbing factor and we destroy at one blow the hope of a real Pan-American, continental policy. Armed intervention in Mexico, besides being a grave injustice to the mass of the Mexican people, will alienate for generations to come the sympathies of

the peoples of Central and South America. We will be regarded as aggressors, coveting the property of our neighbors.

From whatever point of view, therefore, we approach the question, whether from the standpoint of our own domestic policy, the welfare of Mexico, or our position on the American continent, our relations with Mexico should be determined by a spirit of international coöperation, which will assure Mexico of our integrity of purpose and give to the other republics of the American continent, as well as to the world at large, assurance that the United States stands for a new concept of international relations, one in which mutual suspicion shall give way to confidence, aggression to coöperation, and trickery to helpfulness.

EFFECT OF PREPAREDNESS UPON AMERICA'S INFLUENCE AND POWER

BY WILLIAM J. STONE,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.

I have been complimented by a request to open the discussion on this interesting subject, "The Effect of a Policy of Naval and Military Preparedness on America's Influence as a World Power."

I shall take two views of the subject: First, our historical policy and its effects. Secondly, a reverse policy and its effects.

It may be safely said that hitherto the United States has not stood before the world as a great war power, but, on the contrary, has stood, essentially and conspicuously, as a great peace power. Our government and people have not devoted themselves assiduously or with great concern to the task of maintaining either a strong military or naval establishment. These interests have held a subordinate place in the thought and activities of our national life. On four notable occasions our government found itself confronted with the necessity of hurriedly and largely augmenting its military strength to meet emergencies. I refer, of course, to the War of 1812 with Great Britain, the War with Mexico, the Civil War between the States, and the War of 1898 with Spain. So far as the military establishment, as contradistinguished from the naval establishment, goes, the government was compelled in each of these four stated emergencies to rely largely, if not chiefly, upon a volunteer force. Judged by the results of these several conflicts, it may be said with confidence that the government did not in any instance rely in vain upon its volunteer army, nor rely in vain upon the other resources necessary to war which the government was obliged hastily to construct and organize. Naturally these results tended to impress the public mind with the belief that the nation might continue to rely upon the patriotism and power of the people who ordinarily follow peaceful pursuits to take care of the country whenever an emergency should arise demanding military service. Moreover, it has been an old traditional American policy that a large permanent military establishment was undesirable.

There have been several reasons for this national attitude. Among these reasons, it has been believed that a large standing army, in the immediate control of men whose lives are devoted to military activities, might, under the dominating command of some abnormally ambitious man or coterie of ambitious men, become dangerous to our ideals of a simple representative democracy; that such an organization would entail grievous and needless burdens on the country; and that it would tend to create a military caste that would in the course of its development incline to bring us more and more into sympathy with the military spirit and policy prevailing in European nations—a spirit and policy generally condemned in this country. Following the admonitions of the elder statesmen who founded and developed our institutions, the mass of our people long ago settled down into the belief that they could safely depend upon the militia and citizen soldiery to grapple with possible dangers coming from the outside to threaten our national welfare. Because of all this, while we have progressed along all other lines with strides almost without parallel, we have remained practically stationary with respect to our regular military establishment, and, until within the last quarter of a century, have done comparatively little to augment our naval establishment. During the last 25 or 30 years we have added materially to our naval armaments, although we still hold a comparatively inferior rank among the greater maritime nations.

I believe this to be, briefly stated, a correct outline of the policy of this nation with respect to its military and naval interests during the course of our national history of more than 130 years. For 130 years we have been, so far as organized military force is concerned, in a state of comparative unpreparedness for war. Distinctly we have been upon a peace basis. What, then, has been the effect of this non-military policy upon our national development and life? I do not say that it is due to this policy, but undoubtedly during this long period our national expansion and development, leading to national prosperity and happiness, have been phenomenal. In addition to our wonderful progress at home, I think it safe to say that the influence of America for good on the outside world has been very great. It will hardly be controverted that the influence of our national example, taken all in all, has been beneficial throughout the world. I have thought proper to say this much about our long-

continued policy of peace in order that we might by way of contrast have this aspect of our national life in mind when we turn to consider the immediate question before this distinguished body, namely, "The Effect of a Policy of Naval and Military Preparedness on America's Influence as a World Power."

That brings me to my second proposition: Shall we reverse the old policy, or materially change it, so as to approach more nearly to a permanent war footing? That question involves both the need for and the effects of a change. There is now a strong movement abroad in the land to change our old policy with respect to naval and military affairs. On the ground that new world conditions have made it necessary, we have started upon a program for a great and rapid enlargement of both our military and naval establishments; and this we are doing in the name of preparedness—especially in the name of what is called preparedness for defense. All of us still proclaim devotion to peace; but it is said that we must be prepared to fight for peace if necessary to make it certain. And there is more in that than one might think at first blush.

I have spoken of the need of a change of policy; but the scope of the exact question before us scarcely requires me to discuss whether this proposed change would be wise or unwise, and the limit on my time forbids such a discussion. Moreover, my principal task is only to provoke discussion. Nor is it necessary for me to discuss the limitations that prudence or patriotism would place upon our preparedness program.

Perhaps it is sufficient to say, that as we move along from one generation to another the conditions and environments of nations change, and in consequence it may follow that what was a wise policy in the past might not be a wise policy for the present or future. I repeat, that from time to time the relations of different nations to each other are changed—changed sometimes from choice and sometimes from necessity. For example, these relations may be changed from choice when two or more nations have in mind to accomplish a certain purpose esteemed to be of mutual advantage; and that purpose may be good or bad, praiseworthy or sinister. But whether it be for a good or a bad purpose, whenever nations combine to accomplish something which other nations regard as inimical to them, the result is a counter-combination. History has furnished us with many instances of combinations made for mutual advantage,

which in turn have led to combinations in opposition; especially is this true with respect to European nations. There may be irritating causes for combinations, relating, for example to territory or to commerce, or it may be to promote a mere ambition to extend the power of one nation or combination to the detriment of another. These irritating causes may be numerous and varied; and they have in the past as often related to small things as to great things. Anyway, as the world grows in population and opulence and the national breathing space becomes more and more contracted, the restless ambition of rulers, and sometimes the grasping impatience of peoples, stirs up a dangerous spirit which pants for dominance and larger opportunity. For causes of this kind and others, which may bear even to us a hideous and threatening aspect, great nations both east and west of us have organized, equipped, and maintain great military and naval establishments. These stupendous organizations have been made ostensibly for defense and for the preservation of peace. O Peace, what crimes are committed in thy name!

But the reasons for these stupendous armaments which we see about us, whatever they are, are of minor importance. The fact is that for half a century the armaments of a large part of the world have been increasing until practically all of Europe and a large part of Asia have become vast military encampments. In the face of this comes the question—Shall we hold steadfastly to our old policy of peace without preparedness? Primarily, of course, the answer to this question must depend first upon our safety at home, and, secondly, upon our influence on the outside world as a power both capable and willing to protect its rights anywhere under the sun.

Whether considered from one of these standpoints or the other, speaking for myself, I think that a large permanent or standing land military force is as undesirable now as ever. I have felt that our military needs would be adequately supplied if we established a number of large training schools and camps throughout the country, where young men could be taught the essentials of military tactics and service. In this way I have believed that we would gradually, and, indeed, rapidly, fill the country with young men educated in the rudiments of military service, and at the same time keep alive the martial spirit of our people, which I deem of high importance. Likewise, I have believed that the government ought to have constantly at its command the means of thoroughly and efficiently

equipping an army of almost any size. Beyond these items of preparedness, I think we could safely rely on a regular army of between 100,000 and 150,000 men, supplemented by the National Guard, and by our millions of patriotic people in civil life. To my thinking there is not one chance in thousands that we will ever be called upon to defend against an invading army of any magnitude, or to send an army of invasion of great size into any foreign land. I cannot believe that any benefit would come to this country from a great standing army that would compensate for the burden of its maintenance. That is all I shall say upon that subject.

My belief is that if ever we are attacked by a foreign power strong enough to make the onslaught perilous, it will come from the sea, not from the land. Hence, I am an ardent advocate, always have been, of the most complete and thorough system of coast defenses. Everything that military and naval science can devise to make our coasts impregnable, I am for. Likewise, and along the same line of thought, I have always been and still am not only an advocate of, but in fact an agitator for, a great navy. I would create a navy strong enough not only to resist assault, but strong enough, if need should arise for it, to take the offensive; strong enough to protect American honor and American interests anywhere in the world.

And now I answer your question, if question it be, by saying that with our seacoasts prepared for defense as I have indicated, and with a navy riding the waves strong enough not only to defend, but to assault if need be, the danger of possible foreign aggression would practically disappear. Add to this such military preparedness as I have outlined, I am confident that we would hold a position which would have the effect of vastly increasing our prestige, influence, and power among the nations of the world.

THE TRUE BASIS FOR AMERICA'S WORLD INFLUENCE

BY THOMAS P. GORE,

United States Senator from Oklahoma.

There is a peculiar propriety, there is a double fitness in the discussion of the present subject in the city of Philadelphia. This city was christened in the very name of human fraternity. It was dedicated to the sentiment—shall I say to the unrealized dream?—of the brotherhood of man. It was founded and builded upon the principle that man is in some sense his brother's keeper and should not become his brother's butcher, a principle which would deny the sufficiency of Cain's answer, had he answered the question, "Where is Abel, thy brother?" by saying that he lived across the border. Such an answer would have challenged the very spirit of humanity. Few, if any, will agree with Bax when he says that the day is fast approaching when to call a man a patriot will be the deepest insult which can be offered him. Hardly more in this country will agree with Bernhardt or Reumelin when they declare that patriotism is the circumference of morality and that the moral law does not bind the sovereign state. Between these extremes there are those of us who believe that the love of country is not only a noble virtue but is a virtue essential to organized society.

Starr King declared that self-love is the freezing point of the social virtues. Beyond and better than this is the love of family and the love of country, both of which have their proper places in the social and moral economy. Much as we cherish these sentiments, much as we respect these virtues, we cannot choose but agree with Miss Edith Cavell when she said, with the light of another world breaking in her face, "Patriotism is not enough." No sublimer sentiment has been uttered since Gethsemane. Whatever else this may mean it means that beyond patriotism there is a principle of humanity, a principle of good will which should be held sacred, inviolate and universal. This principle must be the basis of international law, the soul of international justice. It should be the sovereign principle of every nation which assumes to be or aspires to become a world power.

I say there is a double fitness in this discussion in this city because Philadelphia is the birthplace of the United States as an independent nation. Nay, more, it is the birthplace of the United States as a world power. The United States became a world power on July 4, 1776. The Declaration of Independence was the greatest moral force set in motion among the sons of men since the sun veiled itself in darkness rather than witness the Divine Tragedy. When Charles James Fox heard of the destruction of the Bastille he exclaimed, "How much is this the best and greatest event in the history of the world?" It was not so great an event as the Declaration of Independence. It was largely the effect, the lineal descendant of that Declaration. The self-evident truths set forth in that indictment of tyranny have been leavening the entire world with the spirit of liberty, equality and fraternity. These principles account for many a revolution in western Europe, and even the silent, brooding East with its mighty millions has during the present century felt the deferred but quickening impulse of the selfsame principles. This new conception of the rights of man has in some measure affected the status of every living human being. It has lent a new dignity to human nature itself. It has been a beacon to the oppressed and to the persecuted everywhere.

The influence of the United States as a world power has further made itself felt as affecting the individual in the abolition of the doctrine of indefeasible allegiance and in the establishment of the principle of voluntary expatriation.

The United States became a world power when in its very cradle it drove the British Lion—if I may so say—halt and bleeding from the Thirteen Colonies, when it triumphed in arms over an embattled empire, the mightiest upon the globe. The United States was acting as a world power when it refused to submit to the multiplying injuries and insults of the Barbary States and rescued the commerce of christendom from a tolerated piracy which had continued for centuries.

That the United States is a world power was further evidenced when in a second passage at arms with Great Britain it abrogated the pretensions of that and other countries in regard to the impressment of sailors and seamen and established in theory, if not in fact, the freedom of the seas. It was the voice of a world power when the United States proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine and placed itself

as a bar in the pathway of the holy alliance in its effort to resubjugate the emancipated Spanish colonies in America. By that one act alone the United States erected a permanent safeguard in the new world against the ambition and encroachment of the old, gave the western hemisphere an identity and destiny of its own. When the United States prevailed upon Japan to unbolt the doors of that hermit kingdom to the advent of western civilization it breathed the breath of a new life into the dead and dying Orient.

I cannot accept the theory that the United States became a world power as a consequence of the Spanish-American War. The character of a nation as a world power must be determined by two considerations. First, the character of the ends which it seeks to accomplish in world politics. Second, the character of the means which it employs for the accomplishment of these ends. The effect of a nation's activities as a world power depends not entirely upon its own intentions or the character of its means and its ends, but depends largely upon the opinion, indeed, I may add, upon the suspicions, which other nations may entertain as to its intentions, its means and its ends. World power must be exercised through one of two forces, or through a combination of two forces. I mean moral forces and military force.

In the main I shall leave others to judge as to the character of the objects which the United States has sought as a world power and as to the character of the means which it has employed. I shall leave others to conclude for themselves whether the United States has relied upon moral forces rather than upon military force in the prosecution of that splendid career in world politics which she has hitherto achieved.

Of course, it was our vast military and naval establishment which enabled us to vindicate the Declaration of Independence and create this republic. It was our trained regulars, our seasoned veterans which enabled us to triumph over the raw recruits, the undisciplined militia of Great Britain. It was our vast naval and military establishment, it was our universal compulsory military service which brought victory to our arms in the War of 1812, in the Mexican War and in the majestic struggle for the perpetuation of the Union. Does not such a suggestion rob our history of its chiefest splendor and rob our greatest national achievements of their true moral worth and significance?

We have never been a nation in arms. We should never be a nation in arms. We have, indeed, maintained moderate naval and military establishments; relatively they have been small. Our moral and political conquests have been out of all proportion to our organized militant forces.

Few Americans, if any, believe in peace at any price, unless they mean by that at the price even of war. No one who cherishes the traditions of this republic, certainly no one living in Philadelphia, will assert that all wars are dishonorable. The Revolution was surcharged with glory. The necessity and the justice of a war must determine its character. Disarmament will not be adopted as a practical policy by any one country unless it be made universal. One reason is that the worst of two countries can determine whether they shall have peace or war. Unhappily, goodwill is not always a buckler against bayonets. The triple armor afforded by a just quarrel is not impervious either to arrowheads or to 42-centimeter projectiles. No nation should be too proud to do right. Herein lies one of the chief evils and dangers of militarism. A sense of power is calculated to breed an indifference to justice. Might usurps the jurisdiction of right.

What just foreign policy have we ever undertaken as a world power and failed to prosecute to success merely through the want of a greater army and a greater navy? What just foreign policy would we have undertaken but which we forbore to undertake for the lack of a larger military and naval establishment? Upon what great foreign policy would we now embark but for the sense of naval and military weakness and inferiority? As a world power, should force or justice be the soul and the support of our foreign policies? If an irresistible army and navy be essential to our character as a world power will they be less essential to the success of other nations as world powers? If we had such irresistible forces would we embark upon foreign policies which lie outside the scope and possibility of moral conquest? Would we embark upon policies to the accomplishment of which only armed forces were adequate? Would such a course promise greater success and greater service to mankind than we have already accomplished? Would it promise more of good than of evil?

In politics, for the want of a better guide, we must resort to precedent and analogy. Have vast naval and military armaments,

has preparedness, enabled other nations to work out their destinies as world powers without war? There are two points of view. The first is that preparedness averts war. Of course this is true; universal experience bears witness to its truth. Germany's unrivaled preparedness has kept the world at peace. But for universal compulsory service perhaps Germany might at this hour be involved in war. France has universal compulsory service. She is enjoying its inevitable consequences—unmolested peace. Russia has universal compulsory service—the war god is a stranger to her shores. Italy and Austria enjoy all the blessings of peace which are inseparable from universal service. Great Britain is the master, the mightiest navy upon the seven seas. This has been her pledge of peace and her security against war and its calamities.

I have always noticed that the strongest of tooth and claw are by nature gentle and amiable. By a sort of instinct they exemplify the virtues of the peacemaker. The lion is a symbol of physical strength and prowess. He employs that strength only for the security and protection of the defenceless. The tiger's claw is a sort of refuge for the affrighted fugitives of the forest and his stripes are the Red Cross or the white flag of the jungle. The beak and talons of the eagle are an ark of safety to the doves of peace. The serpent's fangs were designed and are used not to bruise but to protect the heels of Adam's children—perhaps you have noticed that. This might be called the irony of nature.

We are as well prepared today both for domestic and foreign policies and protection as we have ever been in our history. We have never engaged in a foreign war not of our own declaring. No nation under the sun has ever declared war against the United States.

The other point of view is this: I heard a senator assert the other day that unpreparedness is the pathway that leads to war. Of course, the senator reasoned well. Who will be so bold as to deny that unpreparedness for war begets war? Was it not the unpreparedness of Germany that precipitated her into this holocaust of blood and fire? Was it not unpreparedness on the part of Russia and on the part of France that broke their peace and dragged them into this carnival of slaughter? Was it not unpreparedness on the part of Austria, Italy and Great Britain that plunged them headlong into this whirlpool of blood, this whirlwind of flame? Who

will deny that unpreparedness caused this war? Who will deny that preparedness would have prevented this war? Is not this the logic of militarism?

Did it ever occur to you that every nation on the globe which has prepared for war has got what it prepared for? Did it ever occur to you that the United States, the only great nation under the sun which is unprepared for war, is the only great nation which is today enjoying peace and its infinite blessings? Does this suggest the relationship of cause and effect?

Whatever may be done by our government to further naval and military preparation, whatever may be essential in the way of further naval and military preparation, the United States should continue in the future as in the past to rely chiefly upon moral rather than upon military force, and to dedicate itself to the principles of humanity and to the idea and ideals of peace, arbitration and international justice.

The cause of international peace never stood in such sore need of friends as at the present hour. This is, indeed, the darkest hour in all its history. But let us hope that the pending darkness is but that ominous darkness which precedes and which presages the coming splendors of the dawn.

PUBLIC OPINION IN FOREIGN POLICIES

BY NORMAN ANGELL.

Discussions of this kind are sometimes vitiated by presenting a false antithesis or alternative. The discussion of war and peace and preparedness is often made as an issue between increasing military forces or leaving the forces as they are, or a method of force and no force—some such antithesis—whereas I beg to submit it isn't that at all in practice.

The real problem is, "How shall the force of mankind be used?" And the discussion is not really as between those who believe that it is possible to organize a world without force and those who think that in some way force of itself will solve the whole problem.

For however great your force may be, it will be ineffective to civilized ends unless you decide beforehand how it shall be used. It is sometimes said that if, in some wonderful way, England or France, had only been more prepared, this war would not have happened. Well that obviously isn't certain. Twenty years ago, for instance, there was a great advocacy of conscription in England; and for what purpose? For the purpose of fighting France. If that agitation succeeded and the general impulse and feeling had developed along the pathway on which they began, we would have had an Anglo-French War. I don't see quite how that would have aided our fight against the Germanic danger, if it be a danger.

More reasonably can we say that, if Germany had known for certain that England would have come into this war, had known that Italy would have gone against her, then she would have hesitated and possibly would not have precipitated war at all. But, in the absence of that knowledge, the force of those two nations, however much greater it may have been, would have had no deterrent influence. The thing which might have checked German aggression would not have been the existence of force, it would have been the existence of force plus the knowledge as to how it was going to be used.

That is why we must settle what our preparedness is for. What do we intend to do with this increasing power when we have it.

England has passed through one stage of pacifism—that is to say the John Bright and the Richard Cobden stage. Those men, who were concerned to keep peace for their country, found that the man of disorder, the Jingo, the man who desired to satisfy his temper by war, was always trying to find some excuse for increasing the military instrument, trying, as a matter of fact, to entangle his nation in order that the necessity for a greater military establishment should be apparent. The natural reaction to that attitude was to say, "For Heaven's sake, keep out of it," and for a half-century or so that was the dominant attitude of English pacifism.

But this war has demonstrated that it will not answer. We must go beyond that. We must pass out of that stage of mere passive inaction and recognize that we cannot live in isolation. You have a hundred of your citizens massacred on the high seas in a quarrel in which you are not concerned at all. Your industrial life is turned upside down by reason of a war which is going on in the other side of the world. For good or evil you are affected by issues which are there being fought out. *You must sooner or later intervene*, and the problem for the United States is "How shall we intervene?"

In all this, there is one thing that we seem to have overlooked. At bottom it is a question of will. If the world decided that it wanted to live at peace, it would. It hasn't come to that decision yet. This nation is not, as a matter of fact, at present interested in its foreign problem. It is far more interested in baseball. That is just a simple statement of fact. Chatting the other day with a journalist friend of mine, I asked him why the newspapers hadn't paid more attention since the *Lusitania* went down, to alternative methods of action, something other than war, the future foreign policy of the United States, things very relevant to the problem which was presented to us on the morning after the *Lusitania* was sunk, nearly a year ago. He said, "It is impossible copy. Our people are not interested in it, save when they think that there is going to be a war the day after tomorrow. For forty-eight hours

it would make good copy. From the moment the danger of war had passed, it would cease to be good copy."

Now, how can you have an informed public opinion when you cannot get a degree of continued attention, even as relative as that? Our first problem is to see how we can direct the attention of our people, how we can get the great mass to discuss, to realize the importance of foreign policies as affecting their domestic concerns.

Now I think there is only one way. We must take all the risks, I believe, of an absolutely open diplomacy. We in England who advocate democratic control of foreign affairs do not advocate it because we believe that a democracy can manage negotiations better than the experts in the foreign office. We don't believe that for a moment. But we have got to take some risk if we are to have the people of Europe educated at all in the question of foreign policies. For if these issues do not find a place in the newspapers, the people are not going to talk about these things at all. In the old days, when the deliberations of Parliament were secret, the proposal that they should be reported was met with the same kind of horror with which your diplomatists of today meet the suggestion that all their dispatches should be published. "What!" said these good country gentlemen in Parliament, "Subject the grave deliberations of our statesmen to the cackle of the hoi polloi? Why, it would be the end of all government!" Well, as a matter of fact, the first effect of publicity of parliamentary debates was rather outrageous public criticism, and it did render the parliamentary task much more difficult. But the final result has certainly been wholesome.

Therefore one means of precipitating the discussion of foreign affairs in your country is to insist, so far as possible, that any negotiations that take place shall be public. And apart from that, all those who are in relation in any way with public opinion, either as journalists, authors, university men, what you will, should utilize every factor they can, in order to concentrate the attention of the people upon this very grave problem which confronts them, which the public will finally settle.

It is only a question of whether the public will settle it without

knowledge or with knowledge. Because even where you have secret diplomacy, in the last resort it is your violent explosion of public opinion, as in the Spanish War, which settles the issues. It is finally public opinion which does settle these matters, anyway. The only question is, Will it be an informed public opinion or one that is not informed at all?

AMERICAN POLICY AND EUROPEAN OPINION

BY WALTER E. WEYL,

Editorial Staff, *New Republic*, New York City.

What I wish to suggest in this paper is that the European attitude towards America, what Europe thinks of us, hopes of us, and fears from us, should be one of the decisive factors in determining not only how we should arm but also what foreign policy we should pursue. No nation can be a law unto itself, for none is supreme; each nation must more or less accommodate its policy to the policy of other powerful nations. Europe being hard-pressed and quite naturally timorous and suspicious, will not be won over to any vague, and therefore potentially ambitious and aggressive American policy, easy formulae or pacific protestations. She will judge us by the actual course of our international action. Our safety and our peace, therefore, lie in defining our policy, in sharply delimiting it, in refraining from mere instinctive national grabbing, in withholding support from European coalitions which seek selfish aims, in joining with any coalition which seeks peace on the basis of an orderly, progressive change and growth of Europe and the world. Our true policy, dictated alike by our own needs and the state of mind of Europe, lies in consciously promoting international law and morality and in facilitating joint international action. If we can gradually translate this ideal into a realistic and concrete national policy, we shall be fulfilling the hopes of millions of liberal-minded Europeans, who in the midst of the fatal strife long for its cessation, and look for leadership to the nation which is freest from traditions of animosity, which has least to gain from war, and not least to gain from enduring peace.

This belief that America in its foreign policy must take into account European opinion has long been ignored. In our robustious days a few generations ago, when we were more aggressive and provincial than we now are, to have given weight to what Europe might think of any action we chose to take would have seemed absurdly irrelevant. What we thought of Europe's good opinion was demonstrated by the character of the diplomats we sent to her courts. Let Europe concern herself with her own petty squabbles, her own

parochial preoccupations, and leave us Americans to the fulfillment of our magnificent national destiny. We were great believers in the doctrine that Europe should mind her own business.

It is not difficult to discover the cause of the change in our attitude. Commercially and intellectually we are now tightly bound to Europe, and we are not immune even from the danger of military or naval pressure. We are beginning to realize that what Europe expects of us is an important part of our national environment and is, or should be, a condition of our national action. Whether we like it or not, we cannot but recognize that though we ourselves are potentially strong, the real power in this world lies in Europe. Her more than four hundred million inhabitants, her stupendous wealth, her keen intelligence, her secure domination of outlying colonies in other continents, give her a collective power almost as much greater than ours as ours is greater than Mexico's. In the past this immense might of Europe has been concealed by a division of the continent into two almost equal hostile groups, which has enabled us to oppose our own unity to Europe's weakened duality. But division and union, coalition and mutual hostility are in their essence transitory, and in our relations to Europe we must consider the possibility of those nations ranging themselves in combinations which will be far more effective than any today in exerting influence and pressure upon our own development. We can no longer disregard Europe's attitude towards America.

Our new plans of armament, present and prospective, add to Europe's justified interest in American intentions. We shall be *naïve* if we conclude that we may arm as heavily as we wish and still leave Europe unconcerned. Even in the midst of the present world-conflict, in which ulterior considerations break down under the pressure of the immediate, all European chancelleries must be giving earnest thought to our projected preparations and must be considering how this increased military strength of ours will affect their own ambitions and their own national security. For it is a commonplace that no nation arms for the sole pleasure of seeing its citizens in uniform but only for national purposes and, constructively at least, against some other nation. England felt herself menaced by the German navy despite pacific German assurances, just as Germany felt herself menaced by the Russian army. Whom then, the European asks, does the American armament imperil?

Whom does it aid? What ambitions of what power must be curtailed to prevent our force being added to already antagonistic forces? The entrance of this wealthy and powerful nation into world politics is of agonizing concern to European nations, which must scheme and contrive and fight to hold their place in the world.

It is in vain that we shall hope to allay these fears by declaring that our new armaments are purely defensive. Diplomatic protestations are cheap; all armaments, all wars, all acts of aggression, even the baldest, are called defensive. Germany, Austria, England, Russia, claim today that they are fighting in self-defense, as we also claimed, when in 1846 we forced war upon Mexico. But a defense of rights which are not admitted by an opponent, is either defense or aggression according to the point of view. In what, Europe may ask, will American defense consist? Are Americans solely to defend their continental territory and their island possessions? Or are they to defend the open door in China, the freedom of the seas, the integrity of small nations, the indiscretions of a Venezuela, the financial irregularities of, let us say, an Ecuador or Peru? A plea of self-defense may cover an infinity of shadowy pretensions and of very real aggressions.

Nor is it to be expected that the astute gentlemen who conduct European foreign affairs will construe our motives with excessive charity or interpret our diplomacy in terms of our own history primers. Already many of them think of our political leaders as very concrete, prescient and ruthless, if heavy-handed, statesmen. They read in our history of aggressions against Spain, Mexico and Colombia; of promises not always kept; of treaties not always scrupulously maintained, and note with envy the immensity and supreme ease of our territorial expansion. They ascribe to us more foresight than we possess, not realizing how often we have happily blundered into success, how often we have pursued *Realpolitik* in our sleep. "We Germans," a Berlin professor recently assured me, "write fat volumes about *Realpolitik* but understand it no better than babies in a nursery." "You Americans," he added, I thought enviously, "understand it far too well to talk about it."

In other words, our new power, expressed in military terms, will, unless we are on our guard, prove a source of peril. Our defensive armaments may be used for frankly aggressive purposes, and will be dangerous in proportion as they are susceptible of such

use. This menace of our new armament lies not only in the fears which it may arouse in Europe but also in the hopes and ambitions it may awaken in the breast of some of our own citizens. We cannot, of course, avoid the resultant peril by arming inadequately instead of adequately. Though there may be wisdom in avoiding quarrels there is surely none in entering upon conflicts unprepared. Either we should declare our intention not to resist at all or should, while minimizing the chances of strife, make such preparations for resistance as the balance in power between our probable enemies and our probable allies would indicate as necessary. Our true safety does not lie in disbanding an army or dismantling a navy, because it has latent aggressive capabilities, but in a formulation of a reasonable, restrained and completely unambiguous foreign policy. We shall be safer, and shall preserve a wider latitude of action, if Europe knows exactly where we stand.

A few considerations will illustrate the danger of an instinctive, unforeseen and ambiguous policy. If, for example, Great Britain infers from presidential and other utterances that we are intent upon outbuilding her navy, and therefore undermining her security, may she not conceivably be tempted to precipitate a conflict at a moment favorable to her? If we menace her with undefined, grandiose plans, need she be over-solicitous in her support of us either against European or Asiatic foes? Again, there is a highly important but still nebulous American policy, which all Americans are willing to die for but few Americans are willing to study and understand. Now if the Monroe Doctrine is ever so twisted as to suggest a policy of "the inside track" in Latin America, by which our own citizens will be favored with concessions, privileges and trade opportunities to the detriment of Europe, may we not be confronted with a coalition of nations, intent on keeping us within bounds, as Japan was confronted in 1895 by Germany, Russia and France? I do not insist that any of these events is probable, but only that their probability is enhanced by any vagueness or incertitude of foreign policy, that makes Europe apprehensive.

On the other hand, a mere definition of policy, if the policy is adventurous and stalking, is quite as little likely to bring about peace or security. To announce far-reaching though definite plans of expansion is merely to increase and unite your enemies. Nor is a policy of joint action with one or another of the two European

coalitions desirable or peace-furthering, if such a coalition is aimed only at the perpetual maintenance of the *status quo* and at the repression of other nations, which require expansion. Peace cannot be secured by embalming the world. You cannot stop progress as you stop a watch. Some of the nations will grow faster than others; trade routes will change; the technique of production, the range of consumption, the source of supply of prime raw materials will change, and with these transformations will come new demands on the part of nations, and new alignments. The result will be that any merely conservative coalition with its static conception of the world will burst asunder. It is not because it seems bold that a policy of union with one or another of the European coalitions is, if possible, to be avoided. Boldness is often the safest course. There are, however, two considerations which should make us hesitate before entering upon such hostile coalitions. The first is the indefiniteness and infinite expansibility of their nationalistic aims, in which we Americans may have no interest; the second is the possibility that such coalitions will prove merely repressive, static and reactionary, and will be broken up again into a new balance of powers, in which we shall be compelled to take our place and assume unnecessarily heavy obligations. By no such methods can we secure our peace and bring our national aims into some sort of conformity with the best opinion of Europe. What we might be driven to do by a sudden national peril, what alliances we might then have to make or responsibilities accept, is apart from the question. If, however, we retain our present latitude of choice we should not pursue a policy which will purchase temporary stability at the expense of future wars and continual alarms. There is no gain in substituting a new balance for the old, in converting the delicate balance of Europe into an equally delicate balance of all the world.

A higher ideal, which sustains even in this war the peoples of Europe, is that of a coalition, open to all powers, a coalition which will be a true concert, and will seek not only immediate peace, but such a governance of the world, such a continuous and progressive adjustment of the rival economic and other interests of the nations as will give to each some part at least of its reasonable demands, and thus tend to reverse the motives pushing towards war. Our own policy, while not surrendering vital national interests, should define them, bring them into some measure of harmony with the interests

of other powers, and aid in the upbuilding of an international system, which, though doubtless not immediately possible, lies in the direction in which great economic world forces are today developing.

What I am here proposing is admittedly an ideal and a general direction and not in any sense a ready-to-use plan, which will give us peace without effort. I have no such plan to propose, and if I had, I should be merely adding to the hundreds of interesting and suggestive expedients, daily evolved. It is easy to hit upon expedients, which the world would be the better for adopting, but it is far less easy to convert hundreds of millions of people to a willingness to make the necessary sacrifices and concessions, without which no such plan is practicable. What is needed in America is not an excellent scheme, which will tell us in advance what we should do in each case as it arises, but a change in our outlook, an end to our sense of immunity and moral aloofness, a growth in a community of sentiment with Europe, a conviction that a juster, more plastic and more secure international constitution is in our own interest as also of Europe. We shall advance along these lines only as there develops in America a resolute determination to bring our vague longings for peace and international justice into harmony with our own national interests, and to translate these longings into the exertion by the United States of a steady influence upon the creation of sound international sentiment and durable international institutions.

To ignore the obstacles is to hamper the already difficult realization of this ideal. Deep-lying international conflicts, economic and racial, are innumerable. The privilege of developing backward countries, the right of access to the sea, the right of small national groups to autonomy or even to independence, the right of over-populated peoples to emigrate, the right of small nations to be safeguarded from attack—all these involve perplexing conflicts of principle and interest. It is fair for us to guarantee Belgium's neutrality, to secure a revision of the law of the sea, to urge joint government by the powers of new colonial acquisitions. But each of these problems is itself immensely complicated and has troublesome implications and quite unexpected reactions, and in each case our high ideal must be brought to the level of the practicable. We must labor jointly in such enterprises with other nations. We cannot do it alone. We dare not be merely Quixotic,

merely meddlesome, a censor of the world's morals, a voice crying aloud in the wilderness. Within these limitations, however, there is a wide range of international relations, within which we may make our influence felt.

The age of *laissez-faire*, of non-interference between the nations, is passing. What were once internal problems are today of world concern. The present evils are recognized; the remedies also are vaguely perceived. What is needed is a composition of rival national claims, the wider application of the principle of joint use, the realization that after all the common interests of the nations which are endangered by a world war do in the main outweigh the divisive interests. But to cement these international liens, which beneath the surface are being formed out of the economic necessities of the age, some nation must take the initiative.

This natural leadership, I conceive, falls to America, not because we are better or wiser than others, but because we are the child of all the peoples with allegiance to all, a nation without deep inherited hatreds, economically self-poised, comparatively satisfied, and inspired by ideals of democracy and peace.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NAVAL PREPAREDNESS

BY JOSEPHUS DANIELS,

Secretary of the Navy.

Fifty years ago there lived in my home town, Raleigh, N. C., an eloquent orator and distinguished Senator, by name George E. Badger, Secretary of the Navy under Harrison. Writing a letter of introduction for Badger to Choate, Daniel Webster said: "As a lawyer, he is your equal and my superior." He had the habit, peculiar to his generation—could we not revive it to the literary excellence of our public addresses—of practicing his most important speeches upon some person or persons of sensitive organism to determine how they would take when delivered. There is a tradition that, called upon to speak to a mixed audience, and anxious that he should sense the popular will, Mr. Badger, when he had written his address, stopped at his grocer's one afternoon and rather astonished the grocer by asking him to call at his home that evening as he wished to consult him upon an important matter. The surprised grocer, dressed in his best, presented himself at the appointed time at the home of the learned judge. "I have asked you to call," said Judge Badger, "because I wish to read you a speech I am to make in the court-house tomorrow and desire your opinion upon what impression it will make on those who will hear it," and, without ceremony, proceeded to read his speech to the untaught dispenser of flour and sugar. It was truly an eloquent address, couched in stately diction, upholding the Websterian doctrine of the indissoluble union of indestructible states, made when the South was in the throes that preceded the war between the states.

When he had finished reading—he had a musical voice (with cadence and passion), and had read his address with emphasis—he turned to his single enraptured audience and asked: "What is your opinion, sir, of the address?" The grocer could not command words of praise to express his approval and delight, and declared it to be the most eloquent utterance that ever fell from the lips of man. As he was leaving, he said: "Judge, I am, as you know, an uneducated man, not a judge of style. May I ask you

why you did me the honor to select me as the man upon whom to try out your speech instead of some scholarly citizen whose opinion would have been of more value than mine?" "Certainly," replied the Judge. "I did not wish the opinion of any scholar or orator. I wanted to try my speech on the common mind; therefore I sent for you."

When honored by your invitation to come to Philadelphia tonight¹ and participate in a discussion on "The Significance of Preparedness," I thought it might not be amiss to interview my two youngest sons and see if it were still true, as of old times, that wisdom was found in the heart of a child. The first one to respond to the inquiry, "What is the significance of preparedness?" was my fourteen-year-old boy, who is preparing to become an editor, and who said: "Preparedness is a premium on an insurance policy." My youngest, who aspires to wear the stars of an admiral, was quick to give his definition in these words:

If a man is walking along the street where there are rough men nobody will attack him if they see he has a big gun in his pocket. But if the same crowd sees him walking along without a gun, he may be slugged. The significance of preparedness is to carry a gun if you wish nobody to hurt you.

In the multitude of speeches that have been made on "preparedness," from the hysterical utterances of the disciples of "Blood-to-the-Bridles" to the soothing preachings of the "Peace-at-any-price" advocates, I doubt if any of the well-considered definitions of the significance of preparedness has given so clear and correct an answer as these youthful militant young Americans.

We have sat at the feet of no greater teacher than Benjamin Franklin, the greatest editor, the greatest printer, the greatest philosopher of the New World and exemplar in all that goes to make real preparedness. Since I have been Secretary of the Navy, the lessons he taught in the art of being ready have been particularly inspiring. Poor Richard said—and it is quoted the world over—"There never was a good war or a bad peace," and men have taken that text, without reading the life of that eminently practical man, and used it as an argument against any measure of preparedness. It was his conviction, when he wrote his almanac, that there

¹ This address was delivered before the American Academy of Political and Social Science at its Twentieth Annual Meeting, session of Friday evening, April 28, 1916.

could be no good war. But there came a day in his life when he found that every principle he held dear, the very liberties of his people, depended upon real and thorough preparedness, and I do not think that in our history we have an example of any statesman and leader who in the early days more thoroughly aroused public sentiment to this end than did this Philadelphia editor.

The career of Franklin was a perfect exemplification of Washington's plea for a uniform and well-digested plan of preparation. He exercised the utmost common sense. His energies stimulated and set the pace for the other colonies, however inadequate and incomplete their degree of preparation may be regarded as judged by modern standards.

Franklin had his troubles with the Quakers during King George's War. Their conscientious scruples against war had embittered the other colonists and led them to an attitude of hostility or indifference to defense measures. Franklin compared this Quaker element to "him who refused to pump in a sinking ship, because one on board would be saved as well as himself." In the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, of which he was editor, he prosecuted his plans for preparedness. As he himself says in his famous pamphlet, *Plain Truth*: "I stated our defenseless situation in strong light with the necessity of union and discipline for our defense." He called mass meetings; he organized military companies; he saw that the members of these companies were properly drilled; he got the good women to make banners and devise mottoes for them; he practiced what he preached and was able to state: "I regularly took my turn of duty there (at the battery) as a common soldier"; he organized a lottery to raise funds; he bought or begged cannon from every quarter where it was possible to secure them; he tactfully pandered to the Quakers in the state legislature, in wording a bill to appropriate £3,000, by using language like this: "For the purchase of bread, flour, wheat or other grains," and it was well understood that he meant by "other grains" gunpowder. It was while he was so actively engaged in preparing for the defense of Pennsylvania that there was born in his mind the idea of an eventual inter-colonial union.

Franklin's common sense was never more fully illustrated than in his advice and counsel to General Braddock. Franklin was a tower of strength all throughout the French and Indian War. If

Braddock, ungracious and contemptuous upon the whole, had heeded Franklin, he probably would not have met with defeat and death on his way to Fort Duquesne. He sneered at Franklin's distinct warning against the dangers of Indian ambuscade. Braddock was writhing in disgust at this time because Virginia and Maryland had supplied his army with only 25 wagons for his transport and commissary. Franklin, through his paper and by his influence, quickly secured 150 wagons and 259 "carrying horses" for Braddock from among the thrifty Pennsylvania farmers. He also furnished 20 pack horses for poorly paid officers in Braddock's force. Braddock was naturally delighted with Franklin and in his letters to the home government accorded him the highest praise for his foresight and efficiency. Franklin even went into debt by giving bond for £20,000 sterling for the wagons and supplies which he had furnished to Braddock, and this debt haunted him for a long time until it was finally assumed by the Colonial Government of Massachusetts. That the Revolution, against overwhelming odds, was finally decided on the side of liberty was largely due to the foresight and efforts of Franklin to make preparation.

His example of loving peace, of hating war and yet recognizing that no people ever secured and maintained liberty who were not able to defend it, compelled the colonists to make whatever preparation was necessary. So that I invoke the example of one who did not hesitate to change his opinion—to put under foot his own maxim, "There is no good war and no bad peace."

In our days of stress and anxiety, our eyes have turned, perhaps as never before in all history, to the Navy. From the good hour when John Paul Jones secured the first salute to our flag on the waters, in every time of national crisis the Navy has played an heroic and generally vital part in the preservation of our liberties. There never was a time when it was called upon that it did not compel the nation's pride and gratitude. Jones and his compeers made its name a terror upon the seas. Perry on Lake Erie and Macdonough on Lake Champlain built their own fleets and won decisive victories. It was the American Navy that drove piracy from the Mediterranean. American history has been tardy in doing justice to the Navy's part in the war between the states and to the administration of the war-time secretary, Gideon Welles. It was when he, in close conference with Abraham Lincoln, bottled up the

seaports of the South; and put an end to blockade running, that the Confederacy was smothered to death.

We have come to a day when we cannot wait for war to create a navy. Macdonough required eighty days to fell the trees, build the ships and win a victory on Champlain, but modern super-dreadnaughts and battle-cruisers cannot be constructed so quickly. No battleship has been built under three years, and, up to the last few years, it has taken five and six years to build our greatest ships. If we are to have a Navy strong and powerful, we must look ahead and provide for it in times of profound peace. The issue before the American people has passed from the question of whether we should have a navy or not, or a strong navy or not. Upon that question the American people are agreed. The question is how soon and how strong shall we create our Navy.

In 1903 the General Board of the Navy, headed by that illustrious naval officer, Admiral George Dewey, recommended to the Secretary of the Navy a naval program providing for the construction annually of two of the largest ships that could be built, with a number of lesser craft, which, if carried out, would have given in 1919 forty-eight dreadnaughts and the complements thereof. But the people and the officials were so little interested in this program, announced to the Department of the Navy but held confidentially from the American people, who never heard of it for a dozen years, that it remained a sealed book; and, in the very year after it was written, the Secretary of the Navy went before the Naval Affairs Committee and recommended only one battleship and one gunboat, and President Roosevelt in 1907, in his message to Congress, declared: "I do not ask that we continue to increase our Navy." And from that day interest in the Navy in high office and among the people lagged.

Yet there were far-seeing men who secured the construction of a number of dreadnaughts not surpassed by any nation of the world, and now, for the first time in many years, there is an aroused public sentiment that this country, proud of the Navy it has, glad that it is as strong as it is, is determined that it shall be larger and that it shall be stronger.

The sixty-third Congress, before the European war cloud lowered, began, upon a scale larger than any previous Congress, to strengthen our Navy. It authorized the construction of five dread-

naughts and increased the appropriation for new construction from twenty-two million dollars to seventy million dollars. It rather went ahead of a quiescent public, which did not feel the necessity because the merchant marine had disappeared.

When I became Secretary of the Navy, the first duty that pressed itself upon me was to secure enough men in the Navy to fill the complements of all our ships. Although Congress the previous August had authorized four thousand additional men, the enlisted personnel had absolutely declined more than one hundred from August to March, and we were short 4,700 men. Enlistments, circulars and invitations did not bring us the type of young men we needed in the Navy. Unless you have the man behind the gun and the right sort of man, you have no preparedness in the real sense.

There was a time when parents did not desire their sons to join the Navy. And when enlistments expired, it was not easy for the discharged bluejacket to get a position, because the Navy did not then train the minds of the men at all or their hands in skill so thoroughly as now. The first few days I was in office, I noticed on a placard inviting young men into the service a picture of half dressed women in the tropics, with sailors and marines lounging near by. I ordered them to be destroyed. We determined, in the councils of the Navy, that young men should not be enticed into the Navy by inducement to immorality; that they should be better trained for citizenship and for the trades; and that they should find avenues for proper promotion, even to commissioned rank, according to American ideals and traditions, if they continued in the service. The result of that policy, the very basis of preparedness, is that there has been a waiting list in the navy. The enlistment has increased 14 per cent, and a month from now this Congress will add at least sixteen thousand more men to the Navy and the Marine Corps—enough to man all the ships in the American Navy.

You cannot have an institution in America that is not Americanized. Whenever the Navy builds a bulkhead between an American bluejacket of brains and character and a commission, you have an institution that is not American. To this recognition and encouragement, now introduced in the Navy, American boys are responding, and their fathers and mothers for them. In our three

years, we have given commissions as Ensigns to sixteen young men who entered from the ranks. Each year we are appointing fifteen young fellows from the ranks to the Naval Academy. We have appointed fifteen paymasters from this splendid body of young men and one hundred eighty-seven payclerks from the enlisted personnel.

There was a time when the chief thing a man in the Navy needed to know was how to climb the mast and give a cheerful "aye, aye, sir." The battleship of today is the most complicated piece of machinery in the world, and there is no place on it for ignorance. It is a place for skill, and a skill which the Navy must itself furnish. On the old *Constitution*, at Newport, R. I., there is a radio school where lads from the interior and from the coast, from homes of the well-to-do and from homes where the father toils in the mill and the mother serves at her machine, are mastering the mysteries of wireless. It was with a peculiar satisfaction that I saw them there, some of them just beginning, their keen zest for the task shining in their eyes; others on the eve of departure to take their responsible positions in the fleet. An honorable discharge from the Navy means so much today as a recommendation that a sharper in a Connecticut town printed forged discharges and sold them to youths who could not obtain a place without that easy passport to position.

When the Senate of the United States was considering the Army Bill last week there was incorporated in that bill an idea which Lew Wallace wrote to Sumner: "The only hope of a great American Army is to educate the soldiers, and, when we establish a school in every regiment, we will secure all the men we need for our Army." That provision is now in the Army Reorganization Act. The idea has been carried out in the Navy for three years. The German armies in the trenches in Europe put a similar plan into effect early in the war. Opportunity for education and promotion will attract to our Army and Navy young men of aspiration, of courage, and of ability. And nothing else will.

The problem of officers in both the Army and Navy is a serious one. There has been but one institution for producing them in the Navy, and that is the Naval Academy at Annapolis. The sixty-third Congress passed an act continuing a law about to lapse authorizing the appointment of five hundred thirty-one additional

officers in the Navy. The present Congress has passed a similar act and so popular is the service that, when the examiner opened his doors last week, two thousand young men went up to stand the examination although only five hundred can be appointed.

We are even going outside the Naval Academy, in our present emergency, to secure officers, and the bill now pending in Congress provides for the appointment of eighty aviators from civil life so as to secure officers to meet the needs of that growing arm of the service. I am told by gentlemen who have traveled in Europe that the men who have made the best reputation are daring young chaps from eighteen to twenty-two, with what is really a sixth sense—that of flying. We are going to open doors in our hydro-aeroplane service to young men of this kind, and we are going to the colleges and universities and technical schools to add needed engineers.

There are pending in Congress several measures for increasing the Navy. My prediction is that Congress will authorize as many battleships, submarines and destroyers as the private navy yards of this country can build in the next three years. In this connection let me say that, for the rapid increase of the Navy, we are dependent not only upon naval officers, and upon Congress, but also upon the manufacturers of America. Most of my time for a month has been spent in keeping in touch with these men, urging them to speed up, so that they can furnish the material with which to build our ships promptly. In most instances they have responded readily, and I am one of those who believe that whenever a national emergency is presented to American business men they will respond, even if there is the attraction of larger profits from foreign countries.

Modern wars are being fought with machinery. The engineers who handle the 42-centimeter guns and the manipulators of motors and the delicate machinery in heavier-than-air monoplanes and biplanes are as essential to victory as the soldiers who charge bayonets. We are reading of army corps being held in check by "curtains of fire." But we have not realized until recently that real preparedness is dependent upon the mobilization of industries and the card-indexing of inventive genius, as well as the providing of war munitions. With no hope of reward, save the gratitude of the country, eleven engineering and scientific societies last July, upon my invitation, named two distinguished members each to serve on what is now known as the Naval Consulting Board. These scien-

tists, in conjunction with men of similar inventive and scientific genius and training in the Navy, are materially aiding us in new lines of invention and construction, giving weeks and months of their time to the study of serious naval problems. There is not a perfect or wholly satisfactory motor for submarine or aeroplane in the world. Abroad three aeroplanes are required for every flier. Erosion in guns makes their life and serviceability short. To the solution of these problems American science has responded with the same alacrity with which patriots answer the call to the colors. There is incorporated in the pending Naval Bill before Congress an appropriation for a million and a half dollars for an experimental laboratory, in which these men of science may make experiments and try to solve problems which are to be solved for national defense. And the President in his message to Congress called upon that body to coöperate with him in securing the aid of these thinking, originitive, investigative minds.

We have learned something from the European war. When it began the people of Great Britain had the idea, as most nations have had, that the nation with the most money was certain to win, and they congratulated themselves that they had as the Chancellor of the Exchequer that wonderful man who knew, Moses-like, how to smite rocks out of which revenues would gush in abundance. But the war did not last long before the English people took Lloyd George from the place of Chancellor of the Exchequer and raised him to Minister of Munitions, to a new and higher place, because they found that no matter how much money a nation had, unless it had a man in high place who could mobilize the industries, who could marry science to money in readiness for defense, they could not be prepared for great emergencies. In France, a new cabinet officer has been created. He occupies a like place to that held by Lloyd George in England. All the world knows that in Germany science and preparedness have been married for many years. If we are to have real preparedness in this country, every factory in America must be able and ready to make some sort of munitions. They must have the government gauges and patterns, ready to install at a moment's notice. We have now an organization, composed of five of the chief engineers and scientists, in every state in the Union, with 36,000 active assistants who voluntarily and without compensation are giving their time and their genius to helping

the Navy to be ready in its comprehensive program of preparedness.

The American Navy is our first line of protection. It is the right arm of defense, the protector of the American home. Let us not be misguided into thinking that we have a navy as strong as it ought to be. Let us uphold the hands of the members of Congress who are laboring to make our navy larger and stronger, but, while we do that, let us not give ear to those who say hysterically, as a certain perfervid orator said a few night ago, speaking to the Real Estate Exchange of New York, "Gentlemen, I never go to bed at night without expecting the next morning that some foreign foe will blow this town up. We have no Army, we have no coast defence, we have no Navy, we have nothing." And then, he added, with what he thought would carry weight: "I feel so keenly about this, that I wouldn't invest a dollar in real estate in New York." His audience, dependent for support upon the traffic in real estate, received this absurd statement with derisive laughter. Men who are so pessimistic and so ignorant about what is being done remind me of the maiden ladies in Boston who, during the Spanish-American War, sent delegations to Washington and wanted the whole fleet to lie outside of Boston harbor to protect them from the Spanish Navy which they daily thought they saw in the offing.

In this matter of preparedness in America, we shall, now that we are awake, go forward steadily, rapidly and earnestly, to repair the lack of building for the past dozen years, and we shall build a navy here of such size and strength as the American people need. We cannot build it in a day, because battleships are of slow growth; but the sentiment is now aroused, and we now have before us the problems of promptly securing the construction of the ships that Congress will authorize. I trust there will be no need for us to commandeer the private yards, for I am one of those who believe that, whatever the need of America may be, Americans will be equal to the task.

THE EFFECT ON AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS OF A POWERFUL MILITARY AND NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT

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Of all the novel and perplexing problems which have been fastened on the American nation by the proposal to make a very large increase in its military and naval armament, there is none which bristles with more difficulties than the subject on which I am addressing you this morning. What will be the effect on American domestic life and institutions of a more efficient, expensive and powerful military and naval establishment?

Americans who are opposing "preparedness" are basing their opposition largely upon the havoc which it is expected to work in our traditional internal order. Americans who are advocating "preparedness" are basing their approval largely upon the better order, which it is expected to impose upon our time-honored internal chaos. Americans who are hesitating are basing their hesitation largely upon misgivings as to the wisdom of exposing American institutions and life to the corrosive effect of such a dubious and perilous innovation. These are the questions which American public opinion is considering most anxiously and with the smallest prospect of future agreement. The country is not thinking so much about what we can and should do with a larger army and navy. It is thinking rather about what a larger army and navy may or will do to us.

Preoccupation with the domestic effects of military preparedness presided at its official birth. Last summer when President Wilson decided to include in the legislative program of the administration provision for a large army he ordered his Secretary of War to make the plans for an increase conforming to the existing American military tradition. What the President had in mind is clear. He had decided that more soldiers must be enlisted and trained presumably because they might be needed for certain practical purposes. But after having reached this decision he was

chiefly preoccupied, not with the number and kind of soldiers demanded by these practical needs, but with the effect of any increase at all upon the opinions and traditions of his fellow-countrymen. He knew his proposals would meet with lively opposition based chiefly on the presumptive un-Americanism of large armies, and he preferred to bestow on the plans of the administration not so much the positive merit of careful adaptation to the practical need as the negative merit of conformity to a prevailing tradition. In order to make them politically acceptable the administration plans should look unoffensive and not too unfamiliar. The American army had always been the creature of domestic political policy and so it must remain.

In adopting this course President Wilson was behaving like a shrewd and cautious political leader. It was the course calculated to effect a certain result with the smallest friction. He has been rewarded by the practical collapse of the opposition to his program. It has been an adroit achievement and an important success. But the fullest possible recognition of the achievement should not blind us to the disadvantages of the method. The success was purchased by a lack of thoroughness in framing the details of the plans and by a lack of frankness in explaining their meaning and consequences. The technical obstacles to adequate preparation and its political penalties and dangers have been underestimated and evaded rather than courageously confronted and definitely overcome. As a result the American people are acting in a grave national crisis without any sufficient understanding of the bearing of the new policy on their past and its probable effects on their future.

The American tradition of military organization and policy which President Wilson wished to preserve was not on its merits worth so much anxious solicitude. It called for a small standing professional army which was really no more than a national police force. Its members, organization and equipment were not adjusted to a foreign policy or an international condition. Invasion was not considered a danger against which any elaborate precautions needed to be taken. In the event of war the navy would act as a screen, behind which could be trained around a nucleus furnished by the state militia a volunteer citizens' army. The aspect of this system which Mr. Wilson probably considered most precious was its

underlying and almost complete civilianism. It included a professional army, to be sure, but only in insignificant numbers. The United States depended ultimately for its soldiers upon its citizens and it had consequently no reason to fear the corruption of its democratic institutions and ideals by a military caste or spirit. All this is true, but it is also true that the system was a tissue of inadequacies and contradictions. It evaded every difficulty and ignored every serious responsibility involved by military preparedness.

A democracy should depend ultimately for its soldiers on its citizens; but our traditional system only pretended to create an armed citizenry. Its trained soldiers were prevented from being citizens; its citizens were never sufficiently trained to be good soldiers. The American people had no reason to fear their army, but neither had the possible enemies of the American people. It was not intended to be dangerous to anybody but a few foreign or domestic marauders. Congress always refused to incorporate in it a coherent formative idea. It was partly professional and partly amateur, partly under national and partly under state jurisdiction, partly based upon the idea of service and partly upon an appeal to mercenary motives. But above all it was wholly and intentionally innocuous. It was essentially an attempt to assure civilian control over the military machine less by making the civil authority strong, clear-sighted, able and worthy, than by making the army feeble and incompetent.

If, as President Wilson decided last summer, the American democracy was finally faced by the necessity of seriously preparing during peace for the possibility of war, this national tradition in military organization needed to be radically modified rather than loyally cherished and preserved. The traditional military system can be fairly characterized as organized unpreparedness. Americans had believed themselves immune from the grim necessity of anticipating and providing either against social evils at home or the defense of national policies abroad. America was the promised land precisely because it was delivered from such moral and physical stresses and from the structural reënforcement, necessary to withstand them. Some years ago one-half of these expectations began to be abandoned. It became only too apparent that American domestic economy is not a stream which purified itself in the running.

It had developed the same social disorders as the older European societies and similar precautions must be taken against them. The decision to increase the army and navy means the abandonment also of the other half. The organized unpreparedness of our military system had been based upon a conception of international relationships and of ensuing American dangers, opportunities and responsibilities which had ceased to be true. The indispensable condition of any effective military preparation was a declaration of war against an essential aspect of the very tradition which the President was seeking so sedulously to preserve.

In so far as the American tradition in military organization consisted in the strict and absolute subordination of the military and naval machines to ultimate civilian control and their employment for valid political purposes, every good American will attach the utmost importance to its preservation. But in so far as the civilian control was obtained by paralyzing the army rather than by organizing the nation, strengthening its government and clarifying its policy, the existing tradition manifestly constitutes an insuperable obstacle to effective military preparation. The larger army and navy must be intended and made ready for actual definite service. In so far as it is ready for specific service the army must be a dangerous weapon. It must be dangerous to the possible enemies of the United States; and it must be dangerous to our traditional internal equilibrium. Unless the American people are willing and ready to create a powerful weapon, which if misused would prove to be harmful to them no less than to their possible enemies, the money and energy spent on military preparations will continue to be a colossal waste. As a matter of fact the American people proved more willing to create a powerful weapon than its chosen leaders imagined. The original program of the administration was indeed framed to look innocuous rather than dangerous. It was based chiefly upon the principle of amplifying our deficiencies. But the original program has been radically modified, and every modification has tended to make it less innocuous and more dangerous. A reluctant Democratic administration and Congress, which had every disposition to keep down the scope and cost of military "preparedness," have been forced by the logic of their own decision to build very much more than they intended. The final legislation is likely to provide for a really formidable fighting force—one which

will be measurably adjusted in size, training and equipment to the probable needs of national policy.

The outstanding fact in the proposed military re-organization is the increase in the professional standing army. In the original plan little attempt was made to convert the regular army into a force which was capable of defending the territory of the United States against invasion or promoting its policies abroad. That task was reserved for a body of national militia which was subsequently modified by the House Committee into a body of "federalized" state militia. But the more these bodies of militia were examined the more untrustworthy they looked; and the more public opinion came to favor an increase in the regular army as the one really dependable military force. The regular army is being increased until with its own automatically created reserve, it may, if it can be recruited, afford a sufficient protection against invasion, and protection against invasion is what the public and the military experts have on the tops of their minds. But merely as a consequence of organizing an effective army for defense Congress has done very much more. It has organized an army which may also constitute a formidable aggressive force. Instead of creating as the President and the Democratic leaders intended, a safe and a sane army, they are being driven to create a really dangerous army—a professional force, as far as possible removed from the conception of an armed citizenry.

The new American army will be unsafe for two reasons. An army of this kind is really adapted chiefly to service abroad and consequently to something more than a defensive foreign policy. It is also the kind of an army which will have a profound reaction on American domestic life, because as a consequence of its increased size and authority it will be constantly making imperative demands upon the civil authorities which they will be reluctant to grant and which will raise the issue between civil and military control over American policy. These are precisely the questions which the President wished to avoid, as they have been avoided in the past, but from now on they will wax increasingly troublesome. The new army could not be made serviceable, without becoming unsafe, because in the opinion of too many American citizens, a safe army meant an imperilled country. In truth there was no way in which the domestic life and institutions of the nation could be guaranteed against

far-reaching modifications as a consequence of substituting organized preparedness for organized unpreparedness. An efficient new military and naval establishment is bound in the end to do something important to the American people, and the certainty of a drastic result should be recognized in advance. Confident prophecies are being made as to what this drastic result will be. Many good Americans predict that our democracy will be ruined by their new and dangerous servant. Others predict with equal confidence that a more powerful army and widespread military training is necessary not merely to save the nation from its possible foreign enemies but to preserve it from its domestic infirmities. Neither of these predictions need be taken too seriously. They are the expression of fears and hopes rather than a disinterested estimate of the action of social forces. Although drastic result will certainly follow, what that result will be is by no means so certain. It will depend less upon the size and organization of the army and the navy than upon the way in which the nation decides to use them.

At present the American people have not made up their mind how they will use their new army and navy, and anti-militarists are insisting that the creation of the larger army and navy should be postponed until they do. I cannot agree with them. We shall have to take the risk of preparing first and of deciding later just what we are preparing for. To have refused to prepare would under the circumstances have been an indication of inertia and weakness. To have begun to prepare is on the whole a symptom of self-confidence. It indicated that the country is not afraid to plunge forward even though somewhat blindly and to risk the assumption of a perilous and costly responsibility which before it is redeemed may diminish many prescriptive rights, damage many vested interests and perhaps change the whole outlook of the American democracy.

The American nation needs the tonic of a serious moral adventure. It has been too safe, too comfortable, too complacent and too relaxed. Its besetting weakness is the prevalence of individual and collective irresponsibility, based on the expectation of accomplishing without effort. Living as it did in a favored land which was not exposed to attack from without and which offered to good Americans surpassing opportunities to satisfy their own special and individual purposes, our democracy has not been required to pull

itself together. It has depended for its cohesion upon loyalty to an achieved and essentially complete constitutional system, and upon a suppositious harmony between individual or local, and public or national interests. Unlike European countries, it could afford to leave the satisfaction of many public objects to the results of an accidental concert among individuals, groups of individuals, or local political units. It has been reluctant to create powerful political or economic organs for the accomplishment of its national purposes, and when instruments of this kind came into existence as the result of automatic economic and political forces, the instinct of the democracy was to dissolve, rather than to discipline and use its own unmanageable servants. It has not liked the responsibility of turning such potentially dangerous agents as a centralized administration, an authoritative legislature, an efficient army or any concentrated embodiment of industrial power to beneficial public use.

Because of its reluctance to create organs for the accomplishment of peculiarly important public purposes, the American democracy has always been burdened by a huge amount of improvidence and incompetence. In the beginning conditions did not demand the creation of political, economic and social agents powerful enough to be dangerous to the whole community; and when conditions changed it did not sufficiently care or dare to organize them. The need first arose from the necessity of providing administrative and legislative corrections to the enormous power which the trusts and the party machines had obtained as the result of a combination between professional politics and organized business. Much legislative and administrative action has followed but up to date the attempts to deal with the evils resulting from the concentration of business and political power in irresponsible private hands have been at least partly frustrated, because of the reluctance of the American people to consent to any similarly effective organization of public power. In a sense the American democracy has connived at its own political and economic exploitation. So many excellent voters were profiting in petty ways from the laxity, the waste, the irresponsible individualism of the prevailing system that they would do nothing effective to reconstruct it. In a kindred spirit many of the people who are now either opposing military preparations or are trying to kill it by lukewarm concessions are all

doing so, not merely because they are afraid of militarism, but because they shrink from imposing on the voters the heavy obligation of making really good use of such an exacting and dangerous instrument. They fail to see that dangerous situations require dangerous remedies, the need for which cannot be exercised merely by refusing to admit the existence or the seriousness of the problem itself. The propensity to underestimate the seriousness of its own problems and to meet grave issues with petty half-measures is the most insidious and stubborn enemy of the advance of the American people towards an improved political and social condition.

The advocates of military preparedness are, I think, justified in anticipating that an army and a navy large enough to be dangerous may introduce into American domestic life a useful ferment—one which may prove hostile to the prevalent spirit of complacent irresponsibility. The representatives of the older tradition have been trying to satisfy the demand for military and naval reorganization by the same kind of half-measures with which they have been satisfying the demand for administrative and social reorganization. But their partial defeat is significant. Our domestic institutions and policy will and should be subjected to a strain by military preparedness, severe enough to compel their modification and readjustment. The national spirit must rise to the occasion. If the nation had stuck to the method of democratizing the army by keeping it feeble and inefficient a profoundly disintegrating agitation would have certainly followed. The demand for military preparedness cannot be shirked with the same apparent impunity as the demand for social preparedness. The most conspicuous aspect of the progressive movement during the past fifteen years has been the contrast between the enormous effort and the meagre results. Progressivism gradually became a new expression of American extravagance—an opportunity of subjecting the moral and intellectual resources of the nation to the kind of conspicuous waste which has been dissipating our natural resources. The most serious danger to the work of military preparedness has been that it would follow the same path and arrange for the expenditure of a few hundred of millions of dollars a year more without providing any really trustworthy instrument of national defense or of an enlightened foreign policy.

In the case of military preparedness the danger brings with it a better chance of being remedied. If a larger American army and navy are really needed, their efficiency is a matter of national life and death. Any clear evidence of laxity, neglect and waste can be used to stir up a troublesome popular excitement. Congress will be under constant pressure to improve the operation and the equipment of the new military organ, and, as a consequence of being obliged to do so, it will be similarly pressed to correct its legislative methods and clarify its political policies. It cannot eliminate the waste from such an important department of government work without subjecting itself to a certain amount of internal reorganization. A really efficient army and navy is too finely tempered an instrument to be merely tacked on to the unwieldy administrative system of today. It cannot be created and operated without the adoption of legislative methods, which will provide for the increase of discretion and independence so much needed by all the administrative departments of the central government and for the promotion of improved methods of conducting public business. The conduct of an army and navy is, of course, the supreme example of pure administration. Any deficiency of resources, any division of responsibility or authority, any neglect of preliminary research, or any infirmity of purpose would be perilous if not fatal to its successful functioning. The need of so nicely adjusted an organ will always be a thorn in the side of that Congress which attempts to dictate administrative action in detail instead of being content with controlling its policy and criticising its operations. If the advocates of preparedness propose to create an organ of this kind they can scarcely stop short of insisting on an executive budget, and in general the whole program which reformers have been urging for the purpose of emancipating the work of administration from an unnecessary and injurious legislative interference.

The foregoing is only one illustration of the tonic effect which the attempt to create an efficient and dangerous army may have upon American domestic institutions. It has become a commonplace that changes may be brought about in the American financial and industrial organization. The expense of the new army and navy will be sufficiently heavy to force the reconsideration of the system of national taxation and to change its adjustment to the tax system of the various states. The industrial fabric may have

to submit to a corresponding modification. Of late years progressives have been asking with increasing insistence how far the professions, the railroads and the industries of the country were organized and operated chiefly for the national service or chiefly for private and local service. The same questions will now be put by the advocates of military preparedness. The European war has proved sufficiently the impossibility of seriously preparing for a possible war without calling upon the whole industrial system for assistance. If the American industrial system is not prepared to render that assistance promptly and completely, the country would be unprepared for serious military or naval operations—no matter how well its soldiers were trained and equipped.

Of even more importance to adequate preparedness than these measures of political, financial and industrial reorganization is an effective method of securing for the new military and naval program the support of the wage-earners. In the event of a war which involved the national safety they could be counted on to volunteer in sufficient numbers; but that is not the question. Assuming that the United States is to have an army, which even in the times of peace will require of an increasing proportion of the wage-earners of the country a certain share of their time and labor, how can they be induced to give what is needed? It is the answer to this question which will arouse in the near future the most lively controversy, and upon the way it is answered will largely depend the reaction of a larger military and naval establishment upon American domestic institutions and life. In the past the government has relied for the recruits to the army and the navy upon the expedient of tempting men to volunteer, but if this expedient is to succeed in the future, the temptation will have to be very much increased. It is doubtful whether the new army can be recruited, save at an excessive cost. For this and for many other reasons an aggressive and insistent element in public opinion is demanding the substitution of compulsion for the volunteer principle.

The agitation for compulsory military service bears particularly hard on the subject under discussion, because the arguments in favor of compulsion are derived from social and political rather than military sources. It is not pretended that the nation needs the military service of all the young men of America; but it is claimed that the young men of America need the benefit of military service.

Instead of as at present paying some young men to enter an essentially public occupation, they wish the burden and the opportunity of the employment to be imposed on all alike, without fear and without favor. That is the way really to democratize the American army. Universal service raises American citizens of all classes and sections, if not of both sexes, to the level of an irksome common obligation; and this obligation brings with it to an extent which political and social obligations do not, the occasion for common association. The experience would enable the young soldier to realize how far he is a member of a community and how much fellowship in the community means. It is the real solution of the ideal in an armed citizenry. The nation would obtain soldiers who were citizens and citizens who were soldiers.

The argument of those Americans, who are seeking to give a positive social value to the military system and convert it into a source of national unity, culminates in the foregoing contention. Instead of considering the army as a troublesome excrescence on American life, they propose to work it into the very fabric of the nation. It is to be made the heroic remedy for the insidious disease of national incoherence. By being universalized, military service is converted into a most effective form of compulsory national education. American citizens will be pulled together by the force of active comradeship in common labor and genuine sacrifices for the national welfare.

The idea of making the military system contribute something of positive value in the domestic life of the country is sound, but it breaks down when worked as hard as it is by the advocates of compulsory service. They are following the bad example of the traditional American democrats in insisting that the size of the military establishment should be determined by its expected reaction on American domestic life. The traditional democrats were reluctant to let the nation have as many soldiers or as much military training as might be needed, because they presupposed a necessary antagonism between democracy and military preparation. The contemporary advocates of universal service seek the enlistment and training of more soldiers than are needed, because they believe that the American who has undergone military training will constitute a better rather than a worse citizen. Both of them are falling into the mistake so common to golf players of keeping their eye too much

upon the hole and not enough upon the ball. The former have more fear of military training than they have confidence in democracy; the latter have more confidence in military training than they have confidence in democracy. Both need to understand that an army is one thing and a democracy is another. An army is a delicate and dangerous instrument which may be called upon to perform the terrible work of killing and submitting to being killed and which needs to be adjusted to the probable nature and amount of this work. A democracy is a form of political and social organization, which, because it fastens on the whole people ultimate responsibility for the public welfare, depends for its fulfillment upon the ability of men to rise to higher opportunities. The two are not divided by any necessary incompatibility, and it would be a timid and rudimentary democracy which tied itself to a policy of mis-armament merely because it is afraid to let enough of its citizens become properly trained soldiers. But if the two are not divided by any incompatibility neither are they tied together by mutual dependence. While a democracy may obtain incidental educational benefits from universal military training, only an impoverished democracy would rely upon compulsory military service for the education of its citizens in the essentials of citizenship. The American army will never be brought into wholesome relations with the American democracy until we cease to consider it either as a bogey or as a vehicle of civic grace. It is primarily a machine, planned and prepared to accomplish some desperately important and extremely hazardous practical work.

The reaction of a large army upon the moral integrity of a democracy depends in some measure upon its size and its method of being recruited but still more upon the purposes for which the citizens are asked to undergo military service. When in 1848 the American army was employed in conquering Mexican territory, its insignificant size and its volunteer origin did not prevent it from doing harm to the morale of the country. The compulsory enlistment of a large part of the manhood of the North during the Civil War ultimately strengthened the morale of the American nation, because its citizens killed and submitted to being killed for the realization of a binding and leavening political and social ideal. An army of any size and character can have a demoralizing effect upon the national life in case it is asked to do predatory work, while an army of the same size can add something fine and noble to the national

moral consciousness, in case it is pressed into the service of an enlightened national policy.

Thus we get back to the idea which has already been approached from a somewhat different road. The American army cannot be made democratic by keeping it weak and disorganized; but neither can it be democratized by merging the nation into the army. Not until we know what kind of a policy the larger army and navy will be required to serve, can we tell whether or not its adventure in military preparedness will ultimately be a uniting or a dividing influence in American domestic life.

The usual explanation that the United States is preparing only for defense, which is a policy on which all good citizens can agree, merely begs the question. A nation like Switzerland may arm purely for defense, because a small nation even if armed to the teeth is incapable of aggression, and because it cannot have an enemy of any size, which would not be large enough to threaten its independence; but in the case of a wealthy, populous and geographically isolated nation like the United States no sharp line can be drawn between defensive and aggressive armament. As has been frequently pointed out, the new army and navy will be required to defend a policy rather than merely a coast line. If the United States is invaded the invasion will originate not in a wanton attack from a strong military and naval power, but in a clash with a similar power over a difference of opinion about neutral rights at sea, the Open Door in China or the Monroe Doctrine in South America. In the event of such a quarrel there is really little difference between fighting to defend a policy and fighting to promote it. The Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door are from certain points of view aggressive policies, about the meaning and justice of which wide differences of opinion may exist both in this and in other countries. Hence what we need most of all to understand is the nature and scope of the policies in the interest of which we shall organize an efficient and dangerous army and navy. Until this is known not only can we not calculate how many and what kind of sailors and soldiers we may need and what sacrifices the American people may fairly be asked to make for them, but we shall be equally at a loss to estimate the moral and political reaction of the military preparations upon American domestic life.

Thus the dubious aspect of the existing situation does not consist in the fact or in the cost of preparedness but in the ambiguity of its underlying purposes. The American people are being asked to pay heavily in labor and money for a new army and navy as a weapon of self-defence, because only in this way can contentious matters be avoided and a sufficiently general measure of popular support be frightened into existence. Yet there is a very real probability that the new army and navy will be used chiefly for positive and for aggressive as opposed to merely defensive purposes. These positive purposes can be made in my opinion even more justifiable than a negative defensive policy, but their value and meaning is obscured because they are not frankly admitted, fully discussed and sufficiently defined. As long as they remain ambiguous and obscure, they create and encourage a dangerously suspicious and evasive attitude towards the question of preparedness. The socialists are already declaring that the new army and navy are intended as the instruments of imperialistic exploitation in Mexico and Central America, and the accusation cannot be answered either by silence or abuse. As a matter of fact if the soldiers which will be recruited and trained for the new army see active service anywhere they are more likely to see it, just as the old army has, outside rather than inside of the United States. The service beyond the seas may be susceptible of complete justification as a matter of democratic national policy, but it cannot be justified as a matter of self-defense, and only gradually will it be met with the same general approval and support as would an exclusively defensive service.

So we get back to the consideration which has been implicit in this whole discussion. The probable reaction of military preparedness upon American domestic life and institutions will be determined finally by the ability of the nation to assimilate the dangerous, unmanageable and exacting intruder into its moral organization. The work of assimilation depends in part upon our ability to create an army and a navy whose officers and enlisted men do not cease to participate in the civilian occupations and interests, yet who at the same time are not prevented by civilian meddling from doing thoroughly well their own special work. But it depends still more upon the national policy of which the new army and navy will be the chief instrument. In creating such an instrument the American nation is not submitting itself passively to the benign

influence of a militaristic Saint Michael. Neither is it submitting itself passively to the malign influence of a militaristic dragon. Neither is it pursuing a course which like the menace in the army and the navy after the Spanish American war, will leave its domestic life and institutions practically unchanged. What it is doing is to adopt a new and hazardous course, which in case it is to be successfully carried through will require certain radical changes in the intellectual and normal make-up of the American democracy.

The good American should consequently neither denounce nor glorify military preparedness. He should rather do what he can to make the country equal to its newly assumed responsibilities. The probability is that the effect of the adventure will be disastrous unless the American people can improve their political and economic organization, socialize their industries and convert their educational system into a source of democratic citizenship. Efficient and elaborate military preparations will neither prevent us from making these improvements nor assure their attainment. They must be obtained, if at all, on their own merits and by a sufficient concentration of purpose and effort upon special jobs, each in their turn. What the work of military preparation may do is to help the American people obtain the habit of concentrated attention upon their own collective tasks. As a result of an increase in concentration they should be able to rise more completely both to their obligations and opportunities, but no such result necessarily follows. It all depends upon the national policies, domestic and foreign, in the interest of which the fruits of concentration are used.

The decision to prepare, consequently, decided very little. The larger army and navy will of itself bring neither ruin nor regeneration to the American people. It will not even bring additional security, for security is a matter of comparative rather than actual armament. By deciding to prepare the American nation has merely issued a challenge to itself to use more foresight, more intelligence, and more purpose in the management of its affairs. Its more powerful army and navy like its more energetic and efficient government must be made the organ of a policy, which will consciously and tenaciously make for individual and social betterment. Such a policy has not yet been completely formulated, but the experiments and the discussions of the past year have indicated the direction in which it must be sought. All Americans who wish the national military and naval

establishment to be a boon rather than a curse to their country should turn their attention to the business of formulating it. The foreign policy of a democracy can be democratized only as a result of a sufficient measure of popular understanding and goodwill; and upon the democratizing of American foreign policy will depend the democratizing of its most dangerous organ,—a large and powerful military and naval establishment.

THE DEMOCRACY OF UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE

BY FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, LL.D.,

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This topic is resolvable into propositions of the indispensable science of guess work. There is no way of knowing what the effect of a large military and naval establishment on our domestic institutions and policy will be. The factors of causation are many, and the contingencies are uncertain. Nevertheless, we must guess as well as we can. Marvellous as the achievements of experimental science have been, and great as the accumulations of verified knowledge are, mankind yet goes on its daily way, in matters social and political, by guessing. It becomes important, therefore, to guess well. For practical purposes the difference between good guessing and bad guessing is incalculable. The social and political sciences are attempts to establish principles and methods of good guessing, in these domains. Encouraging progress has been made since this Academy was founded twenty years ago. It is this progress that we celebrate today.

The fundamental principles of good guessing are no other than those of scientific method in general and perhaps this fact offers as good a reason as any that could be found in justification of our temerity in speaking of social and political sciences. A careful discrimination of facts, qualities, and kinds of things, one from another, is the first requirement. Painstaking measurement, or estimate, of quantities is the second requirement. In attempting to guess what the effect of a large military and naval establishment upon our domestic institutions and policy will be, we shall plunge wildly unless we keep these requisites of method continually in mind.

What, then, are we to understand by the phrase, "A Large Military and Naval Establishment"? We are a nation of more than one hundred million souls. An army of one million men would have been impossibly large for the United States one hundred years ago, when our total population did not exceed five million persons, men, women, and children all told. It would have in-

cluded every male of military age, without allowance for invalids, cripples, and other incompetents. Would an army of one million men now be large? It would be less than one per cent of the population; it would be approximately five per cent of the male population of military age. To the cold-blooded statistician the figure is not of disturbing magnitude. To the sensitive soul of the pacifist, it is monstrous. Let us try to arrive at a view acceptable to a reasoning and commonsensible mind.

I admit that, at the moment, there is a painful failure to agree upon what or who the reasoning and commonsensible minds are. The pacifists have of late been exploiting the vocabulary of neurasthenic description. Their favorite words are, "hysteria," "hysterical," "fright," "epidemic of fear." I shall not argue with them about the mental state of those advocates of preparedness to whom these terms are so freely and unremittingly applied. I will only remind you, whom I now address, and who, I assume, are ladies and gentlemen of scientific temper, that one of the well-recognized symptoms of real hysteria—the genuine thing—is the indestructible conviction of its victims that the normal people round about them are hysterical.

Returning to tangible things: for a period nearly as long as the life of this Academy thus far, the world's example and measure of militarism has been the military strength, organization, equipment, and military morale of Germany. The normal make-up of this surpassing military force consists of a standing army, in time of peace, of 870,000 men, reserves of 4,530,000, men all thoroughly instructed, drilled, and equipped, and an available but unorganized force of 8,162,400. The population supporting this establishment is less than 70,000,000 persons. Leaving out of account the unorganized forces, and counting only the instructed and organized forces, the six greater nations of Europe, namely, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Russia, Italy, and Great Britain normally have an immediately available military force of more than 25,000,000 men. It will generally be admitted, I suppose, that military preparedness of this magnitude may, without exaggeration, be described as militarism.

The area of Europe, which its 25,000,000 to 30,000,000 soldiers are expected to defend or to devastate, as occasion arises, is 3,754,282 square miles. The area of the United States, plus the area of

Alaska and the area of our island possessions, is 3,743,306 square miles, or only 10,979 square miles less than the total area of Europe.

If we had a peace-footing army of one million men, and trained reserves of five million men, we should have for the protection of our continental area, Alaska, and island possessions, less than one fifth of the military establishment maintained upon the equal area of Europe; Japan and all other nations being left out of the reckoning. It is permissible to any free born American to call such a measure of preparedness "militarism" if he wants to. There are intellects, here and there, that function that way.

So I offer my first contribution to our guessing match upon the probable effect of a large military establishment in the United States. My guess is that a peace-footing army of one million men, and a trained reserve force of five million more men would have, so far as any reaction of mere magnitude is concerned, absolutely no effect whatever upon our American domestic life. It would be neither more nor less appreciable than a police force of 15,000 men in this city of Philadelphia, with its population of more than one million and a half inhabitants.

The magnitude, however, of a military establishment is by no means the only or the most important factor to be regarded when forecasting its probable reactions. Far more important than any dimensions that we are likely to have to consider, is the character or type of the army that we might create in the United States. Like England we have been, and are now, committed to a hired or professional army which, next after monarchy and hereditary rank, is the most undemocratic thing that man has so far invented. A hired army does not have to be large to establish undemocratic standards and to cause mischievous irritation. When the European War is over, the class struggle will break forth afresh, with fourfold energy. I think that we may confidently anticipate that the forces of organized labor and of socialism will actively oppose professional armies. Rightly or wrongly they will insist that a professional army may, at any time, be used by a dominant capitalism to quell strikes and to put down an industrial revolution.

International socialism, to its honor, is opposed to all preventable war, but it does not feel about universal military service as it feels about a hired and professional army. Universal military training puts all citizens on the same footing. The proletarian,

like the man who hires him, is taught the manual of arms, and, in the event of war, the man who hires him is equally liable with other men to take his chance in the trenches.

Many of you here present doubtless remember, as I do, the bitterness engendered by that form of conscription to which the federal government resorted in our Civil War. My father was the minister of a Congregational church in a country village, and I vividly recall my impressions of scenes in our home when women in humble circumstances came for a word of comfort, holding in trembling hands the tear-blotted scrap of paper that told of the death of husband or son, and, child as I was, I felt their smarting sense of injustice that their loved ones had to go to the battle field while the relatively well-to-do manufacturer and the merchant could buy substitutes. I do not need to argue, for you all know, that the worst of England's troubles in the present war have been directly attributable to her initial reliance upon an inadequate professional army, helped out by volunteers; while the superb democratic solidarity of France is attributable to the equality and justice of a universal military requirement, which puts all men of high or low degree on the same footing in the face of suffering and fate.

So I make my second guess, which is that if we create a hired army of more than half a million of men, and do not back it up by some form of universal military requirement and training, we shall engender irritation and distrust; we shall unnecessarily intensify the class struggle; and we shall disintegrate such democratic solidarity as we yet enjoy. Whereas, if we follow the examples of Switzerland and of France; recognize the responsibility of every able bodied citizen for the defence of his country; give every man a good, but not too exacting military training, we shall inspire all citizens with the conviction that our institutions are founded in justice and duty, and shall thereby invigorate our democracy.

These possible reactions of a larger military establishment are, I conceive, the most important ones to take account of. There are others not to be ignored. I will content myself with a brief consideration of two.

It is generally acknowledged by unprejudiced persons that military training may have an educational value. I count myself fortunate that in my college days I enjoyed such training for a

time, under the instruction of Captain, afterwards General, Thomas Ward of the Regular Army. I learned many valuable things that, as it turned out, I should have had no other opportunity in my life to learn, and that on the whole have contributed to my physical health, my sense of social duty, and my comprehension of the importance of efficiency in team work. Incidentally I learned, I think, the moral no less than the marching distinction between guiding right and guiding left, and I have since been trying to "guide right."

It is urged by men whose intelligence and distinction carry great weight that all of the educational advantages of military discipline may and should be obtained through other means. Cannot setting up exercises, coöperative activity, accuracy, regular habits, and all the rest be taught apart from their associations with war? Undoubtedly they might be, and they should be. Nevertheless, they are not, in our schools or in our colleges. After lifelong association with educational interests, I regret to have to say that I see very little reason to expect that these disciplines will be effectively developed in America unless the demand for them comes from the same source that has demanded and obtained them in continental Europe and in Australia. It is a thing one would rather not say, but it is true: we are a loose-minded and a loose-mannered people. Money making, and fads invented by lunatics are the only things that we take seriously. I share the conviction, which has been growing in many minds, that this deplorable state of mind, and of behavior is in no small measure the consequence of our fatuous custom of letting our young people "go on the loose," instead of holding them to tasks, duties, discipline, and achievement.

As a fact of experience it seems not to be true that the average man will do the things that he should do merely because they are expedient and right. He does them under economic or social pressure. Economic pressure in the United States, by comparison with economic pressure in the old world, has been relatively light; and our social pressure is formless and relatively ineffective because, in cutting loose from the aristocratic traditions and conventions of an older world community we have, at the same time, cut loose from a priceless heritage of human wisdom, in the vain thought that the laws of the universe are suspended in the Western Hemisphere.

Among the precepts of wisdom that we have been trying des-

perately to ignore is the truth that human beings do not do things for their health, bodily or spiritual, until their health is gone. They do things in the day's work because they have to; they do things for fun because they like to. The well set-up "cop," the fireman, the middy, and the soldier, do not take their exercises and their drills because they have reasoned that such exertions are good for them; they take them under social pressure, because they have to, on penalty of losing their jobs.

Here we have the crux of the whole question of the educational value of military training. Education as education, school boys and college boys do not take seriously in this country, and they will not take it seriously until they feel a social pressure more effectively organized than any we now have. Young men do take military training seriously, they are set up and disciplined by it because they feel that it is linked to tremendous realities, because it is a recognition of the solemn fact that nations have been obliged to repel invasion and to put down insurrection, and that the necessity may arise again. It is associated with convictions of obligation, with love of country, with loyalty and obedience.

Yes, with obedience. I am well aware that one half at least of that opposition to preparedness which parades as pacifism is neither more nor less than an anarchistic revolt against the teaching of obedience. I should be in sympathy with it if obedience were now, as in other days it was, submission to irresponsible power or authority. But obedience today, in America at least, as in Switzerland and in France, is another thing. It is a loyal and rational acquiescence in the general will; it is the *act* of being republican; it is the *act* of being democratic as distinguished from the verbal democracy of the humbug and the blatherskite. And this democracy of act, of loyal obedience to the general will, of willing sacrifice for the general good, is the republicanism that we need; it is the democracy that we must have if we are to be a nation respecting ourselves, and worthy of the world's respect.

Upon the second of the possible minor reactions of a larger military establishment than we have hitherto had in the United States, I shall be still more brief. Is there danger that by recognizing the importance of general military training, and by adopting it, we shall become interested in military operations for their own sake, and insensitive to the dreadfulness of war? Granting that

the maintenance of an adequate army of defence, and a powerful navy would not in itself be militarism, should we, nevertheless, by creating such establishments be entering upon a perilous course, leading to militarism in the end? My answer to this question is like the answers that I have given to the questions already considered. I call your attention to certain facts and discriminations. Where, in all human history, do you find that republican and democratic populations have become militaristic? Where, in all human history, do you find monarchies that have not become, or tended to become militaristic? Militarism is not a simple phenomenon; it is a highly complex product of many factors intricately combined. Monarchism harks back to ancient days, to reactionary instincts; it is intrenched in privilege; it resists change. But mankind progresses. Progress endangers monarchy; it threatens it with overthrow. Monarchy as such cares nothing for the populace, except as a base of supply and a fighting force. Monarchy is excited by progress; it casts about for policies to turn progress to its own account; militarism is the sum of the policies that it adopts. Militarism is, in fine, a policy of monarchy excited by progress. Democracy has nothing to gain by aggressive war—but everything to lose. Both instinctively and rationally democracies realize that such is the truth. Their danger lies not at all in a possible drift toward militarism; it lies rather in a failure to grasp the complexities of international interests and relations as they stand in the world today; in a failure to realize that good behaviour by the well-intentioned is no protection against aggression by the ruthless. The danger of republics and democracies lies in the immense difficulty of arousing democratic masses to an appreciation of the importance of forecast, of preparation, of timely organization, of the development of efficiency to meet contingencies not only possible but, in the imperfect and by no means righteous world of today, in the highest degree probable.

What I have said about the probable reactions of a larger military establishment on land applies, I think, in the main, to the question of the probable effect upon our domestic life and institutions of a large naval establishment. We may safely assume that the United States does not need the largest navy in the world, or even a navy as large as that of Great Britain. But we have long lines of coasts to protect, and the outlying possessions of Alaska

and our Pacific Islands. By creating a navy second to that of Great Britain, and larger than any other, we should merely measure our naval strength according to the amount of work that it may be called upon to perform. And I offer as my final guess in this discussion that neither individual nor nation can undermine character or endanger free institutions by foresight of events, evidence, provision of appliances, and discipline of strength according to the measure of responsibility and of obligation. It was not an alarmist who said: "He that provideth not for his own, is worse than an infidel."

BEWAREDNESS

BY HENRY D. ESTABROOK,
New York City.

Fellow Americans! Are we a free people, a people trying the experiment of self-government—trying to work out our own salvation without the guardianship of king, czar, pope or potentate? You know that we are. Who gave us our liberty? Nobody. We conquered it for ourselves in war against a king, and no king ever yet surrendered to his subjects except upon compulsion. And as our government was won by war, so its integrity was preserved by war, and so under God we will continue to defend it, by war if need be, though all the world should come at us in arms.

This is not rhetoric or bombast but the solemn statement of a solemn fact, and you know it. I agree as to the horrors of war. It is to prevent the horrors of war that I am in favor of preparedness. Whatever the dangers of a big standing army may be to the liberties of a people, they cannot obtain in this country, thanks to the wisdom of our forefathers, who were as much opposed to militarism as we are. Napoleon said that "an army crawls on its belly," meaning that it must have food and clothing and equipment. In other words, it must have money and lots of it. Now our Constitution wisely provides that every revenue measure must originate in the House of Representatives, the popular branch of our national legislature, so numerous in its membership that it may fairly be said to constitute the people themselves. Our Constitution wisely forbids any appropriation of money by the House of Representatives for a longer period than two years. Hence the army and navy—West Point itself—are absolutely dependent for their existence from year to year on the will of the people.

The pacifist warns us that we should be afraid to trust the protection of our lives and liberties and properties to any army made up of American citizens, but sees no danger whatever in trusting our lives, liberties and properties to the tender mercies of armies made up of citizens of Europe and Japan! Excuse me! If I must live in terror of an army I insist that it shall be an army made up

of my fellow citizens and not an army of foreign puppets trained to do the bidding of a bloodthirsty autocrat. Our own history vindicates the wisdom of our fathers, for after every one of our own wars our armies have melted back into the body of the people as naturally and inevitably as the smoke of battle melts into the firmament. But if—in the words of the soldier-poet—

If by treacherous yielding chance
Our land hath trafficked its splendid anger,
For only a lean inheritance
Of outward lustness and inward languor;
Why then, O comrades! it were full well
If the shocks of our armies were not over;
For the Lord made men to conquer hell,
And not to fatten like kine in clover!

We have been taught that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. We repeat this phrase over and over as a reminder of our duty, and not as a mere ritual that by mouthing has lost its meaning. And what is vigilance but preparedness?

The significance of preparedness is the significance that inheres in every precaution taken to avoid or minimize possible dangers. Caution means "wariness," from whence comes our word "beware." The motive back of bewaredness is the same precisely that suggests to Mr. Henry Ford, for example, the wisdom of taking out fire insurance on his automobile plant, or, better yet, of spending enough money in the first instance to make it fireproof. It is the same precisely that suggests to a steamship company the wisdom of equipping its ships with bulkheads and lifeboats. It is not expected that any ship will founder on an iceberg. The vigilance and care of trained men will be employed to prevent such a catastrophe. But the ship is liable to encounter sudden storms, black nights, and fog banks; and if a wreck should occur through any misadventure, the money spent for preparedness will have been well spent. The whole philosophy and significance of preparedness are summed up in the current phrase "safety first." The man who goes through life haphazard and trusting to luck may claim, and even believe, that he is trusting in God and is therefore wiser, better, and more righteous than his neighbors, but he is nothing of the sort. The foolish virgins were Portias compared with him. No man has a right to lay down on God for help until he has done all within his own power to help himself. God hates a quitter as he does a liar.

Specifically, and as a national issue, preparedness means a military equipment adequate to the defense of this government against possible foreign aggression, and to give sanction to the just demands of our government upon all those who would otherwise disregard them. It is amazing to me that any genuine American should oppose a program looking to this end. Why should our government maintain sheriffs, policemen, a constabulary, and a militia to enforce its demands upon its own citizens, but with fatuous imbecility take it out in scolding and making faces at a foreign enemy? The placid assumption of the pacifists, so called, that preparedness necessarily means war with somebody, or that those who are in favor of it are less concerned than themselves in preserving the peace, is on a par with that assumption once made by Mr. Bryan that all those who were in favor of an honest dollar and opposed to the free coinage of silver at sixteen to one were enemies of the common people to be crucified on a cross of gold. And you will recall how near Mr. Bryan came to making them believe all this. Lincoln said "You can fool all of the people some of the time, and some of the people all of the time, but you can't fool all of the people all of the time." An inscrutable destiny seems to have set apart Mr. Bryan as the mouthpiece and exponent of the contingent that can be fooled all of the time, and unhappily the contingent is large enough to make it worth his while.

But listen to this from the Holy Bible—to what it says is liable to happen to a "careless" people; a smug people,—a people sitting in fancied security, trusting to their blandishments, their enchanters, and their stargazers to ward off possible evils. I read from Isaiah:

Now therefore hear this, thou that art given to pleasures, that dwellest carelessly (or sittest securely) that sayest in thine heart, I am and there is none else beside me; I shall not sit as a widow, neither shall I know the loss of children: but these two things shall come to thee in a moment in one day, the loss of children and widowhood; in their full measure shall they come upon thee, despite of the multitude of thy sorceries, and the great abundance of thine enchantments. For thou hast trusted in thy wickedness; thou hast said, None seeth me; thy wisdom and thy knowledge, it hath perverted thee; and thou hast said in thy heart, I am, and there is none else beside me. Therefore shall evil come upon thee; thou shalt not know from whence it riseth (or how to charm it away): and desolation shall come upon thee suddenly, which thou knowest not. Stand now with thine enchantments, and with the multitude of thy sorceries, wherein thou hast laboured from thy youth; if so be, thou shalt be able to prevail. Thou art wearied in the multitude of thy counsels; let now the astrologers (or diviners of

the heavens), the stargazers, the monthly prognosticators, stand up and save thee from the things that shall come upon thee. Behold, they shall be as stubble; the fire shall burn them; they shall not deliver themselves from the power of the flame; it shall not be a coal to warm at, nor a fire to sit before. Thus shall the things be unto thee wherein thou hast labored: they that have trafficked with thee from thy youth shall wander every one his own way; there shall be none to save thee.

Even Jeremiah could not resist the temptations offered by the unpreparedness of a people, for he said to his own people:

Arise, get you up into a nation that is at ease, that dwelleth without care: saith the Lord, which hath neither gates nor bars, which dwelleth alone.

And their camels shall be a booty and the multitude of their cattle a spoil. I will bring their calamity from every side, saith the Lord.

And we are unprepared. We have neither "gates nor bars." We are careless of the future, and the machinations of wicked men and the ambitions of royalty. We sit in fancied security, trusting to the potency of our riches and the divinations of our stargazers. We are fat, otiose, spineless, insolent and rich. Could the devil himself add anything to this catalogue to make us riper for plucking? Yes! Yes, for with the best intentions possible we have succeeded in incurring the enmity of every nation on earth. Is this state of imbecility to endure? Shall we continue to listen to a wandering voice? When this voice was recently removed from the counsels of our government, we thought, good easy souls, we had gotten rid of it. Has Mr. Bryan proved himself so good a prophet in the past that we can afford to trust him for the future?

Preparedness, therefore, is only another name for insurance against contingent evils. And America has more things of value to insure and more money to pay the premium than any nation in the world. What is an insurance premium? It is simply the price paid for peace of mind, for sleep o' nights. It represents, not an investment as a source of income, but an annual charge upon the business protected by it. The insurer kisses his money good-bye, hoping that the calamity which alone would make it an investment instead of an expense will never happen. The amount of his premium is based on the value of the property insured and the character of the risk. A marine risk at present rates costs money. Our ship of state is freighted with property worth at least 187 billions of dollars, and has a passenger list of 100 million souls. Can we afford to insure it at a premium of about one-fourth of 1 per cent of

the value of our goods alone? Can we not afford to spend as much—nay, only a fraction as much—on our army and navy as we squander every year on whiskey and tobacco, or half as much as we pay every year for automobiles? Oh! but it is not the expenditure of dollars *per se* that your pacifist objects to. He has a soul above skittles and beer.

It is the principle of the thing. War, he says, is the curse of the world, and it is time for the people to put an end to it. Amen! and Amen! But how would Chinafying America accomplish that result? The people themselves seldom make war. Only kings make war, and I tell you that so long as there are kings in the world there is bound to be war in the world. We may never hope for universal peace until every king and kinglet, prince and princelet—together with their preposterous claims of divine right—together with all the pomps and shams and frauds of royalty have been extirpated from the earth. The sword of liberty is not a metaphor. So long as tyranny goes armed, liberty dare not disarm.

America would fain be neutral, but if war is hell, neutrality as we have found it isn't exactly heaven, and so preparedness becomes religion by a sort of necessity.

Washington called it the most effective way of preserving peace and declared that a free people should not only be always armed but disciplined according to a plan.

Lincoln declared that war in defense of national life is not immoral, and that war in defense of independence is an inevitable part of the discipline of nations.

Is America a nation with the noblest institutions to maintain, or a salmagundi of nationalities—a congeries of foreigners over here for the money in it?

And America has more than her physical possessions to defend. These and her opportunities, she willingly shares with all who come to her. But the thoughts that are hers, the ideas that are hers, and hers alone,—she is bound to defend always, in all ways, and against all comers!

For America today is the cynosure of the world. Her ideas, like the ideas of Christianity, will disturb the conscience and inspire the hopes of humanity until the coming of that perfect day. Even China has seen our flag that symbolizes our ideas and our ideals, and her senile, rheumy eyes have kindled at the sight. From out

its crimson arteries she has drawn new life, a younger blood, and has felt the pulse and tingle of the transfusion. China—old, old China, twin sister of Time himself—China has seen Old Glory and is struggling with the thought of liberty. And we Americans know there are thoughts so big that only a Caesarian operation can give them birth. Jones Bill or no Jones Bill, our flag is in the Orient to stay. It will never budge from the ramparts of Manila, but there, like a constellation in freedom's skies, its stars shall multiply and shine forever.

NATIONAL IDEALS AND PREPAREDNESS

BY WILBUR C. ABBOTT,

Professor of History, Yale University.

An English writer has recently declared that Germany is the catfish in the cosmic tank, which has stirred up us codfish nations and prevented our becoming overfat with material prosperity, by giving us something else to do and to think about besides getting rich. And whether one is pro-German or "so neutral that he doesn't care who whips them," there is something in that statement well worth pondering. It requires no consideration to perceive that the tremendous controversy now raging in the United States, and in the world generally, whatever the military outcome of the war, is having an influence on the thought of mankind scarcely to be measured in comparison with any such movement in the past fifty years. It has not merely diverted our attention from our absorption in money-getting; it has not only showed us that business, which we have regarded for a generation as the chief end of man, is, after all, only one of the interests of the world and not always the most vital one. It has impressed upon us that moral no less than economic factors are still a part of human affairs, and the most important ones; that self-sacrifice, honor and courage, duty and discipline are still determining elements in human life, and still to be reckoned with in the equation. It has caused not merely an extraordinary revival of the religious factors in human experience, which has, indeed, had little reflex in this country; but it has revealed a powerful revival of that sentiment which we call patriotism, which has extended itself even to the United States. In the face of the doctrines of the so-called "wider liberty," "greater socialization," and "universal brotherhood," there has emerged a large body of individuals who have manifestly no desire to be transformed into citizens of the world, or even of a municipalized society. They are not anxious to find themselves men without a country or a home; even though they are assured that the nation and the family are outworn institutions doomed to extinction. And, in any consideration of the probable effect of a change in our national equipment and policy, that simple

and old-fashioned element must be taken into account, even though it has not been so vocal as the more advanced reformers in recent years.

It is true that some of my friends have declared themselves with more or less—generally less—restraint upon the other side. Moved by the horrors of war, as well as by a comfortable optimism which proceeds in many instances from a life which has had few hard places, they have declared, virtually, that nothing is worth fighting for. But no one who has really lived in a real world believes that. He knows that mere goodness, without strength or intelligence, not only makes him the prey of those with less conscience than himself, but leads to the destruction of the very ideal for which he stands. That peace hath her victories no less than war carries as its corollary that it has its conflicts as well. Nor is any one who has knowledge of affairs likely to believe that the business world has renounced self-seeking and the inevitable struggle which comes from competition. Least of all can any one, viewing the tremendous world conflict, taking into consideration the pleas of economic necessity put forward by one set of powers and the steps being taken by their opponents to inaugurate a trade war on the conclusion of the armed struggle, be under any illusions that there are more ways of putting men and nations out of action than by bullets and bayonets.

But it is as difficult in these days that try men's souls, to declare one's self in favor of reasonable precaution against aggression without being condemned as a militarist, as it is to urge a policy of keeping out of unnecessary trouble without being hailed as a pacifist. It has been said with much humor and more point that recent events seem to have demonstrated that "Thrice just is he who has his quarrel armed"; for our own position of benevolent but disarmed neutrality has brought the United States very nearly to impotence to a cause in which we, in common with all nations save one consider right—that of humanity in sea warfare.

And this is the second of the considerations which present themselves in such a problem as that we have before us, not merely the preservation of our property but of our principles by the increase of our land and naval force. It is not easy to see how the maintenance of an army and a navy adequate to attain these ends can be regarded as dangerous to international morality any more than the

employment of a proper police force—to which our pacifist friends doubtless contribute—is inimical to the social order of the communities in which they live.

For if history teaches one lesson more than another, it is that peace and war are not so much questions of so-called preparedness as of the spirit and aims of a people and its rulers, and this is a problem not of an army and a navy so much as of the human heart. The first king of Prussia prepared the army with which his son, Frederick the Great, wrested Silesia from Austria, but his own reign was an era of all but unbroken peace. Never has the United States been in a better position to enforce its authority and extend its power in the western hemisphere than at the close of Civil War; and never has its peacefulness been more in evidence. The fundamental thing is what nations are trained to think and believe—those matters of the spirit which we know as traditions and ideals.

Any increase of our forces by sea and land will, obviously, bring certain new elements into our national life and produce certain easily predicated results. It will increase taxation; it will open to a far wider portion of our people what is to them virtually a new profession, that of arms; it will, in some degree, turn men's thoughts away from the complacent self-satisfaction which our long isolation has engendered. What other results it may have, we can but conjecture; and it is an old maxim, "never prophesy unless you know." One of my more belligerent friends observed to me that he didn't know what would happen to the United States if it increased its army and navy, but he could guess pretty closely what would happen to us if we didn't. And in that observation lies one answer to the problem. It is that, if we desire the continuance of the peace which we have so long enjoyed, that peace in which alone rests the possibility of working out the solution of the tremendous problems of democracy in an industrialized society which press so strongly upon us, and which would be indefinitely postponed or infinitely aggravated by interference from outside, it is our duty to secure ourselves within reason against the unscrupulous statecraft which the last ten years has again introduced into world politics.

Nor is it merely a question of protecting our own shores. No individual and no nation lives or dies alone, its obligations are not wholly material nor are they confined within its own borders. Favored by its geographical location and the political developments of

the European powers during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century, the United States was enabled to develop a peculiar form of government and institutions in peace and comparative isolation without the necessity of maintaining a force to protect itself. Within a generation circumstances have completely changed. Thanks to the rise of a militaristic and imperialistic Germany, with ambitions for world-dominion, of a modernized Japan hungry for territorial expansion, to the fact that Europe has entered on the Pacific stage of her career, that eastern Asia has taken its place in world-politics, and that the United States now holds the old Spanish route to the Philippines, we are no longer on the edge but in the center of affairs. South America is now a first-rate factor in the world; with the same form of government and measurably the same ideals as our own. Thus, however we may deprecate or seek to deny our position and its responsibilities beyond our borders, we are compelled to look at affairs in a very different light than was vouchsafed even to our own fathers. Whether we believe that duty has determined destiny or that destiny has determined our duty, the fact of our present situation remains essentially the same.

Captain Mahan has acutely observed that this country, like England, is, for all military purposes, an island nation; since it is inconceivable that we should expect invasion from Mexico or Canada; and that our policy should be directed with this axiom in mind. It should be, in brief, a navy adequate to defend our coasts, an army large enough to support the sea forces, and a reserve sufficient to support them both. But beside these we should have, in so far as possible, an "open" diplomacy, and a people "educated," to use a popular phrase, to a point where the appeal of demagogue and gusts of popular passion cannot move their government from those principles of peace and humanity for which a democracy like ours stands, if it stands for anything. That such a program can make for the species of militarism which produces war for what a recent German publicist defending Hohenzollern aggression has described as "profit or necessity," no reasonable man can well believe.

That it will in any sense affect the framework of our governmental system as we have inherited it from its makers, it is no less difficult to imagine. But—and here is the point of the whole contention—will it not modify the ideals and ambitions of the society which underlies that framework; will it not make us as a people

truculent and belligerent, eager for wider dominion and power, more ready to engage in far-reaching adventure, imperialistic, centralized, aggressive? That question does not stand alone. By a natural, perhaps inevitable process of economic development we have acquired, at the same moment that we have been drawn into the maelstrom of world politics, a huge population, ignorant not only of our institutions, our traditions, and the fundamentals of our polity, but foreign to our civilization. That another generation may see these men or their children Americans must be the fervent hope of all who believe in the United States and what it stands for. But that it will be the country we have known and loved there is little reason to believe. That its ideals and practices will have changed, no one can well doubt. And they should change, else would come stagnation and ultimate death. They do change before our eyes, though we are blind to the deeper meaning and tendency of that change. But it is our duty, as we stand at the beginning of a road that leads we know not whither, to see that, whatever form the new republic shall take, that it shall maintain "those eternal qualities of high endeavor, on which, amid all changes of fashion, formula, direction, fortune, in all times and places, the world's best hopes depend." That we should have a hundred thousand or a million men in our armies is a question of absorbing practical importance; but beside the deeper issue as to what the people of the United States believe should be done with them, it sinks into insignificance. For what men live by, is, in the last result, what they believe. Justice, tranquillity, defence, welfare and liberty, these were the ideals of the framers of our constitution. If, through the undreamed-of adventures of the coming years, we are able to keep our children in that faith; if, still more, we can inculcate such principles into our more recently acquired elements, we may look upon the future with untroubled eyes. "For he that walks in these statutes, and keeps these judgments, deals truly, and is just, shall surely live."

COMMAND OF THE AIR

BY REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT E. PEARY,
Washington, D. C.

We do not respect a man unless he possesses some elements of force of character.

And no nation can win respect or exert influence unless it stands for forcefulness and strength.

In no way can we, as a nation, stand so effectively for forcefulness, for strength, and for world influence, as by Command of the Air.

Our geographical position, our size, our resources, our wealth, our astonishing national growth, the watchfulness of Providence which has accompanied more than one of our national crises, all indicate that our rôle in the world's future, that our part in world influence, is to be of the first importance. Just as in the war with Spain, events external to us and beyond our control forced us from our position of isolation into that of a world power with possessions and interests circling the globe, so today events external to us, and entirely beyond our control, are shaping for us a position and an influence greater than ever before.

To touch upon only one of the directions in which that world influence will act, I will note our position as the most influential member of that American Federation which is surely coming, a federation of peaceful, prosperous, autonomous states, impregnable in their union, occupying the entire western hemisphere, seated upon two continents, reaching from pole to pole. In that coming world influence, the one great dominant thing which will overshadow all else will be air superiority and power.

Twenty-four hundred years ago Themistocles, Athenian statesman, soldier, and creator of Athenian naval policy, asserted the principle that "He who commands the sea commands all." With the naval victory of Salamis, which changed the history of the world, he drove home the truth of his principle, and sent it down the centuries to be a living axiom of national power and influence today.

"He who commands the sea commands all" still holds good. But it has a rival, the command of the air, without which it is beginning to be valueless, and in the near future it will be superseded entirely by the axiom "He who commands the air commands all."

However, we cannot yet minimize the importance of command of the seas. The battle cruiser offers us the quickest and surest means of securing that command, but that is another story. What we must do now is to insure command of the air, or we shall be hopelessly outclassed. Great and important as is a sufficient navy for our safety, I speak advisedly when I say that our air service of the near future will be more vital to our safety than our navy and our army combined.

Air Inferiority of United States

The United States Army was the first army to have an aeroplane in 1909. Our navy was the first navy to have a seaplane in 1911.

Yet where are we now? We have, army and navy together, less than 100 aeroplanes, and could hardly muster 50 aviators. Little Bulgaria with an area somewhat greater than Maine, and a population less than Massachusetts, has over 300 aeroplanes.

The personnel of the French air service today numbers more officers and men than there are in our entire army. The personnel of the British air service numbers more officers and men than we have in our entire navy. Germany has not less than 9,000 aeroplanes, and all these countries are constantly adding with feverish haste to their equipment in this department.

The Ministries of these nations which have thousands of aeroplanes, and whose frontiers are insignificant compared with ours, are constantly apologizing to the people of their countries for not being able to increase their air fleets fast enough to defend their country and protect the lives of their people.

The sooner we wake up to the fact that command of the air is absolutely vital to our safety, and that it can be secured more quickly and at less cost than any other form of defense, the better it will be for us.

Aeroplane Has Completely Changed Modern Warfare

The aeroplane has completely changed modern warfare. Surprise attacks are no longer possible. And if one of the contestants

can secure command of the air and deprive the other of it, conditions immediately become those of a fight between a blind man and one in possession of his eyesight. In the present struggle abroad the air strength of the contestants on the Western front is so nearly equal, that the balance wavers from side to side, first one and then the other having the advantage.

In our case, our geographical position gives us a natural advantage which if we utilize *now* should relieve us of anxiety.

An attack upon us must come by sea. Our coast line as a base gives us an inestimable advantage in aerial warfare, and will enable us to send out such a veritable cloud of aeroplanes, as would completely overwhelm and destroy any number of aeroplanes that could be transported on the decks of a hostile fleet, thus leaving us in the possession of our eyes and the enemy blinded.

But we must be ready *before* the fact. There will be no time to get ready when the attack comes. Once an enemy secures a base on our shores, any and every city in the country may be the prey of his air squadrons. And a single squadron of aeroplanes sweeping across New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington, in a frightful shower of falling bombs would cause more damage in an hour, than our entire air service would cost.

Should Have 5,000 Aeroplanes on Each Coast

We should have at the very minimum not less than 2,000 seaplanes ready for duty on the Atlantic Coast, and an equal number on the Pacific, 5,000 on each coast would be much better.

At each important place squadrons of aeroplanes should be parked like tents of the summer encampment of the National Guard.

Do not think I am talking wildly. In 1900 there were some 700 automobiles in this country. Today there are some 3,000,000 and it has been estimated that the output for this year will be over 1,000,000. The growth of the aeroplane will be equally or more rapid than that of the automobile.

Aero Coast Patrol

I have the honor to be chairman of a Commission which is working on a definite constructive proposition that will give us a continuous picket line of seaplanes around the entire country to

warn of the approach of an enemy. A central committee made up of two U. S. Senators, a leader of the House, an Assistant Secretary, a Head of a Department, a New York banker, and one of our foremost inventors, is located in Washington. The Adjutant General of every state, and the Commanding Officer of each State Naval Militia is a member of the Commission.

The total cost of the system will be about \$500,000. This is one third as much as was raised both by France and by Germany by public subscription previous to the war for their air services. The cost of each section will be \$10,000. This is an amount easily within the reach of most coast communities and within the reach of hundreds of individuals in those communities. Maine was the first to take up and formally endorse this system, and Maine will have the honor of establishing the first station of the System this summer. Fourteen other states have the funds assured for a section of the system in each of those states.

The conception is this, a continuous picket line of seaplanes or flying boats fifty miles or more off shore and two thousand feet or more in the air, around our entire coasts from Eastport, Maine, to Brownsville, Texas, and from San Diego, California, to Cape Flattery, Washington, each machine traveling back and forth—back and forth—over its section or "beat," a winged sentinel, forming a cordon, a continuous line of whirring shuttles, weaving a blanket of protection around the country.

The idea is to divide our entire coast lines into sections of convenient length, say about one hundred miles. Each of these sections and stations will be equipped with a seaplane. Each of these machines will carry a driver and an observer and be equipped with light wireless apparatus, powerful glasses and a sensitive microphone. When in active operation these seaplanes in each section will take their position some fifty miles off shore, and patrol their respective beats continuously back and forth, in clear weather two thousand feet or more above the sea, from which altitude ships fifty miles distant may be seen. At night or in the fog the seaplanes would, of course, sweep much lower, at all times themselves invisible to an enemy.

By means of the wireless, information as to the character, number and apparent destination of approaching ships will be transmitted to the shore station, and from these to Washington whence,

if the ships are hostile, orders will issue directing the movements of our fleet and the submarine squadrons for the preparation of the coast defenses and for the concentration of troops, if necessary, while reserve planes hurrying out will keep the approaching craft under continuous inspection while themselves invisible.

Such a system is a new departure. The like of it exists nowhere at present, and yet it involves no new principle, but is simply the utilization and multiplication of the known capabilities of a single seaplane.

Follow me a moment. One of these seaplanes is traversing its beat 50 to 100 miles west of San Francisco and 2,000 feet or more up in the air. A ship or ships appear on the horizon fifty miles farther out. The powerful glasses are brought into play by the observer. His trained eye recognizes the number, character, and course of the ships. The wireless crackles the information to the shore station. The shore station transmits it to the great government wireless station at San Diego. That station snaps it eastward across the Rockies. In a few minutes Washington knows all about it, and, if necessary, orders are snapped back to San Francisco, for whatever action is advisable.

Let us imagine it is war. This advance notice of the approach of the enemy is the first step. In modern warfare, hours and even minutes may spell victory. The enemy is still unaware that his approach is known, for the sentinel seaplane was invisible to him. With the next step a cloud of scout aeroplanes sweep out in such numbers as to overwhelm and destroy the enemy's aeroplanes, leaving him blinded. Then follow the squadrons of great battle tri-planes, each machine carrying several tons of high explosives to drop upon the hostile fleet. You can imagine the result.

In time of peace the undoubted improvement and perfecting of our seaplanes as a result of the fifty or more machines in this system in constant practice and training along our coasts may be worth the cost of the entire system. If the system results in training the entire personnel of the Militia Aviation Sections of our coast states, it will have returned full value on the cost of the system. And a single plane might discover, report and send assistance to a ship in distress, that with cargo would be equal in value to the total cost of the system.

It is proposed to supply the equipment of these stations

(\$10,000 for a station) by the private initiative and generosity of the coast communities. Once equipped the stations will be turned over to the control of the Naval Militia, and the maintenance and upkeep of the stations will be met by that Department.

England's Bitter Lesson

Two years ago England was as we are now, asleep, and with more reason than we, for the possibilities of the aeroplane were not then known, while we now have before us an object lesson which no intelligent mind that knows the facts can fail to understand. They felt secure as we do now. The idea that anything could reach or harm them in their tight little island was preposterous. Today the papers, the people, and members of Parliament in England are saying, "Give us a man at the head of our Air Department who can protect us from the airships of the enemy, and if he does not do it, hang him."

We shall be saying the same in the near future, if we do not learn and utilize *now* the lesson Providence has put before us. We have the chance to learn it in peace and sunshine. Our neighbors across the water are learning it in tears and bloodshed.

Suppose such a horror from the air should fall upon this city as has already fallen more than once upon the east coast of England, leaving a trail of dead and dismembered women and children, mutilated men, and ruined property. Would the whole country flame with rage? Would there be a snarl of "Why has this happened?" "Who is responsible?" "Why were we not ready to prevent it?"

The following will give some idea of how death and destruction, fear, rage, and bitterness of spirit, have driven home to England the vital importance of air power. Equally instructive material could be presented from Germany, from France, from Italy, from Russia, but the British material is more convenient and accessible. *Mr. Balfour* in the House of Commons said:

It would avail nothing to England to have control of the sea unless it had also control of the air.

Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, in the House of Lords, March 9, said:

At the present time the air service is merely auxiliary to the fighting forces of the navy and army. I can see a time coming when the air service will be more important than the army and navy. We must get into the habit of looking at the air service not

as an auxiliary to the army and navy but as a great service which is an establishment of itself, and to which we shall have to look in future years for the defense of this country. The advantages of our insularity are rapidly disappearing. Upon the efficiency of the air service much will depend. Let it not be said with shame of our generation, that we did not trouble to guard in the air what our forefathers won on the sea.

Lord Beresford said:

The new air warfare is going to be of so tremendous a character that it may supersede the army and navy. Anyway we should be ahead in the air, the same as we are on the water.

On the 22d of March in the British House of Commons the following statements were made in the course of debate:

For dealing with this very pressing question of the air, there should be sittings *every* day and if necessary *all* day, until some solution is found for our third class position as an air power. Our national pride has suffered a blow which it will take us many years and much labor to recover from. Our very national existence in the next twenty years will lie in the ocean of the air. Within the next five or ten years we may live to see the sky darkened by aeroplanes. The idea of a country owning five hundred aeroplanes will be looked upon as a humorous event of the past. *The supremacy of the air lies ready to any government which has sufficient initiative to see to it.*

At a meeting called by the United Ward's Club of the City of London on March 28, a resolution was moved

that the meeting considers the most effective means of protection against air raids would be by the creation and maintenance of an efficient air fleet in addition to and independent of the existing naval and military requirements.

At this meeting Mr. Pemberton-Billing, a member of the House of Commons said:

What we want to bring about is something grander than the air defense of London. We want to demand of the government that the money, brains, ability, and resources we possess shall be employed, and that we shall gain as soon as possible and maintain forever the supremacy of the air. For the cost of two day's war we could have such a fleet of aeroplanes as would darken the skies. We must do it. This country must be supreme in the air. It has been suggested that I am a man of one idea. Before many years have passed that *one idea* will occupy the minds of many men of this country and women, too. Every inland town lies on the coast of the ocean of the air, liable to instant and violent attack. When we think that in about ten years' time countries will possess not 1,000 but 100,000 aeroplanes at the cost of a few battleships, it is a terrible thought,

These aeroplanes will fly at a speed of 100 to 120 miles an hour. Their powers of mobilization will be alarming. It means that if our relationship with another country is strained at 6 o'clock in the evening, before we arise in the morning it will be possible for our principal towns and cities to be laid waste.

Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, guest of the Liberal War Committee at a luncheon at the House of Commons, March 22, said among other things:

He had come to speak to a serious and well informed body on the need of concentrating special attention and effort on aviation. He was pleading for a more energetic policy in regard to all forms of air craft. . . . The struggle for supremacy in the air was only just beginning and would not stop when peace came. . . . Compared with the cost of dreadnaughts, field guns, and armies in the field, the cost of even a huge aerial fleet would be small. What was wanted now in our statesmen and in our nation was more power of imagination. They could neither win nor hold an Empire merely by "safe" policies. "Safe" men were all very well for times of peace. But time came when they might be dangerous. What they wanted now was *new* men with *new* ideas. Problems of the air were all new. There were no precedents to bear in mind, no files to refer to, no historical works to consult. The new service would need leaders, who had ideals, foresight, imagination, and scientific training. These leaders must always have a clear vision of future possibilities, most of which were probabilities.

All that I have read applies equally to us. It might be said in Washington, in Committee room or on the floor of Congress.

One Week of War Cost Will Give Us the Lead

One week of present war cost to Great Britain would give this country such a fleet of aeroplanes as could in an emergency rise from our shores literally like a flock of sea-gulls, to defend and insure our national integrity.

The basic ideals of this country, born of our ancestry, our national growth, our physical position, are bigness and realization. These two ideals are our ever present though sometimes unconscious trend in every line of effort. Here is an opportunity for us to make good on these ideals on a great scale, by taking up in earnest the air service of this nation, recognizing that it is of crucial importance, and putting it and ourselves in the very world van.

Our geographical position, our national rank and standing, *our national safety, demand it.*

Our resources and mechanical genius not only permit it, but make it easily possible. Shall we do it?

Mr. Chairman, I would that I might have the power to transmit to this audience the intensity of my feeling on this subject.

It is vital, *vital*, VITAL to us, this Command of the Air.

A FOREIGN VIEW OF THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST PREPAREDNESS IN THE UNITED STATES

BY GEORGE NESTLER TRICOCHE,

Late Staff Officer, French Foot Artillery.

The first point which generally strikes an unbiased foreigner in the present discussion about Preparedness is that the adversaries of increased armaments claim that no sentiment favorable to the latter seems to exist "outside what is known to have been manufactured by the Navy League. . . ." Now, to the European who, devoid of prejudices, has taken the trouble of questioning people in different walks of life, or of simply listening to conversations, things do not present themselves at all in this light. It has been said that clergymen and educators are almost unanimously adverse to preparation for war. Yet, a poll taken on preparedness among Presbyterian clergymen by a Chicago magazine showed 270 favoring larger armaments, and only 50 opposed to it; on the other hand, an inquiry made by *The World* last December proved that former Presidents of the United States, governors, university presidents, and leading business men of this country were unanimous in the opinion that preparedness should be dealt with by the Congress "immediately, without regard to politics." To a foreign military observer, the growing popularity of summer camps for students and business men, and the steady increase in the membership of the National Guard, are the best signs of a change for the better in public opinion in respect to matters of national defence.

The arguments against preparedness can be roughly divided into two classes: those dealing with generalities, those referring to specific points. Among the former, we find humanitarian or religious considerations.

The Arguments against Preparedness Answered

War is Incompatible with the Teaching of Christianity. First it is to be noted that clergymen do not agree on this subject. Canon Morley very aptly asserts that "in the act of recognizing and

including within herself nations, the Christian Church necessarily also admitted war within her pale." "*Peace at any price* is certainly not a maxim of heavenly origin" declares Rev. Stone Hubbell. Second, one may find in Christianity a justification for preparedness, because inadequate preparation causes needless suffering to the sick, the wounded and all men who have not received a sufficient training for the hardships of war.

The Very Barbarity of War Makes it Unjustifiable. Undoubtedly, war is one of the greatest evils that can befall mankind. Yet the world's history teaches us that often war has been a necessary evil. Suppose the American Colonies had not fought England. Suppose, in 1861, the North had meekly submitted to have the Union destroyed. Suppose the Cubans had not shaken off the Spanish yoke. Does Mr. Bryan—or Mr. Ford—really believe that the Boers, the Servians, the Belgians ought to have yielded to the request of the stronger countries which had invaded their territory, and contented themselves with declaring that they were "too proud to fight"?

Whether War has its Usefulness or not, it is Bound to Disappear within a Short Time: Therefore, it is Useless to Increase Armaments. Unfortunately, pacifists do not give us any facts; they remain within the scope of hopes and expectations, and these are based as a rule, upon the Hague Court of Arbitration. But it is a sad truth that the success of the latter has so far been dubious. None of the serious conflicts that have arisen since the Court was established has been settled by arbitration. Some adversaries of preparedness think that a readjustment of militarism will be, so to speak, the natural outcome of the present war. This is a highly desirable, yet an impossible occurrence. Should the war end in a draw, each side will strive to get strong enough to renew the fight as soon as possible. If one side wins, the victor will not, himself, reduce considerably his military establishment, for in the latter lies his only guarantee that his terms will be complied with. Moreover the vanquished will never be prevented from cherishing the hope of a revenge. What nation was ever so crushed that it gave up that hope? It is extremely easy for the American pacifist to say to the belligerents: "I think I am getting tired of this war, and of all wars in general. Kindly stop that troublesome fighting; cease that slaughter that nauseates me, and shocks my

nerves. Disarm, all of you, and live in peace for ever more!" This very same philanthropist would think it a bad joke, or an insult if, after being kicked into the gutter by a bully, he was told by a bystander: "My friend, for the sake of universal harmony, shake hands with the other fellow, then go home, and forget all about it." It is customary for people who are not conversant with military institutions to trust in the exhaustion of the now warring armies to further the endeavors of those who seek universal and everlasting peace. This is a gross mistake. Armies recuperate in a wonderfully short time. Instances of this are numerous in military history: the best known are those of the Prussian army after Jena, of the French army after the campaigns of 1812 and 1870-71.

A Strong Military Establishment Fosters the Development of a War Caste, Liable to Endanger Peace. Now, it jumps to the eyes that the value of this argument is in direct ratio to the degree of militarism of the nation to which it applies. In America, people seem to confound military preparedness, or even military spirit with *militarism*. General Wille, commander of the Swiss army, remarked lately that there is nothing incongruous in having compulsory service in a country based on democratic principles. In fact, real militarism exists nowhere, except in Germany, and, to some extent, in Russia. France and the nations with an efficient militia system, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, are not infected with militarism: *is the United States so little democratic that she should dread what causes no fear in those countries?*

Preparedness Adds Cubits to the Stature of All Mischief-Makers in the Land. If we understand this well, pacifists fear that a greater state of preparation would render this nation aggressive. The history of the United States shows plainly that when the country at large wishes to avoid war, no amount of clamoring by the "yellow press" or ordinary scaremongers is heeded by the Congress or the Cabinet. On the other hand, whenever public opinion expresses itself forcibly in favor of war, war is liable to break out in spite of the wishes of the government. It would be as impossible to create *now* an overwhelming current of opinion for a break with Germany or even Mexico, as it was to stop it in 1812 and 1898 when it manifested itself against England and Spain. The record of this country's dealings with Hawaii, Porto Rico, the

Philippines, Colombia, not to speak of older facts like the appropriation of Texas and California, is pretty good for a nation which has never been prepared for war. From this, one may draw the conclusion that *a state of unpreparedness does not preclude aggressiveness.*

Pacifists sometimes present this argument in a different way: **The Real Mischief-Makers Are the War Traders and Stockholders in the Large Armament Firms.** Could the influence of these men become as powerful as it is depicted by anti-militarists? This appears to be practically impossible if this nation adopts only a policy of *reasonable preparedness*. Switzerland has reached a very good state of military preparation; so did Sweden: yet, there is no record, in these countries, of a condition of affairs like that pointed out, in Germany, by Karl Liebknecht, and in England by George H. Perris. Moreover if it be true that federal arsenals can produce war supplies at about half the price asked by private factories, why should not the government undertake the whole fabrication of guns, ammunitions, and equipment of all kinds? This would be both an economy, and a guarantee against the activities of war traders.

Any Increase in Preparedness Paves the Way to an Economical Situation that may Prove Extremely Onerous to the Taxpayer. Any sane man deplors that money should be used in destructive instead of constructive pursuits. However, one must also think of what any war would cost *if the country were not prepared*. It should be borne in mind, besides, that what is asked for the United States is only *a reasonable degree of preparedness*. Now, if one thinks of the reckless expenditure and the graft so frequently reported in other undertakings, one is bound to wonder at the ado made by pacifists when the military budget is concerned. They show, as "horrible examples," the tremendous military expenditures of the great European powers: did they ever realize that a single corporation president, here, is sometimes paid as much as ten or twelve French major-generals? That one opera singer, in one evening, receives what two Russian lieutenant-generals get in a year? That a certain sheriff of New York County costs to the taxpayers just as much as 38 colonels cost the Italian people?

The Present War Shows the Fallacy of The Theory that to Preserve Peace One Must Prepare for War. Therefore, a Greater

State of Preparedness is Useless to Us as a Protection Against War.

To a European, the theory alluded to ceased to have any serious meaning, not in 1914, but many years ago, *as regards great military powers*. But, *in as far as other nations are concerned*, preparedness MAY be a good guarantee of peace—however paradoxical this seems. Pacifists scoff at the Swiss preparedness which, they say, could not prevent that nation from becoming the prey of one of the great powers. Undoubtedly the two or three hundred thousand Swiss militiamen would be unable to beat off Germany, France or Austria, if any of these countries should deem it of *vital importance* to occupy the territory of the Confederation. The question is: is it possible that circumstances should ever be such that adequate preparation for war should be of any value to Switzerland? To this one can emphatically answer: Yes. A mere glance at Swiss history discloses that fact that, on no less than four occasions, that little country, which had been sensible enough to organize very efficiently its citizen soldiery, induced much more powerful nations to come to terms without a fight, or to refrain from intervention in the affairs of the Confederation. These events happened in 1838, 1846, 1857 and 1870. In none of these instances, an invasion of Switzerland was of vital import to the great powers; but they would have invaded the Swiss territory, had not the Confederation been in such a state of preparedness that Prussia, like France, thought *the play was not worth the candle*. That is exactly where lies the core of the matter: *a stronger nation will not molest a weaker one when the latter is in a sufficient state of preparation to cause the former to believe that it is not worth while to fight*. It should not be forgotten that there has been a time when, in the United States, military preparedness avoided a rupture with a great military nation. This was in 1865, at the close of the Civil War. The occupation of Mexico by the French was contrary to the Monroe Doctrine. The United States asked Napoleon to withdraw his forces; her demand was backed by a well trained army. The French Emperor did not think it *worth while* to maintain his stand, and he evacuated Mexico.

War Preparedness May Lead to Ruin. A well known university president asserts that "Our people can have war with somebody or almost anybody in due time and on some excuse if they want to go to the trouble and expense to prepare for it." We are told that the European countries, which have on so elaborate a scale prepared

for war, have gotten exactly what they prepared for. This is by no means true of all these countries. France, Belgium, England did not want war. What would have happened to France had she not been prepared for the struggle? The Germans would have crushed her long ago: Would such solution benefit the cause of the pacifists? The latter ask us to look at China, and, in the wrong which Christian nations have perpetrated upon her, to behold one of the greatest perils of preparedness. What we cannot fail to see is that China was pounced upon, just because she was not prepared to fight. Pacifists claim that the United States was shoved headlong into war with Spain because she had a navy that outranked the Spanish navy. Such is not, by any means, the opinion of the majority of American or foreign diplomats, statesmen or military experts. The intervention in Cuba was required by public opinion, business interests being linked with sentimental considerations on that subject. The Maine incident would have made war unavoidable, under the circumstances, even if the navy had not been prepared. A situation exactly similar was that in 1812 when Congress declared war on Great Britain despite the fact that it was obvious that the United States was not ready to engage in such an undertaking. In fact, the campaign of 1898 ought to be a lesson to pacifists; the blatant inefficiency of the militia system, the numberless blunders of the Quartermaster Department, the useless loss of life in the fever camps in the South have made this war, in the military colleges of Europe, a classical example of the evils and dangers of the lack of preparedness. Regarding Japan, it is stated that "the Jingo in Nippon has no difficulty in making a good cause against the United States" who planted her guns "under Japan's window." In answer to this it may be stated that if Japanese statemen or politicians are disturbed at the thought that the United States is increasing her armaments, then it is a safe assumption that the Nippons have planned some warlike scheme against America, and the latter is quite justified therefore in getting ready for a possible rupture with that nation.

Preparedness is a Reversal of the National Policy of the United States. Pacifists, and especially Mr. Bryan, deplore the fact that this country should abandon the hope, "so long cherished," of being an example to Europe. Truth is sometimes unpleasant to hear, but we must state here that Europeans do not see

at all why America should set herself as a model for them to admire and copy. In the dealings of the United States with Mexico in 1846, with Hawaii, Porto Rico, the Philippines, Colombia, there is nothing for Europe to learn, because these dealings were simply forms of aggressiveness—hardly consistent with Mr. Bryan's assertions. One may go one step further and affirm, without the slightest hesitation, that there are many things the United States could and should copy, not from German militarism, but from military institutions of Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and even France. Lack of discipline, of self control and respect for established authority have brought about, in America, a condition of affairs which is nothing short of shameful, and which has been strongly denounced by the best educators or public spirited writers in this land. Some of the latter, indeed, have gone so far as to advocate a short compulsory service to check "the spread of a virulent form of moral disease."

The Isolation of the United States not only Renders any War Unlikely, but will give Her Ample Time to get Ready, Should War Become Unavoidable. The man who, in this country, opposes preparedness on the ground that there is no enemy in sight, resembles the house owner who would decline to take out an insurance policy, saying: "My mansion is not exactly fireproof, I know, but I am very careful about fire. Besides I have decent neighbors on two sides of my property, and there are ponds on the other sides. I am not going to burn down!" It is certain that such view would be deplored by all his friends, for how can he feel safe against the work of tramps or incendiaries, sparks from somebody else's chimney, lightning and even an accident caused by himself in a minute of thoughtlessness? It is not inconsistent to hope in the formation of the United States of the world, and to get ready to resist attacks from nations which maintain a warlike attitude. But let us deal with plain historical facts. If the United States is free from the disturbing influences that have created unrest in Europe for so long a time, there must have been other factors somewhat troublesome on this side of the Atlantic for, as ex-Secretary Garrison remarked, *the country has averaged a war or a fight of some kind once in every seven years*, and the army has been used at least one hundred times to repel invasion, put down insurrections, etc. Ex-Secretary Bryan said once: "The President knows

that if this country needed a million men and needed them in a day, the call could go out at sunrise, and the sun would go down on a million men in arms." It might be possible to get these men in a day, but they would be *men in arms*, not soldiers. Nobody doubts the valor of the American volunteer; however, nowadays, less than at any period of military history, personal heroism cannot hope to win in war. In the older times, a general who had suffered losses of 10 per cent with ordinary troops and 25 per cent with veterans, could be justified in thinking of retreat. In the present conflict, the Allies' infantry held its ground after losing 60 per cent and, in a few cases, 70 per cent of the effective force. Not only would it be foolish to rely on made-over-night regiments to fight any foreign regular army, but this would be criminal toward these raw recruits, unable to withstand the fatigue and the moral strain of military operations.

Lastly, it would be interesting to know how persons who believe in over-night-preparedness expect to provide their men with arms and ammunition, if no adequate provision is made for this in time of peace. In modern warfare, half a million shells are sometimes fired in one day. Are shells and cartridges and guns to be manufactured, also, overnight?

It is Practically Impossible for a Foreign Foe to Overcome the Coast Defenses or to Land Troops on the Shore of the United States. It must be admitted that fleets usually prove ineffective against coast defenses. But, should hostile battleships succeed in coming near the coasts, it is highly improbable that they would waste valuable ammunition by trying to make a few holes in the batteries or to kill a score or two of coast artillerymen. *They would rather devote their fire to the hitting of the city protected by the forts; and this could be done effectively, by a daring fleet, even within the range of the defense's guns.* As regards landings, the only point at issue is: can a foreign army be transported across the seas to this country? There is no good reason why it could not. One hundred and twenty thousand men, during the present war, have been conveyed from Canada to England without a hitch. German officers have repeatedly stated that, under favorable circumstances, four army corps could be sent to America. All this, of course, could be done only if the United States fleet had been destroyed or much weakened by losses or some strategical diversion—three possible

contingencies, *for the American navy is at present only the third, if not the fourth, in the world.* Be it as it may, it does not seem worth while to devote much time to the discussion of *direct transportation* of a landing army to the United States. England, possessing Canada, would not need to land troops on American soil. In respect to other possible foes, it is obvious that the greatest danger of war, for the United States, lies in questions pertaining to the Monroe Doctrine or to her insular possessions. Should Germany, for instance, decide to establish herself forcibly in South America, the theatre of operations would be *there on land*, after the Empire had, more or less leisurely, transported its troops to that region, previous to a rupture with the United States. This is a contingency which no American should fail to have in mind in the discussion about preparedness.

If One Takes, One by One, the Leading Military Powers of Europe or Asia, also Canada and Mexico, it is Impossible to Find a Reason Why any of Them Should Ever Fight This Country.

1. *Canada.* The assertion that "business interests of the two countries are so interwoven as to preclude a rupture between them" is not convincing. Under any circumstances, the Dominion would be loyal to England, so much the more so *because there is no particularly friendly feeling there towards the United States.* It is very easy for a European to ascertain this fact just now!

2. *Mexico.* It is hardly worth while observing that he who feels sure that the United States will never have a war against that nation is assuming a great deal. One should not lose sight of the fact that the government at Washington has pledged itself to see that European interests in Mexico shall be protected. The time may come, sooner than pacifists think, when it will have to act otherwise than by way of a half hearted chase for a bandit.

3. *Japan.* It must be remarked, first, that even those who think war with Japan is "impossible," admit, generally, that there are causes of disaffection on the part of the Japanese, which might tend to disturb the "course of friendship." It matters little whether Japan declares war, or whether the latter is forced upon the United States government by public opinion. Japan, it is contended, owes too much to this country to ever want to fight it. The world's history is made up of palinodes and ingratitude. We see at present Bulgaria fighting Russia, her godmother; the Turk

opposing the French, his ally of 1856; the Boers aiding England against Germany whose moral support they enjoyed in 1900,—and so forth.

4. *England.* Here again we find the old set of arguments: sentimental, commercial, financial considerations uniting in making any future war impossible. Now, the extreme friendliness of English people towards their American cousins did not prevent these nations from waging one against the other *two wars*, lasting respectively eight and two and one-half years. The good feeling, towards America, of British workingmen during the Civil War is not to be denied. However, the Trent Affair does not give the impression that the English government was kindly disposed towards the United States. It is still considered today one of the most serious difficulties that ever arose between the two countries. The Venezuela incident was another proof that, when national interests are at stake, close relationship has no longer much value. Can we be sure that there will never be, at any future time, some other Trent or Venezuela affairs, and that public opinion, at least on this side of the Atlantic, will not be roused to the "breaking point"?

5. *Germany.* The argument based on the belief that Germany would not fight the United States because she had too much money invested in this country need not be considered. A similar situation existed between England and Germany, and Germany and Russia, and did not prevent the present conflict. Nor should one pay much attention to the consideration that several millions of inhabitants of the United States are of German origin. This situation might handicap America; it would be very favorable to Germany in case of war. We all know, by this time, how much that part of the population is able to accomplish, in many ways, to help the old Vaterland. Opponents of preparedness ridicule the contention that Germany, if victorious, will need territory in South America or elsewhere; and that, if vanquished, she may be prone to "steal American money," in order to recuperate. However, there is no telling what a nation which considers treaties mere scraps of paper could do in respect to American wealth in case of need. This is admitted by as peaceful a man as ex-President Taft. But let us look more closely into the matter. Germany may win. It is well known that victorious nations generally become overbearing

and arrogant. The attitude of Germany in 1870 was the outcome of the crushing down of Austria in 1866. In 1871, Germany was eager to pick a quarrel with Switzerland about some trifles. In 1875, she was equally anxious to attack France while the morale of the German army was still high, and its confidence complete in the officers, veterans of 1870. Should Germany be vanquished, it is logical that, having her activity curtailed in Europe, she should turn to another field of action, perhaps South America, which has been for a long time so alluring to her. Against this, the other great powers would certainly not raise one finger. A European political writer of much ability and keen judgment, Mr. Joseph Reinach, said, in *Le Figaro*:

The more one reflects, the more one is convinced that the economic and political absorption of America is one of the greatest secrets of the Germanic Empire, and, that consequently nothing is more inevitable than an eventual conflict between Germany and the United States. . . . It is for America to decide whether to let Germany choose the hour or choose it herself.

Moreover, there have been already acts on the part of the Germans which leave no doubt about the intention of that nation to get a foothold in South America. Do we need to recall the Teutonic activities in Venezuela and Brazil as early as 1880, in Venezuela again in 1901, in the Ecuador two or three years ago? It is absolutely beyond doubt that, towards 1913, a very active propaganda was conducted in Central and South America by persons acting under instructions from Berlin. A large number of pamphlets and much literature of all kinds were distributed among residents in Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and other republics. These pamphlets contain quotations from German writers such as Sievers, Funke, von Liebert, from Lang's book *Reines Deutschtum*, and Dr. Tannenberg's *Gross Deutschland*. They are very suggestive, as may be judged from the following extracts:

Rio Grande del Sul ought to be converted into a territory held by German capital and immigration. The historical precedent and the force are with us, and none can oppose us as long as we decide not to be weakened by inopportune political aspirations. . . .

. . . . The States divided among themselves like the Republic of Argentina, Brazil and all those begging republics of South America must be made by soft ways or by force to listen to our words.

Let us now ask the pacifists a question or two. Have they cognizance of the German Federal Law of July 22, 1913, which makes it impossible for a German to be other than a subject of the German

Empire, and always subject to military service in Germany? Is it necessary to recall the fact that this amendment to the old naturalization law of Germany (June 1, 1870) *applies to Germans residing and naturalized in the United States*? But, outside of these considerations, there are things that we would like to see explained by pacifists, from their own standpoint. If Germany entertains no thoughts of ever fighting this country, why has she organized such an extensive system of spying all over the land? Why did her army officers come over, as simple tourists, to study the American means of communication between the interior and the Atlantic seaboard? Why do so many Teutonic writers indulge in publishing books and articles drawing more or less fanciful pictures of the conquest of the United States by Germany? An undeniable fact is that German hostility has showed itself otherwise than in literary essays. That feeling manifested itself almost violently in Manila in 1898; the intrigues of Germany at the occasion of the St. Thomas purchase are an open secret. The tone of the German press as regards the administration's policy with Mexico has been unceasingly unfriendly—nay, even insulting.

Before concluding this paper, we must briefly examine the assertion of persons who, although recognizing the need of better preparedness, believe that **It is Sufficient for the Federal Government to give more Encouragement to the Militia and to Make Some Provision for a Speedy Organization of Volunteers in Case of War.** It is customary for these persons to lay great stress on the prowess of armies organized like those of the Boers, the Vendéans of the French Revolution, and the Tyrolese of Andreas Hofer in 1809. But, notwithstanding the good marksmanship of the Boers, nothing could make up for their lack of military organization, instruction and *discipline*. The same is true of Vendéans and Tyrolese; besides, they were fanatics, marching under generals who were born leaders of men. All were ultimately conquered by soldiers regularly trained, under competent officers. These facts are well known; yet five persons perhaps out of ten, in this country, are still under what we could call "the delusion of the Civil War." They have in mind the wonderful achievements of Grant and Sherman. They have lost sight of the cold truth that the troops who compelled Lee to surrender at Appomattox Court House were as different from the men of Bull Run as a soldier of the German Guard is now from the rawest militiaman of the United States.

AMERICAN INFLUENCE AS AFFECTED BY PREPAREDNESS

BY W. MORGAN SHUSTER,

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Wars in the future will not be made by one power against another. We have passed that stage. It will be groups of powers against other groups of powers or against a single nation. And with what group do we stand, if you please? Are we a fair-haired child walking alone in an alley where thugs infest the corners? Are we under some divine protection which makes it unnecessary for us to take care of ourselves? Are we so good and so pure that everyone respects us?

I am for preparedness in this country, yet I certainly would resent the imputation of being a jingo. I have made speeches for preparedness because I believe it is the biggest and most vital issue for the American nation today. I do not think there is a single domestic question, nor a single international question, nor any other issue which even approximates in its importance to the American people the matter of their ability to defend themselves in the near future.

If I were a preacher and wanted to talk about extending our good influence to other parts of the world; about beating the unruly savage over the head in this land and in that; about carrying the ideals of American civilization to this place and to that, then I should urge upon you a very much more powerful system of preparedness, an aggressive preparedness; but I deem that to be unnecessary, inadvisable, and impracticable as we are situated today.

I mean by preparedness, and I hope no one who speaks in favor of it means anything else, only preparedness to resist unwarranted aggression against our natural rights as a nation and as a people.

It would be a wonderful thing if some nation were so great and so good, so powerful and so wise that it might extend its civilization over the world by persuasion where possible, by force where necessary, and rejuvenate and purify all mankind. But I conceive such views to belong rather to dreamers than to practical people.

We have had one such dreamer in the last one hundred and forty years. Some say we have another, but I do not want to see one arise in this country, because dreamers may have their work to do, but they cannot be safe advisers for vast numbers of people, for one hundred millions of people whose welfare, whose duty to themselves must be based upon more practical lines.

We have a duty and a high duty in this world and we have failed in it sometimes in the past. We have on some occasions acted the bully, in an international sense; with not quite so much bloodshed as in some cases where other nations have acted as bullies, but we have been guilty to some extent. And that is the thing which throws doubt into my mind, and that is why I cannot sit, convinced that my own country and my own people and I, as a unit in it, are today risking by their apathy the loss of everything that they consider dear, without feeling that those who call themselves pacifists are a real danger to our country. I think they are wrong. I think they are sincere, most of them at least, but I think they are wrong about the American people, and if I did not think so I would not want to be a citizen of this land.

I am sure that the American people themselves do not necessarily associate power with tyranny and brutality, though I am sorry to say that some other nations seem to have pursued that line of logic. If I believed that for this nation to be strong in an international sense would mean that it would become a tyrant over smaller nations or larger ones where it could, I think I should willingly choose, so far as I am concerned, the alternative of weakness and unpreparedness. But if I believed that, I would not consider myself a good American or fit to be a member of the body politic which we call our nation.

I do think it is perfectly useless for any nation or for any people, to talk about good intentions, to talk about humane objects in the world unless there is the power to back them up. What do you think of an individual who talks of his purposes, when you know he is a weakling; when you know he is utterly unable to make good in anything he may say? Do you respect his motives? What suspicion enters your mind? That he is speaking of holy subjects and lofty motives because he dares not speak of any other? Now nations, just as individuals, are considered and are held in repute in the family of nations, and we are held in repute throughout the

world not by what we say or by what we propose to do, but by our power to do, as estimated in the minds of various cold-blooded and cynical gentlemen of many races and nationalities.

It does not make any difference whether we are convinced of our latent power when we shall be thoroughly aroused and the earth shall tremble with our passion. That may be of interest to us locally. No one can tell what a nation will do when it is aroused, but we can tell what a nation will do when it permits itself to get aroused in an international quarrel without due preparation of the most practical description. It will suffer the useless murder of thousands of its citizens. If it is not possible for the American people and nation of one hundred millions, roughly speaking, today, to be strong,—strong morally, strong physically and in a military and naval sense, without provoking among ourselves a suspicion that we are on the road to militarism, to jingoism, to imperialism, without provoking, in our own hearts, the suspicion that we are about to use that organized force, or are liable to use that organized force, to do wrong to other peoples, great or small, then I ask you in all sincerity what confidence may we have in ourselves? What confidence may we have in our moral purposes, whether we are prepared or unprepared, if we consider that with preparedness we would use that weapon merely for our own moral undoing? Or that we are so weak of fibre that because we have the power to strike a blow we would strike it brutally and in a cowardly manner and for aggressive purposes?

I do not believe it. But, after all, that is only argument. It is the only argument left to those of our fellow citizens who preach that battleships insure war and that preparedness for war brings it on. There is a half-truth in what they say. Certain kinds of preparedness, if you please, do bring on war and did bring it on in Europe, in my opinion.

To use a homely simile, you may go through a dangerous portion of the country about your business, quietly and unaggressively, and if there are people who attack wayfarers and journeyers and they see that you are armed they will probably wait for the next man to come by in the hope that he may not be armed. But through that same place you might go aggressively, swaggering and boasting of your ability to impose what you saw fit upon any one or in any place, and thus get into difficulties merely because you had irritated people

whose custom was more or less to prey upon the weak, but who never attacked the strong unless they were irritated up to that point. That form of preparedness, that form of military or naval power I should certainly hope never to see in this country.

I do not think a regular army of one hundred thousand or one hundred and fifty thousand men is enough in this country. But that is only a detail after all. It is the principle we must see; the result will follow.

I would be willing to cast my vote on this question for the judgment of the loyal men who have studied those problems, the officers of our army and navy (and I have known them for more than twenty years), than whom I do not believe more simple, loyal, sincere and unaggressive Americans live anywhere in this country.

I have no fears as a citizen of aggression or of the subversion of our civil institutions by the United States Army, whatever its size. They have stood for law and order and they have obeyed the orders, distasteful at times to their instincts, of civil authorities all over the globe, without ever considering their own welfare or their own risks; and their influence in the community, whatever they may be, is wholesome and good.

You come back into this country and you never see a soldier or an army officer. It is a positive treat to meet one. I have been in places where you could not throw a stick without hitting large numbers of them. But I do not believe in the theory that our institutions would be in any danger if we should have what some choose to call a large standing army; an increase of three or four army corps.

I see headlines in our papers to the effect that we have sent four thousand men into Mexico; and everybody is expected to get excited. I wonder what the staffs of the different sectors over in the European battle lines will think when they see that four thousand troops have been deemed of sufficient importance to be mentioned in the American newspapers?

It is an apathetic state which we are in after all; that is the real danger in this country; when the time comes, and there is a real crisis, in some ways there will be a very wonderful response in this country, and the only sickening part will be the reflection that ten times as much could have been done, if there had only been 10 per cent more of preparedness for it.

And we must come to know in this country that we have a duty and that duty is very clear and very simple. Our duty is first to maintain ourselves as a nation and as a people, and safeguard our institutions without injustice or aggression to others; and secondly, and I emphasize this secondly, to do what good we can in this world; I put things in this order, because nullities can never do any good and we must become a factor to be reckoned with before we can spread any influence, good or bad; before we can spread anything. Let us then be strong, first for our own sake, strong because we believe in ourselves, because we trust ourselves, and after that let us disseminate whatever good our prestige as a powerfully organized state may permit. Then, I think, we shall have been good Americans and shall have added to the peace and satisfaction of mankind.

PREPAREDNESS IS MILITARISM

BY OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD,

New York Evening Post, New York City.

The significance of preparedness, we are told, lies merely in the fact that Americans believe that our experiment in democracy is the most precious thing on earth; that it is of greater moment to all the world than any other experiment in human government, and that for it Americans are as ready and as willing to die as were their fathers in 1861 and their forefathers in the Revolution. "Life," remarked to me the other day one who sits in the seats of the mighty, "is but a beautiful adventure, to be flung away for an ideal whenever the hour calls." So we must be ready to count no cost should the enemy be at the door, particularly if that enemy should be one who typifies the greatest military efficiency the world has ever seen, who believes its experiment in monarchical socialism of far greater value to humanity than our own brand of democracy, but combines within itself a military autocracy we hold to be the greatest menace to mankind in modern times.

And so we are counselled to take from our possible enemy the very things that have made him efficient and dangerous and become efficient and dangerous ourselves. Not that we shall ever make war—*pace* 1846 and 1898—on anybody; merely that we shall follow in the footsteps of those who believe that the earth is ruled by fear, and that there is no other way to preserve peace than by being so armed that no one shall venture to attack us. And so we have gone about getting a "preparedness" which we are strenuously but falsely pretending will be ours when the legislation now before Congress passes, and so protect us at the close of the war in Europe, and even safeguard us should the present difficulties with Germany result in hostilities. As a matter of fact, the army reorganization proposed will not be consummated for five years, nor the naval program until 1925 or 1927, by which time the present war will be fading into the background like the earthquakes at St. Pierre and Messina and San Francisco and other great and horrible convulsions of nature, and new world-problems will be upon us.

Now, the real significance of this is that we have all at once, in the midst of a terrifying cataclysm, abjured our faith in many things American. We no longer believe, as for 140 years, in the moral power of an America unarmed and unafraid; we believe suddenly that the influence of the United States is to be measured only by the number of our soldiery and our dreadnoughts—our whole history to the contrary notwithstanding. The ardent efforts of both sides in the present European struggle at the outbreak of the war to win for their cause the enormous prestige of the sympathy and moral support of the United States—although “unprepared”—we overlook as if it were not the most outstanding fact of the year from August 1, 1914, to August 1, 1915. We are to deprive the world of the one great beacon-light of a nation unarmed and unafraid, free from the admitted evils of militarism. We are to complete the vicious military circle of the world, so that, if we do not desist, if the oppressed of the nations do not rise in revolt against the whole accursed military system, the United States will be doing more than any other nation to intensify the race between peoples as to which will be armed most and at the greatest cost, and it will be one of the most hated and dreaded. As Lord Rosebery has said, nothing since the beginning of the war has been as discouraging, for in Mr. Wilson's advocacy of our new policy there has not been up to this hour one single phase to the effect that the United States will be ready and eager to lead the way to disarmament at the close of the war, and our five year naval program, as its terms signify, is a program for preparedness years hence.

Next, the preparedness policy signifies an entire change in our attitude towards the military as to whom we inherited from our forefathers suspicion and distrust. A cardinal principle of our polity has always been the subordination of the military to the civil authority as a necessary safeguard for the republic, particularly in our national councils, and as to all matters affecting national policy. Today, in our sudden worship of the expert in uniform, we are told that what we need is a national council of defence comprising, as one rear-admiral suggests and some of our new-born leagues of safety advise, fifteen military and naval officers with only seven civilians graciously given places at the council board. These men, it appears, sitting in secret session and responsible only to themselves, are to formulate the policies of the nation, congressmen to have no

other function than to vote the necessary money, ships and men, it not being theirs to reason why. In other words, the council is to be our Great General Staff, and, like its German prototype, it is to make our Congress vote first like the Reichstag and ask questions afterwards—the questions to be answered only if the council deems it wise. Its members are not to be elected, but are to be designated by act of Congress once for all.

Already it is openly stated in the press that the power of the secretary of the navy is to be curtailed by the present Congress, so that he shall not be able to overrule the naval men, thus putting the military directly above the civil. For this purpose the undeserved unpopularity of the present secretary of the navy is being cleverly exploited, while the public is kept in ignorance of the fact that England, the greatest and most efficient naval power on earth, has never, not even in its direst hour, yielded to the navalists, but has kept the control of the fleets in the hands of its civilian Lords of the Admiralty. Simultaneously we hear demands that only our future admirals and generals, and no civilians, shall be permitted to be our secretaries of the navy and of war.

But our sudden worship of the military does not end here. In New York the legislature has just established military drill in all the boys' schools, while all boys between the ages of fifteen and nineteen not at work are to go to camp as soldiers in the summer. There was no public demand for this bill, but the militia wished it, and through it went. Not even in Germany has such a step been advocated, for there, in the home of militarism, gymnastic exercises have been recognized as better preparation for life and military service than military drill. It goes without saying that the smattering of military knowledge the boys will acquire will be of the slightest value, since it is not planned to let them live in trenches, handle bombs, or distribute liquid fire and poisonous gases, and the instruction is bound to be highly superficial. The bill was not debated, and is in its form a model of how not to legislate. It strikes deliberately at one of the most sacred American liberties—the right of freedom of thought, of action, and of conscience—since it excepts not even Quakers, as even England excepts them today. It goes without saying that we of New York owe this favor entirely to the German General Staff. Yet are we told that militarism has and can have no foothold among us! As a matter of fact, we are

assured not only that the soldier and the sailor are as infallible as the Pope at Rome, but similarly beyond criticism. Let a civilian refer to the immorality of our army, which has been officially denounced by a Republican secretary of war as worse than that of any other army in the world, and the military men in his audience rise and break up the meeting—precisely as British soldiers in England have discredited their uniforms by refusing to allow orderly meetings held to discuss peace to exercise the historic Anglo-Saxon right of free speech.

The publication of a statement, erroneously attributed to a well-known socialist, reflecting so grossly and unjustly upon the army as to defeat its own purpose, results in an appeal by military officers to the postmaster-general for its exclusion from the mail, which action is taken. The German General Staff would have done no less and would but have accomplished the same. There is a deep significance in the demand by the *New York Times*, now one of the most ultra-conservative class organs in the world, that protestants against preparedness should not be allowed to speak in public after the President made his first public utterance for preparedness. It is of the utmost significance as also showing that, as in Europe, free speech is in danger when it comes to the criticising of the military class and its program. So the *Seven Seas*, the organ of the Navy League, has recently demanded that Congressman Kitchin be not allowed to speak on the floor of the House because of his opposition to a vast navy, which navy, a contributor to this same journal says, shall have no higher aim than to seize for us the lands of weaker peoples wherever they may be found. Already some of our Tory newspapers have begun to admit that there is a military party in this country—a military party suddenly raised up to add one more to the innumerable problems of race, of labor, of capital, of church, and all the rest with which the country is afflicted. If further proof were needed that we are well along the road towards militarism, it surely lies in the recent demand for the dismissal of the assistant secretary of labor because he thinks soldiers a feudal anachronism. Further instances could be multiplied; it is only necessary to recall the fierce outburst of indignation at the labor leader who dared to say that the working people in this country were not sufficiently well governed to make them care to fight for their government and their country.

Now, if our military and naval experts were the shining lights they pretend to be, why is it that by their own admissions they have made ducks and drakes of their own army and navy? The maladministration of our submarines cannot, for instance, be laid at the doors of the civilian control of the Navy Department or those of Congress; nor can the inefficiency of our regiments be attributed to the fact that the secretary of war is not a military man. That an American cavalry regiment can have its own machine guns stolen from it through the culpable neglect of its officers, and that this same regiment can, a couple of years later, be surprised in its camp, lose a hundred horses, and be unable to shoot off its machine guns because of the dark or to protect the lives of its own men and neighboring citizens, might surely give pause to some of the War College strategists who are so certain of their competency in their own trade as to believe that they are better qualified to advise the nation as to its national and international policies than anybody else who has never studied the art of war.

The truth is that there are no experts the world over so utterly discredited as the military ones. It was the all-wise German General Staff that urged the greatest political blunder of modern times, the invasion of Belgium, as it was the German Navy Staff which ordered the sinking of the *Lusitania* and thereby horrified the world by this unparalleled act of barbarism. The generals who began this war to the world—where are most of them? Where are the Austrian and Russian generalissimos? Joffre survives as yet, and so does Von Hindenburg. Kitchener hangs by a thread. Sir John French, like many another, is in retirement, while the frightful slaughter at the Dardanelles, like that at Verdun, spells the shattering of many another reputation that deemed itself wise enough to lay down the law to civilians. The German General Staff—what has become of its certainty that it could take Paris in a month, that the raw levies of Kitchener would not fight, that Zeppelin raids over London would terrify the hearts of brave Englishmen? And what soldier truly foresaw trench warfare or the rise of the submarine or the invincibility of coast defences? Yet in this very hour, when the military the world over ought to be in the dust, we Americans are told that we must as blindly accept their decrees as did the poor, deluded German people in the years leading up to its present catastrophe. Critics are warned moreover not to point out that

every military or naval officer is a biased expert, since he never fails to urge more men and more ships to his own personal profit, for this is already beginning to smack of high treason. We are, of course, wholly certain that we can never be quite like the Germans; therefore, a military caste is quite unthinkable among us—and yet we have the word of the secretary of the navy that one high officer has told him that the only persons who are properly equipped to judge of the needs and conditions of the navy are officers whose fathers and grandfathers served in our fleet before them! Who is there who has come into contact with our navy life on its family and social side who has not been struck by its tendencies to snobishness and aristocracy?

The air has been full of charges during the passage of the Army bill by the Senate of the existence of two lobbies, that of the National Guard and that of those favoring a Continental army. Both sides seem to the outsider to have proved their charges as to the existence of those lobbies, in addition to the existence of the regular army one, which a Cabinet officer once described to me as "the ablest, the most dangerous, and the most successful" lobby that ever came to Washington. We are creating in the National Guard a political machine of such power that already regular army officers are asking whether Congress has not created a Frankenstein to destroy them. It is stated that every private in the Virginia militia wrote to Congressman Hay, and got others to, in favor of the militia plan, and particularly of the Federal Pay for the Militia bill. When we recall that this Army bill contains a clause undoing a half-century of reform by throwing open the civil service to all soldiers who can obtain the signatures of three officers to their certificate of good conduct, when we remember the influence exerted in the matter of earned and unearned pensions by the Grand Army of the Republic, we ought surely to ponder well the significance of what is going on under our eyes.

What it all means is that we are putting the emphasis upon the wrong things in life, on the old *destructive* military policy that holds out no hope for a better world, instead of on the *constructive* policy of facing squarely towards a world federation or at least the freeing of the world from the old fear of one nation by another, a world whose militarism is the most successful device yet invented by tyrants, like the Czar of Russia, for keeping their subjects despotically

enslaved. It is a militarism which eats up such vast treasures in wood and iron and steel as to make ridiculous even in our unprepared country any campaign for the preservation of national resources. What will that avail if our defence bill next year is to be more than half a billion of dollars?

Surely so intelligent a people as our own is not long thus to be deceived as to the significance of the new use of the old enslaving cries of patriotism, of national safety, of rallying about the flag. Nebraska and Michigan have just bid us believe that others will soon see how for us, too, the paths of military glory "lead but to the grave"—to the despair that wrings the hearts of Europe and of England for all who stop to think of the losses to the world from a war which could never have come but for the armies and navies built up for defensive purposes and the war-parties born of them, the real reason for which war no man knoweth. American sanity and intelligence will speedily see that the outcry for more soldiers and ships comes not from the masses of the people, but from the fortunate classes in life, and particularly from the very classes that have heretofore batted upon every special privilege. The coming of "preparedness" spells but a new phase of the old battle of democracy against privilege.

American sanity and intelligence and wisdom ought to see to it when the war excitement is over and news of preparedness is no longer featured in the press as once were the free-silver fallacy and the battles against the trusts and the railroads, that their government face the other way. Indeed, for right-thinking people this is the time to let the time-serving and compromising administration in Washington know that they expect of it the highest "preparedness" in the form of a readiness to take the lead at the peace conference in proposing international disarmament or in calling a conference for this purpose simultaneously with the peace conference. As Mr. Lansing and Mr. Wilson rise to this opportunity, so will their final standing be at the bar of history. It is idle to say that there are international problems beyond solution; that there is no way out of the present low estate of the world; that its animal passions cannot be checked. Behold in Paris there are now sitting the representatives of eight nations who are legislating not merely as to measures for carrying on the war against the Central Powers, but as to such questions as a joint-tariff system, low telephone and tele-

graph tolls, an international statute as to the licensing of corporations, as to bankruptcies, yes, even as to the losses resulting from the theft of bonds, and as to the false designation of merchandise.

Now, if these great nations can take time and thought in the middle of a war they believe to be one of life and death to legislate together as to these things, who shall say that after this frightful bloodshed they cannot be led by the great American Republic to legislate on other far more vital themes? He who doubts belongs in the class with those who despair of humanity, who see nothing to be gained by tackling world-old evils because they are old; who bow down before brute passion and would touch neither the Social Evil, nor any social evil, nor smallpox, nor cancer, nor crime, nor ignorance, nor poverty, because of their age.

Against the god of might; against the god of force; against the policy of murder of millions by millions, there will be American citizens to protest as long as there are stars in their courses. Against every preparation for war men henceforth will rise to say *no*, even with their backs to the wall and rifles in front of them. For there is no slavery in the world like this to arms, none that today so checks the growth of liberty, of democracy, of the coming of the kingdom of heaven on earth. They will bear readily and willingly imputations of fanciful, unpractical idealism, of lack of patriotism; only it must never be said of them that they were unfaithful to their faith or that they were ever at peace with militarism, or that they were afraid to die for their ideals, or that they were traitors to the Prince of Peace in thought or deed.

THE "PREPAREDNESS" CAMPAIGN IS SUPERFICIAL

BY FREDERICK F. INGRAM,

Detroit, Mich.

A preparedness that merely contents itself with appropriations, soldiers, ships and guns, and that is indifferent to fundamental economic conditions, is recklessly superficial.

Natural resources lie at the foundation of all preparedness, whether for peace or for war.

No plan for national defense can be effective without adequate public control of the raw materials of the nation. Without water-power for electricity, we cannot manufacture nitrates, the basis of gunpowder.

But one hundred and twenty public service corporations own and are holding undeveloped and out of use an amount of water-power equal to four fifths of all there is developed and in use by all the public service corporations in the whole United States.

The Shields Bill, now before the Senate, gives to the private power companies monopolistic control of far more water-power, including navigable streams, than all the power of every kind now in use in United States. Private corporations are authorized by this bill to seize upon any land, private or public, they choose.

The ownership and control by powerful private corporations, even in times of peace of our natural resources—the raw material of our industries—operates to divert the created wealth from its producers to these monopolists. In times of war it might threaten the very existence of our country.

This applies with equal force to coal, iron, zinc, oil, copper. Fundamental preparedness requires that our government resume ownership and control of these natural resources. Lives may be a vain sacrifice if the natural resources of the country are not available on the same terms.

Then Real "Preparedness" Would Take a Look at Agriculture

Since it is vital that we set our house in order before hostilities, we believe the government should ascertain why agriculture languishes and why in spite of the many millions of federal and state

appropriations spent in its behalf, farms are being abandoned to such an extent that the richest agricultural state in the Union showed a decrease in its total population at the last decennial census, although there was a large increase in the population of its cities. The rural population in many states is dwindling and farm lands are being turned into grass or exhausted, are left barren. The price of farm products continues to soar to such an extent as to be a problem to the skilled city mechanic who, though receiving a greatly increased wage, finds it difficult to live thereon, forcing women and children into our factories in unprecedented numbers.

Then There Are the Slums

The slums and the great mansions are increasingly abundant in our cities, while working men are forced to give up their former homes and take boarders or live in rooms. Meanwhile there are large areas in these cities unimproved or inadequately improved. That nation is best defended whose homes are best worth defending.

In preparedness activities there is a principle that is, or should be, axiomatic—it is, that the sacrifice involved should be equal.

Wealth Should Pay Its Share

Our indirect federal taxes are unjust in their incident. In effect, they are income or poll taxes and, based on consumption, are mostly paid by the poor.

Sacrifices Too One-sided

Only recently have we levied any federal taxes on wealth and even now get but one eleventh of our revenue from wealth. We hear much of Great Britain's unpreparedness in contrast with Germany when war began, but in that year (1914) Great Britain's tax collection from wealth was \$380,115,000. The United States on the same per capita ratio would collect about \$900,000,000 from wealth, instead of one fifteenth of that sum. In Germany the combined income tax on men of wealth often reaches 10 to 12 per cent.

Is it safe or reasonable preparedness to expect the poor who offer their lives to their country, also to pay the cost of war out of their already meager income? That tragic sacrifices be made by the many while a few are making colossal fortunes out of war contracts?

Fundamental preparedness will remedy such conditions, so dangerous to the country's welfare, be it at peace or war.

Less Danger But More Fear

Since the President, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were saying a year ago that we were fully prepared for any emergency, Europe, from whence could come our only danger, has lost at least \$10,000,000,000 of wealth in war and 5,000,000 soldiers.

Should not the President and Congress by investigation discover the source from which this clamor for war and preparedness for war comes? For all information open to the public seems only to confirm the statements made in an article written by T. Wells Brex, a noted British writer.

Mr. Brex says:

The war has altered the social face of Europe as much as the glacial epoch once altered its physical surface and has set back civilization one hundred years, crumpled Europe's social structure, stunned its arts and sciences, and withered away its web of travel intercourse for a century. . . . The warring nations will be taxed by war debts, while dreadful memories will keep a gulf between the civilized nations of Europe.

Twenty-five million men have taken up arms and nine million are already slain or permanently disabled. The total destruction of life will be twenty million. This is combatant waste alone. Nearly everywhere the birth rate has fallen and the death rate is rising. Paris is losing similarly, Berlin and Vienna much more heavily and, when the great war is over, Europe will realize that no plague in the middle ages ever ravaged it like this black death.

At the end of the war the population of Europe will not be much greater than it was before the Napoleonic wars. Confronting the weakened and diminished people will be such problems as three women to two men of marriageable age; more old men than young; more boys than workers physically in their prime; more physically unfit than fit. . . . high commercial freights, dear imports and handicapped exports, owing to the shortage of ships. Arts languish and humanities rust, while shattered Europe lies in a spiritual and intellectual stupor like that of the dark ages.

MILITARY PREPAREDNESS A PERIL TO DEMOCRACY

BY CHARLES E. JEFFERSON, D.D., LL.D.,

New York.

An anti-preparedness man is always constrained to begin his argument with the declaration that he is a stout defender of the virtue of preparedness. In his opinion, so called anti-preparedness men are the most enthusiastic, consistent, persistent, and thorough-going preparedness people now alive. We place extraordinary emphasis on the absolute necessity of this nation preparing itself to meet coming duties and perils. We all believe in national defense. We all realize the value of security. We all desire to safeguard the nation against invasion. We are second to nobody in devotion to the flag, in desire to keep its folds free from stain, and to maintain the principles for which it was unfurled, and to preserve and perpetuate the institutions over which it waves.

The much derided anti-preparedness men freely admit that we as a nation are not prepared to meet victoriously the strains and storms of the coming years. We know that as a people we are not equipped to fulfill our obligations either to ourselves or to mankind. We realize we are not *politically* prepared. Our governmental machinery in its present shape is not adequate for our expanding needs. Our legal apparatus is not sufficiently developed to grapple with the world's baffling problems. We have not yet devised a way by which our national government can safeguard the lives of aliens in the various commonwealths. We have not worked out a plan by which a state on the sea coast can be prevented from nullifying a national treaty. We have no consistent and clearly stated policy in regard to immigration, or the tariff, or the Philippines, or the Monroe Doctrine. We have as yet created no commissions to work out in conjunction with the various nations involved, any of a half dozen intricate and irritating problems out of any one of which international conflict might arise. We have a department of the Navy, but no department of International Conciliation, a secretary of war but no secretary of peace. We spend the enormous sum of one quarter of a billion dollars every year on our army and navy,

and scarcely a dollar for the maintenance of agencies for feeding the fountains of international goodwill. We have erected no safeguards by which a President of the United States can be prevented from plunging us into war. Technically only Congress can declare war, but as our constitution now stands, any President is at liberty in his dealing with foreign governments, to take steps of such a character that Congress is virtually committed to war. To reduce the points of international friction, and to work out a solution for the problems that hang on from year to year and which, because of their confused condition, are thunder clouds out of which lightnings may come: to foster and multiply the forces working for friendly feeling, and to create more effective legal devices by which the nations may live harmoniously together, this is preparedness of the most fundamental and indispensable sort, and of it we have altogether too little. The first charge which we bring against the labelled advocates of preparedness is that they overlook the things which are of primary importance, and lead the nation astray by creating a great hubbub over matters that are superficial, and do not at all touch the heart of the world problem.

There is such a thing as industrial preparedness, and we need it. The great world of the wage-earning masses must be elevated and harmonized, and a better spirit must be created in the hearts both of capital and labor. The idea that a nation's life depends wholly on the courage of its soldiers is an ancient superstition which the present war has exploded. The delusion that generals and admirals are the sole custodians of a nation's honor has been dissipated forever. We now know that mechanics are as necessary for success on the battle field as the men who carry guns, and that without the loyal support of the common day laborer no nation can hope for victory. When Mr. Lloyd George begged the Welsh coal miners to go back to their work, assuring them that the destiny of the British Empire rested on their shoulders, the world caught a glimpse of a fact it will never forget. No nation can any longer be victorious in war unless it has the loyal coöperation of all classes of its people. Unity of spirit, even more than dreadnaughts and howitzers, is the final safeguard of a nation's life. The men who give their days and nights to elaborating fresh schemes for the multiplication of guns, deal too much with the physical, forgetting that at last everything depends on a nation's soul.

There is such a thing as social preparedness, and we ought to think about it. We are an unkempt and undisciplined people. Things run at loose ends in every department of our life. We are extravagant and wasteful beyond belief. We lack social efficiency. Many of our municipal governments are a scandal. Our administration of public affairs is often a disgrace. We are not fitted to play our part creditably in the family of nations. What we most need is certainly not a club.

And are we as a nation morally prepared? Read the annual record of our homicides, our divorces, our drunkenness, and our thefts and robberies and defalcations, and all the atrocities of high finance, and you must admit that we are not morally prepared to face triumphantly the searching fires of the coming years. Our criticism of the so-called preparedness crowd is that they think too much of the outside of the cup and the platter and forget to look inside. They think only of the external armor, and pay scant attention to the interior defenses, lacking which a nation inevitably succumbs. Physical armor saves no nation. All the perished nations of history went down to death with their armor on. The enemies which America has most to fear are not conjectural foes four or five thousand miles away. Our deadliest enemies are inside our own gates. O you Americans who clamor so loud for preparedness, why do you not get your eye on the foes which are foes indeed?

The world-tragedy of the last forty years has been the squandering of brain energy on devising material defenses which in the crucial hour failed to save Europe from the unspeakable havoc which they had been created to ward off. If one tenth of the money spent on defense had been spent in cultivating kindlier feelings and loftier ideals, this war would never have been. The tragedy of the Hague Conferences was that both in 1899 and in 1907, a large part of the time was devoted, not to working out a scheme by which war might be abolished, but to the work of laying down technical rules by which the bloody game of human butchery could still be played. This is the tragedy of America at the present hour. When every sound mind and heart should be brooding over the question: How can we so order the world's life that a recurrence of this tragedy shall never be, there are thousands of Americans thinking of nothing else, talking of nothing else, suggesting nothing else but the old stupid experiment which has again and again soaked our planet

with blood. How are we ever going to get out of the heart-breaking predicament in which humanity finds itself unless men who think, dare to break away from the military traditions which have cursed and destroyed so many generations? Cannot we get beyond the ideas of Tiglath Pileser and Ramses II? Can not we rise above the ideal of the cave man? He always armed for defense. He thought only of his own skin. He was a low-down undeveloped creature, and is to be excused, because he lived in the morning of the world. But what shall we say of men who, living two thousand years after the death of Jesus Christ, cannot advance an inch in their conception of international life beyond that which was regnant in the ancient barbaric world?

But some one asks: Do you not believe in any army or navy at all? Certainly. We all believe in an army and navy for police purposes. That is not now up for discussion. The question before the American people is shall we have *adequate* preparedness—that is, a preparedness which is considered adequate by the military-naval experts? That is a kind which we have never had. From the days of Washington we have been continuously unprepared. All the experts say so. For one hundred and forty years we have lived in a fool's paradise. The specialists are all agreed. We now spend 250 million dollars a year, but this is a mere bagatelle. "This is not preparedness at all. Let us now prepare in earnest!" But a multitude of us shout no! Not now. Not till the end of the war at least. Let us lick into shape the army and navy we already have. Let us learn how to spend a budget of 250 millions before we squander more.

But somebody says: Is there not danger of a foreign invasion? We think not. No such danger has ever existed, and there is less danger now than at any time in our whole history. Our greatest peril is the peril of military preparedness.

Military preparedness is a peril to democracy, and a menace to the peace of the world. Piling up explosives in a world where so many persons carry matches is perilous. Running races in naval tonnage is exciting, but perilous. Diplomacy which relies on the pressure of guns is sometimes effective, but always perilous. Making other nations afraid of us is perilous. Germany made her neighbors afraid of her, and so she was gradually surrounded by a tightening ring of steel. We shall circle ourselves with a similar

ring by a like policy of military efficiency. It is perilous to drill the young men of a nation in the art of shooting human beings. It brings a degradation of the spirit which is blighting. It is perilous in these restless days, to pile additional burdens on the backs of the taxpayers for the support of vast numbers of men in barracks and on battleships. It is perilous to squander on instruments of slaughter the money entrusted to us by the Almighty for the service of mankind. Our nation is a steward, and it must render a strict account for all its gold. This is a fact which political and social science must never fail to take into account. As Huxley used to say: "We are playing a game with a player who makes no mistakes." It is perilous to waste the time of our National Congress in interminable discussions over the army and navy. For twenty-five years Congress has shamefully neglected matters of sovereign importance to devote session after session to wrangling over the types and numbers and prices of ships and guns. It is perilous to play with the passion of fear. Fear is the mightiest and most demoralizing of all the passions. Fear paralyzes the nerves of reason. Men no longer think when they are afraid. Militarism flourishes only in an atmosphere of fear. Huge appropriations for ships and guns are possible only when nations are terrorized. The astute men who are at the bottom of all this preparedness movement know that now when the whole world is panic stricken because of long continued bloodshed, is the best possible time for making a desperate effort to swing our republic still farther out into the maelstrom of military preparedness.

Building a huge war machine is perilous again because it plays into the hands of five men who because of the structure of modern civilization are endowed with extraordinary power for working mischief. First comes the military-naval expert. Modern armies and navies are colossal. Officers are numbered by the thousands, 35,000 to every million men. Some of these officers are certain to be Homer Leas and Bernhardis. This is inevitable. You cannot have a gigantic war machine without a military caste. You cannot have a military caste without a war party. You cannot in this republic prevent army and naval officials of a certain type chattering with reporters, talking at banquets, writing for magazines and the Sunday newspapers, publishing books, everlastingly trying to

scare the public, and working day and night to increase the size and prestige of the military and naval establishments.

Along with the military naval expert comes the war trader. Vote hundreds of millions of dollars for any purpose whatever, and you raise up at once colossal corporations eager to make the profit which vast contracts bring. Wherever you have great armies and navies, you have the Krupps, and the Armstrongs, and the Vickers, and the Creusots, and in order to keep their costly machinery running, you must always, even in days of profoundest peace, be vigorously preparing for war. You must change your guns every few years, you must scrap heap your ships before they are used and buy new ones. The nations are systematically and continuously and mercilessly fleeced.

Next comes the irresponsible newspaper editor. He fears neither God nor man. He fills his columns day after day with insolent gossip and lying rumors, always poisoning the wells of international good will, always playing on the fears and the prejudices and ignorance of the crowd. Some future Dante who writes the Divine Comedy of America will put this type of scoundrel in the lowest round of hell.

And then comes the Jingo politician, the glowing, effervescing patriot who wants the United States flag to float all the way to the Isthmus, or who is certain that in a hundred years we as a nation will be extinct, or hold in our possession the entire North American continent. Who has power to close the mouths of the dunces? By every increase in your army and navy you add new cubits to the stature of every fool in the land.

And finally there is the commercial exploiter, the money maker who rushes into belated countries and gathers up concessions, and stakes out zones of influence. He invests the millions of powerful corporations and syndicates. By unscrupulous methods he pushes his operations, counting on the government to safeguard his investments by its army and navy. The gold of a few men shall be made safe by the blood of the boys of other men. He is a dangerous man. In every war of the last twenty-five years, he has been at the center of the clique which has brought on the conflict. The bigger the army and navy, the more insolent and ambitious this arch-mischief maker becomes.

The military and naval expert of the Bernhardt type, the covet-

ous and unscrupulous war trader, the irresponsible and diabolical newspaper editor, the hot-headed Jingo politician, and the pushing and rapacious commercial promoter—look at them! These are the five fingers of the hand which is now crushing the world. You cannot increase the size of your war machine without increasing the strength of every one of these fingers. To break the power of that infernal hand, is the first and most imperative duty of all men who love mankind.

Somboddy says: "We arm solely for defense. We prepare not for war, but *against* war." Indeed! European nations prepared only against war, and behold! You cannot change a situation by altering a preposition. Things are what they are, no matter what names you give them. Preparing *against* war is identically the same thing as preparing *for* war, and that is why all the military naval experts, and all the war traders, and all the editors of the baser sort are heartily in favor of it. They like the change of the preposition. It hoodwinks innocent people who do not take time to think the subject through.

"We are never going to use our army or our navy for aggression." Who said that? Who has authority to say that? No one. The Secretary of the Navy cannot say it. Poor man, he will be out of office long before the big machine he has planned is ready for use. No congressman can say it. He also is like a flower of the field. In the morning he grows up and flourishes, but in the evening he is cut down and withered. No President of the United States can say it. He is in his office for a brief season, and then the place that once knew him knows him no more. He may possibly be succeeded by a megalomaniac who has a fashion of thinking his own notions synonymous with eternal justice, and who when he wants a thing takes it. Let no one be fooled by all this talk about never using our army and navy except for defense. Create a war machine, and God only knows who will use it!

"Ah, but we are a peace loving people." So we are, and so are all Europeans. There is not a war loving people in Europe. They all love peace. They all hate war. They spent forty billion dollars in trying to ward this war off. They simply prepared for it, and so they got it. We live in a universe in which we get not what we want, but what we deserve. Our deserts are determined by our actions. Whatsoever we sow, we reap. The universe pays no at-

tention to what we want. No tipler or guzzler wants delirium tremens. He simply wants the exhilaration which alcohol imparts. But let him drink long and hard enough and delirium tremens comes. We do not want war, but let us make ever increasing preparation for war, and there is no escape. Whatsoever we sow we reap: what we prepare for we get. This is the solemn significance of preparedness, it leads to death! Therefore let us prepare now for peace. It will take the self sacrificing labors of tens of thousands of men, we know not how many years, to work out the machinery of peace. We have got to organize the world. It will cost brain and time and money. Let us spend money for peace, tens of millions, hundreds of millions, billions, tens of billions, whatever is necessary for peace!

The preparedness program of the administration makes me sick at heart. Either America is likely to be invaded or she is not. If she is in danger of invasion, this program is a trifling and paltry thing, nothing but a sop to the militaristic Cerberus. It is simply playing with fire. If we are *not* likely to be invaded, then this program is wildly and wickedly wasteful. It would be wicked at any time, but is a hundredfold more wicked just now, when we stand at the gravest crisis in all human history, and when every nation not engaged in the conflict ought to be asking itself, not how it can save its own hide, but how it can minister to the crying and awful needs of a wounded, bleeding world. Tens of thousands of human beings like ourselves—men, women and little children—are on the verge of starvation, and our government officials come forward with a scheme that calls for the expenditure in one department alone of 500 million dollars within five short years for the extension of the machinery of human slaughter. Not one dollar for bread—but every dollar for the dogs of war! "O judgment, thou hast fled to brutish beasts, and men have lost their reason." Would that we had a secretary of peace, a man who, at an hour like this, would present a scheme for increasing the happiness and well being of our people. Millions for new roads, millions for new buildings, millions for new schools, millions for new farms to be carved out of the deserts and the swamps, millions for fighting disease, millions for preventing accidents, millions for brightening the lives of the poor and the ignorant and the forlorn, millions for the solution of problems which have long vexed us, and millions for forwarding noble enterprises to

their coronation. Five hundred million dollars to be spent the next five years in making us a healthier, happier and better people. This is the preparedness which fits us to fulfill our duties. This is the preparedness which fits us to stand before God!

But this would not defend us—some one says—from our foreign enemies. They would be attracted by our increased prosperity and might break in and steal our treasures. Well then, let us build up lines of defense in foreign lands. We have spent one hundred and seventy eight million on coast defenses, and an expert has declared that any foreign army can easily walk around them. Why not build coast defenses which nobody can walk around? Why not build them in the hearts of the nations? O for a secretary who would suggest not 500 million dollars for machinery to sink boys of foreign countries to the bottom of the sea, but who would recommend 500 million dollars for healing the open sore of the world. The price of a dreadnaught to each of the warring nations for the erection, at the close of the war, of asylums and hospitals and orphanages and homes and schools for the service of the great company of those whom the war will have left impoverished and helpless. The price of a battle cruiser and torpedo boat and a submarine to each of those nations for the endowment of these various institutions. Five hundred million dollars for the relief of the nations who are stripped of their raiment, and wounded and half dead. Why should it be thought a thing incredible that a Christian nation should do a Christian deed? Would there then be danger of a foreign invasion? Some men are so hidebound in their materialism they cannot conceive of any defenses except those made of concrete and steel. We Americans are often accused of worshipping the almighty dollar. We are counted money makers, money grabbers. Why not show the world that we can be money givers? Why not cease this shameful shivering and whimpering over the prospect of somebody hurting us, and show the world that we can think of helping others? Spend your 500 millions on war ships, and in less than twenty years they are all on the scrap heap. Spend 500 millions on institutions scattered over Europe for the care of those whom this awful war has maimed and mangled, and they will stand forever as the imperishable monuments of a great republic's love. Do you say this is impracticable? I tell you it is not. A noble deed is always practicable.

ARMAMENTS AND CASTE

BY SIMEON STRUNSKY,

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I believe it is not getting too far away from our subject, if I make no attempt to deal with the concrete results which may be expected to follow upon a policy of military expansion. I am more concerned with the spirit which the agitation for large armaments has brought into being, and which armaments in turn are likely to foster. Our institutions are bound to be shaped by the national state of mind; and more than that, they are bound to take meaning from the national state of mind. Externally, Germany of today has many of the political and social arrangements towards which we have been struggling in the name of greater democracy. It is still a guess what militarism will do to the Constitution, to Congress, to our federal and local machinery, to progressive legislation, to industrial reform, to child labor, to woman suffrage, to the entire creed of social righteousness and justice which absorbed us for many years, until a Presidential year came around and it was suddenly discovered that the higher justice and righteousness have their home in Servia and Belgium, and not in Alabama and Pennsylvania. About concrete changes we must still speculate. But what is already manifesting itself is the soul which armaments engender.

About this spirit of preparedness, I do not want to dogmatize. What I wish to convey is only a general impression, arising from a mass of impressions as they have come to me in the course of my daily work in a newspaper office. These impressions are based as much on the trivial features of the preparedness campaign as on its important features. My impressions are drawn from what the advocates of armaments have said formally from the platform and over their signatures in the press, from what they have said casually to reporters, and from what they have left unsaid. For an appraisal of the spirit of armament, it seems to me that the proceedings in Congress are hardly more significant than the proceedings of the latest woman's auxiliary for creating a large reserve of bandages and formaldehyde for our wounded soldiers.

It is my belief that the differences of opinion, which undoubtedly exist in this country both as to the necessity and meaning of large armaments, are to be explained principally by a difference of class-feeling. In many of the arguments for thorough preparedness and in the state of mind which these arguments reveal, I detect an attitude and an outlook which among the older nations would be described as a manifestation of the spirit of caste. I am aware that other reasons have been advanced for the prevailing division of sentiment. One explanation is geographical. The distinction has been drawn between public opinion on the two seaboards and public opinion in the interior of the country. The difference certainly exists. It is usually accounted for by saying that the people of the Middle West either do not realize the serious position of this country in the face of international developments, or that they selfishly refuse to bear the trouble and expense involved in a great system of national defense. Secure behind the Alleghenies and the Sierras, the people of the interior either cannot visualize the menace that confronts the people of the two coasts, or refuse to recognize their obligations to the general welfare. Whether the fault be a lack of patriotism or a lack of intelligence, localism is supposed to be one of the principal reasons why the people of Kansas and Iowa do not think like the people of New York and Boston.

The second explanation is one that is more often implied than expressed in the usual plea for armaments. The sentiment is widespread that indifference or outright opposition to national defense arises from a general weakening of national sentiment and that this is due to the presence among us of a large population of foreign birth or of foreign descent. It is true that responsible political leaders, in discussing Americanism, have been careful to make the point that Americanism is not a question of birth or origin; Mr. Roosevelt has asserted repeatedly that hyphenism is psychological and not ethnographic. Yet in everyday conversation, in much that has been written and said about Americanism, there runs this undercurrent of conviction, that if today we are not as resolutely national as we once were, it is because of the heavy dilution of our citizenship by immigration. How else shall we explain the widespread concern about facilitating the process of naturalization among our aliens? It is not a logical state of mind. The only element that has fallen under suspicion is the German element.

It seems rather absurd, every time we suspect a German-American, to go out and naturalize an Italian, a Slav, a Russian Jew, or an Armenian, who by no stretch of the imagination can be conceived as siding with their native country against our own, even if the international situation admitted of such a divided allegiance. The reason, rather, is what I have indicated it to be. It is simply the general feeling that if we were more purely native today, we would be more emphatically American.

Neither explanation, the parochialism of the Middle West and South, or the influence of the foreign element in our population, will adequately account for the existing opposition to a policy of large armaments. This will appear if we look a little more carefully into the variations of popular opinion, both in those sections where the preparedness sentiment is weakest and where it is strongest. If Kansas and Iowa were indifferent because they feel secure from invasion, the feeling ought to prevail among all sections of the population. Whether you are a banker in Des Moines or a street-car conductor in Des Moines or a farmer in the interior, you would be equally secure against an invading army from Germany or Japan. Actually there is a notable difference in sentiment, and it is determined by class conditions. Trained newspaper observers who followed in the path of President Wilson to study the effect of his missionary journey to the West, found this to be the fact. When they canvassed preparedness sentiment in Des Moines, they found that the bankers and big business men were in favor of armament and that the working population was against it. The big army sentiment was strong in the clubs, and weak in the cheap restaurants. For the country as a whole there is sufficient evidence that the labor unions and the farmers are opposed to militarist expansion. Debates on the subject in the labor federations have shown an overwhelming sentiment for our traditional policies. Two million farmers, through their grange representatives at Washington, have gone on record against preparedness in the hearings before the Congressional committees. We have the lesson of the Michigan and Nebraska primaries. And there is significance in the attitude of the Socialist party with its record of nearly a million votes in the last Presidential election. That party has nominated an anti-armament man for the presidency and is conducting its campaign on the issue.

So much for the West. If we turn to that part of the country where the sentiment for militarist expansion is strongest, we find the same subdivision of opinion based on class. I speak of New York because I am best acquainted with conditions there, but what I say of New York is true of Boston, and I imagine of all large cities on the Atlantic coast as far south as Baltimore.

If two years ago we had approached this problem *a priori*; if we had said, "Suppose a wave of Americanism sweeps over the country, expressing itself in no matter what form, where will this new patriotism manifest itself most strongly?" how many people would have prophesied New York? Recall New York's traditional reputation. It lies almost outside of the United States geographically and quite outside of the United States spiritually. It is the city of the Gay White Way, the tango palaces and the un-American Sunday. It is the city where fortunes made outside of New York, in America, are spent, and where ideals made outside of New York, in America, are rejected and frustrated. It is the home of that foreign incubus on American life—Wall Street. It is the city, and New York is the state, where the great social and political movements that have stirred American life during the last decade have elicited the least response. Recall what the historians have written of the West as the dynamic center of the national life and of the East, with New York as its capital, as the dead mass upon which the western ferment must work. And then consider the situation we face today of New York as the citadel of the New Americanism which is measured by armament!

Put aside this traditional vaudeville interpretation of New York which I have just outlined. There yet remains a solid body of fact why we should expect a reawakened nationalism not to show itself at its strongest in New York City. In 1910 the foreign born population of the United States was 14 per cent of the entire population; in New York State it was 30 per cent, or more than twice as great. In 1910 the native population of foreign or mixed parentage in the United States was 21 per cent. In New York State it was 33 per cent. If we were still reasoning *a priori*, what showing in the matter of Americanism could we predict for New York State, with only 37 per cent of its people of native parentage as against Kansas with 72 per cent? Or for Massachusetts with only 30 per cent of its people of native parentage as against Iowa with 58 per cent?

Two years ago, looking forward into the future, we should have said that if a President of the United States found it necessary to undertake a missionary journey in behalf of Americanism, he would set out for foreign New York amid the frenzied cheers of the people of Kansas City, and he would proceed to the redemption of foreign Boston at the behest of the excited population of Topeka.

But while New York, as a whole, is in favor of army increase, there are gradations of sentiment. Of our press, for example, the *World*, the largest in circulation among morning newspapers, is moderately in favor of increased armaments, the *Sun* is emphatically in favor, the *Times* and the *Herald* are feverishly in favor; the *Tribune* is deliriously in favor. The Hearst papers are imperialist when it is a question of Mexico or Japan, but are strangely pacifist when it is a question of Europe.

Thus, while New York as a whole is favorable towards armaments, the emphasis varies with class considerations. The tone of the individual newspapers is plain evidence. Recall that the Hearst newspapers in New York, as in every city where they are established, appeal to our lowest social stratum when measured by the income-tax scale. It is therefore significant that the Hearst papers should be cooler towards armaments as a reflex of European conditions, than any other New York newspaper. Go up one step further and we find that the Pulitzer papers, and especially the *Morning World*, appeals predominantly to the small business man, to the retail shop-keeper, the more prosperous of the skilled worker, and the moderately prosperous suburban class. And the *World* is more outspoken for armaments than the Hearst papers. But the *World* shows moderation, and that I attribute to the fact I have just mentioned that its public is among the smaller business men and the moderately prosperous sections of the community. It is only when you reach the solid business class and beyond that, the realm of big business and established social position—when you reach the public covered by the *Times*, by the *Sun*, by the *Herald* and the *Tribune*, that you find the militaristic agitation in its most violent form. I believe it is plain that whether in Kansas or in New York, whether sentiment is predominantly against armaments or in favor, class lines cut across the prevailing drift of opinion.

In speaking of big armaments as an upper-class policy, I am not using "class" quite in the dignified sense of an economic group

in the community. I am thinking of class rather as the word is used in the society columns. When the Socialists speak of preparedness as a class issue, they will tell you that it is a movement fostered by the capitalist class with a view to war profits and foreign trade exploitation. And if we find it difficult to understand why New York State with a native population of native origin of 37 per cent and Massachusetts with a like population of only 30 per cent should be hotter for national defense than Kansas or Iowa, the Socialist will say that New York and Massachusetts pay 48 per cent of the income tax for the whole country, while Kansas and Iowa together pay $\frac{9}{10}$ of one per cent. And of course there are a great many people who are not Socialists, who do not speak of the "capitalist" class as the fomenters of militarism, but who nevertheless do speak of special classes, the munition makers, the armor manufacturers and the shipbuilders.

But what I have in mind is not only the influence of the wealthy munition maker, but the influence of his son at the university and his wife in society. I am not thinking merely of the well-to-do classes as consciously favoring war for the sake of profits, but as favoring the growth of military establishments out of that spirit of caste which among all aristocracies the world over finds in the business of fighting the most congenial of occupations.

Armament is fashionable. I must confess that I am not greatly impressed by the zest with which "society" has gone in for national defense. This business of establishing hospital depots, organizing ambulance units, drilling high-school girls in uniform with rifle, strikes me as akin to the zeal with which one goes in for flower shows and barefoot dancing or whatever may be the fashionable pre-occupation of the moment. Lenten amusements nowadays have a way of attaching themselves to a great social purpose. In some measure we are confronted today with the same spirit which, at the beginning of the war in Europe, let loose a deluge of duchesses upon British headquarters in Flanders.

But beyond such comparatively harmless excursions into new realms of sensation, I think there is to be found among our well-to-do classes a real approximation to the spirit of *noblesse oblige*. I find a sense of anxious responsibility, of that call to duty, which across the water is every little while addressed to the "Gentlemen of England." There is a very distinct appeal now being addressed

to the "Gentlemen of America." Our prosperous citizenship has hitherto refused to render service to the community, by doing its share for the political life of the country. Men of wealth have preferred to work upon congressmen and legislatures instead of working in Congress and the legislatures; and their sons have preferred polo and speed boats. But military service has its own glamour. I cannot help thinking that a great many young men of wealth, who hitherto have seen no field open to them in the service of the nation, now think they have such an opportunity opening up for them. The army and the navy as a high-class occupation for the rich unemployed is a factor which enters into the movement toward a heightened military policy.

This growing sense of responsibility has been affected by the wild talk about our declining sense of patriotism, to which I have referred. Continuous insistence on the perils of hyphenism has undoubtedly created the apprehension that a divided allegiance is threatening the honor and safety of these United States. From its specific application to German sympathizers the reproach has been widened so as to include the whole mass of foreign born and the descendants of the foreign born. The melting pot has proven a ghastly failure, and the feeling is widespread that if we are ever plunged into difficulties with other nations, such as we have encountered with Germany, we must expect the same disloyalty.

Once that distrust of the great masses of our people becomes widespread, you can see how it would call forth a reassertion of Americanism among the people of the old stock. And that sentiment would be strongest precisely where the foreign element is most numerous. To the extent that in New York or Boston the old native element is threatened with engulfment it would tend to become self-conscious and class-conscious. The natural sense of social exclusiveness of the well-to-do is heightened by the consciousness that they are a saving remnant for true Americanism. Amidst a hyphenated population it is incumbent upon Americans of ancient origin to assert their fidelity to America, as a protest against the disloyal and as an example to the wavering or the ignorant. And the most concrete way in which this demonstration can be made is through a wholehearted acceptance of militarism, both as a patriotic service in itself and as a school for patriotism.

It is in this sense that I have been speaking of the present

movement for preparedness as appreciably a caste movement, actuated by a certain spirit of aloofness from the mass of indifferent citizenship. It is in this sense that I believe the creation of a large military and naval establishment will react in turn upon caste spirit. If our traditional policy were to be changed under the stress of a universal demand from the citizenship of the country, if the United States went in for militarism on the German scale, and navalism on the British scale, to the abandonment of traditions as old as the republic, there would yet be some compensation, if that change were the will of the *whole* people. From a nation in peace and industry we would become a nation in arms, but, after all, France after 1789 was a nation in arms and remained democratic. But if the militarisation of the United States should be brought about by the economically and socially superior classes exercising an influence beyond their numerical strength, militarism would come to us as a class policy. Among our farmers and workers the feeling would arise that the policy of armament has been forced upon the country by the moneyed classes for their own interests, whether financial or social. Among the rich in turn the feeling would maintain itself that this country has been saved *in spite* of a large part of the nation, and that the future welfare of the country must depend upon the patriotic and enlightened devotion of a small class in the face of a great mass of ignorant, or imperfect, or disloyal Americanism. That, I believe, is caste.

You may proceed to pile up institutions which in form are democracy; but if the ruling spirit of the nation is what I have outlined it, you will have only a Tory democracy. The voice of the Tory is making itself heard. You hear it in Mr. George W. Perkins' desire for the presence of a commander-in-chief in the White House. You hear it in the demand for a General Naval Staff independent of civilian control. You hear it in a remarkable editorial published only the other day in one of our New York papers, from which I wish to read a few sentences. The article is called "The Warning," and has for its text the insurrection in Ireland. Our writer says:

The incidents which have taken place in Dublin may be repeated in Chicago, in Milwaukee, in New York City, at any moment. They may occur because with precisely the same warning that the British government has had the American has neglected, dodged, skulked away from the obvious duty and the unmistak-

able facts. . . . We have lived in this country of ours amidst disorder, violence, outrage, organized from without. . . . There never has been a time when the American peril could not have been disposed of had our rulers dared, had they possessed the courage, the will, the strength to face the situation. . . . The whole world is filled with terrible lessons that are being taught to the selfish, the cowardly, the blind. . . . This is the price Britain is paying for the Asquiths and the Greys and all the rest of the "wait and see"—Gallipoli, Mons, Mesopotamia. . . . We have treason and anarchy here. Unless they be dealt with now we shall have insurrection and machine guns hereafter.

I will not enter into a detailed analysis of this argument. I will not attempt to examine how close the parallel is between 21 months of the German American question in America and five hundred years of the Irish question. I need not dwell on the fact that of the three horrid mistakes of the "wait and see" policy—Mons, Gallipoli and Mesopotamia—Gallipoli was the work of a strong young man named Winston Churchill who had the courage, the will and the strength to send off 100,000 men to die at Gallipoli on his own hook, and Mesopotamia was the work of another strong man named General Nixon who, as stated in the House of Commons, set out for Bagdad on his own initiative. But what I do wish you to see is that in the writer of the article I have quoted we have produced a very fair example of the Tory mind and the Tory outlook. The civil process of the courts by which German plotters have been seized and sent to prison is not enough for this Junker of Park Row. What we need is the mailed fist, Bethlehem mailed or Krupp mailed does not matter. When you think of several hundred casualties in the streets of Dublin as the result of weak-kneed sentimentalism and compare it with the splendid state of peace and contentment which 500 years of the other sort of thing have produced in Ireland, can you blame this writer for lashing out at the folly and cowardice of the "wait and see" crowd? And if you gave this young man a nice, large army, can you see what he would do with it?

Two thousand miles from Park Row, the spirit of Tory democracy breaks out in a softer, more poetic strain; but the spirit is there. Mr. William Allen White, somewhat uneasy at an alliance that he foresees between Mr. Roosevelt and the "plutes" of Wall Street, as Mr. White calls them, on a militarist platform, finds comfort in the thought that Mr. Roosevelt, while working with the "plutes" will yet compel them to pay "tribute." This tribute, says Mr. White,

will be paid in larger wages for men, for unemployment insurance, for abolition of child-labor, for shorter hours of women in industry, for workingmen's compensation, for old-age pensions, and state insurance. This means that the rich will have to divide.

But which of these things has the Kaiser failed to provide for his people? And how does this social programme differ from the Junker state philosophy of a well-fed, safe-guarded, simple-hearted and simple-minded people contentedly taking orders from a small ruling class which alone has the intelligence to realize national destiny and the vigor to shape it? There is no perceptible difference between the ideal state of William of Potsdam and the ideal state of William of Emporia. The rich will indeed be glad to divide; for the masses of the people there will be comfort and safety under the form of democratic institutions; for the rich, the power to shape the policies of the nation and to apply the democratic machinery to the uses of imperialism. That vision of social justice which only a few years ago was to be attained through the efforts of a democracy inspired by an ideal and conscious of its power, is to be realized. But it is to come not as the prize of a triumphant democracy but as a profit-sharing bonus declared by the "plutes."

MILITARISM AND THE CHURCH

BY ALGERNON S. CRAPSEY,

Rochester, N. Y.

We have in our midst a certain inchoate institution in this country which we call the Church. We have in that Church an investment of something like \$2,000,000,000 and we spend every year in its support between \$200,000,000,000 and \$300,000,000,000. It therefore has an economic existence if none other. This institution is based upon certain principles which it declares to be divine underlying principles of human life. It claims to have a commission from the Creator of the Universe, the Author of human life, to teach these principles as necessary to the happiness and even the being of humanity. It takes in a large and a most important area of human thought and feeling; that all of this should have been so completely ignored by the arguments of militarists is most significant, and we ask ourselves whether it is indeed a fact that the Christian Church, and with it the Christian religion, has ceased to exist as a factor in the life of the people of the United States.

The militarist's idea is in direct contradiction to the fundamental postulates of Christian teaching. The military method makes physical force the ultimate means of settling disputes between the different nations. According to this method, each nation must always be prepared to resent injuries. It is to go armed with this in mind all the time. It is as if a private individual were to arm himself upon the supposition that every man in the street is hostile to him and desires his injury, so that he must be ready at every moment of his life to the full extent of his ability to resent such injuries. And he is to resent them by the use of physical force because it is physical force of which he is afraid. This is the fundamental thought of all militarism.

One hardly needs to say that just the opposite of this is the foundation principle of that great institution known as the Christian Church. The pacifist comes in for the sneer and the scorn of the militarist on the supposition that he does not believe in force. But just the contrary is the case; the pacifist has faith in force as well

as the militarist, but he believes that there is a force stronger than physical force. The moral forces of the universe are at his command, and he fights, not with his sword or his gun, but with his reason and his conscience. He believes that man is a reasonable and a moral being and in the ultimate is open to conviction, both as to the wisdom and the rightfulness of his action. Therefore, the pacifist lays primary stress upon moral and spiritual preparation and only minor stress on mere physical preparation.

The second emphasis of militarism is on enmity. We are the natural enemies of other nations and they our natural foes. As soon as we organize as a group, that separates us from our fellowmen, and those fellowmen of ours in opposite groups are watching to see how they can come at us and take advantage of us and spoil our goods. It is this principle of natural enmity that is insisted on in season and out of season by those who are preaching military preparedness. Now unless I am mistaken entirely as to the constitution of that great organization known as the Christian Church, this thought of enmity is utterly opposed to all that it stands for. It lays stress not upon enmity but upon friendship. The Founder of Christianity said: "Ye have heard it said of old times, thou shall love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy; but I say unto you, love thine enemy." Now in old times, in the days of undeveloped humanity every stranger was an enemy. Every man who lived outside the city gates was lawful prey.

But Christianity had come when that condition of society was outworn and the human race ready for a higher stage of existence; when friendship and not enmity was to become the natural and acknowledged relation of human beings. Enmity is the strange thing, friendship the ordinary; and this principle Christianity applies to groups as well as to individuals. The nations are the natural friends of the nations. Germany is no one's natural enemy; it is everyone's natural friend. It has to make itself an enemy by violence. Now if one makes himself our enemy that is his lookout not ours; we stand on our fundamental principle that he is our friend, no matter what he may do. That is essential to the continuance of his spiritual life and ours. The great institution which is here in our midst representing our spiritual and moral life, expending vast sums of money, officered by more than 200,000 men, insists upon love and not hate as the primary condition of life, and yet as we

have seen, this institution and its teaching have been utterly ignored in the arguments of the militarists.

There is a third principle at the base of militarism which declares that we must continually prepare against future and contingent evils. Our present preparedness campaign is directed not against actualities but only against remote probabilities which are in fact hardly more than mere possibilities. Now there is no thought more wasteful of human energy than this, and it is a thought utterly condemned by the teaching of Christianity. The Founder of Christianity said "take no thought for the morrow, the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself, sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."

It may be said that fully one-half of human energy has been thrown away because men have acted contrary to the saying of Jesus, and the American people today are in great fear where no fear is. Never in our whole history were we so safe from anything like foreign invasion as we are at the present moment. The only two sources of danger suggested to us are Germany and Japan. At this moment both Germany and Japan are so occupied nearer home that they have neither the means nor the way to undertake so stupendous a task as the conquest of the American republic. Conditions in Mexico may—if they are not handled with wisdom—make of the American republic a conquering nation, but there is from that quarter not the slightest danger of conquest.

All this wild cry for military preparedness has its source, very largely, in the wishes of those who desire that the American republic shall be a conquering nation, and be based upon the imperialistic and not the democratic conception of life and government. The American people will have far more to fear from a large military establishment of their own than from any military establishment outside their borders.

One thing seems evident, the American people must either abandon their religion and dismantle their churches, or else they must use their religion and their churches to curb the present tendency to return frankly and openly to the conditions antecedent to the preaching of Christianity. Our choice lies between Christ and Caesar.

DEMOCRACY OR IMPERIALISM—THE ALTERNATIVE THAT CONFRONTS US

BY FREDERIC C. HOWE,

Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of New York.

There is a very general assumption that the time has come for the United States to abandon its policy of splendid isolation and enter into the broader field of international relations, and that this new policy is demanded by new opportunities, by our expanding trade and overseas relations, and that a refusal to take this step is an indication of weakness or a willingness to remain a "little" America in the field of international affairs.

Were the question as simple as it seems I would agree with this contention. Were the larger contact with the outside world merely a contact of expanding trade and commerce, it would seem to me to be inevitable. But the internationalism of the present day is not really an internationalism of trade and commerce. Those who are most actively urging that America take a more positive place in international affairs are interested in a different kind of imperialism than that which they urge upon us. They would have us assume the paraphernalia of imperialism, of a great navy; they would have the United States be in a position to use the mailed fist to back financial interests, enforce their demands, and otherwise adopt the accessories of imperialism such as those of Germany, Russia, England and the great powers of Europe. And it is because an abandonment of our policy of splendid isolation inevitably involves us in a military front, in the adoption of European diplomacy, and the identification of the state department with sinister interests, that such a policy seems to me fraught, not only with peril to our country, but with most unjust burdens and costs to the great majority of the common people as well. Imperialism is a menace to democracy. It is a menace to social reform and internal development. Judged by the experiences of Europe, imperialism is always at war with the best interests of the State. And it is for this reason that I believe in a continuance of the policy of isolation and detachment that has served us so well for a century.

I

In the first place it is not possible for America to lay down the rules of the game in international affairs. They are fixed by the feudal, aristocratic and dynastic powers of Europe, which still think in terms of an earlier age. These powers establish the terms of the contest, and for us to enter upon an imperialistic policy means that we must accept the game as they play it. Outside of England and France, the great powers of Europe still think of humanity as food for guns; they still each have a contempt for democracy.

To me democracy is the most precious thing in the world. It holds the hopes of the future. And imperialism means the weakening of those things for which democracy stands. There may be glory in internationalism, but there are necessary costs which *democracy* has to pay. And in preparing for imperialism, for a wider field for industrial activity, labor bears the cost. Labor goes to the front; labor mans the ships; labor leaves its wife and children at home to get along as best they may. Labor gets none of the gains. It enjoys none of the concessions, privileges and profits incident to imperialism. But that is not the end of it. War and preparations for war, imperialism, militarism, mean colossal expense. They mean a great increase in the military budget. And the bended back of labor bears most of the cost of it all as well. Wars would not be possible were it not for the fact that taxes are collected by indirect means, upon the things that people consume. This is especially true in America. For fifty years scarcely a dollar of the federal taxes was collected from wealth, property, incomes or inheritances. Ever since the Civil War the federal government has been maintained by taxes on consumption, by tariff taxes, excise taxes, internal revenue taxes. We have supported our army and navy by taxes on sugar, on clothes, on tobacco, on the things people use. Each year we collect between \$600,000,000 and \$700,000,000 from these sources. Only within the last two years has anything been collected from incomes; and even today less than one-eighth of our revenues come from taxes on property of any kind. Labor pays for imperialism. It pays in money and it pays in blood.

II

Labor not only bears the cost of imperialism at the front and at home; labor suffers in legislation as well. Imperialism is usually identified with a reaction at home. It checks social legislation. It centers thought upon overseas matters. The progress that has been going on during the last ten years is likely to be checked with this new emphasis on overseas interests. The result of the war in Europe means that the privileged interests who have been called into the government will continue to rule for many years to come unless democracy asserts itself through revolution. It may be said that this is not true of America; that we control things better; that we are free from privileged interests. But the experiences of the last fifty years disprove this. During the Civil War banking interests, financial interests, tariff interests, railroad interests, land grabbing interests, made their way into the government. They controlled Congress in their own interests. They controlled the states and the cities. Ever since the Civil War we have been paying the price of the war in the control of our agencies of government by the great interests which took advantage of our necessities at that time. And they are more active today than at any time in our history. Imperialism, a great budget, a great navy, and the possible wars which may come from imperialism mean that the financial interests will continue to be powerful. In case of great emergency they will be called in to rule, much as they have been in Europe.

It is because imperialism is a menace to democracy, that it invites control by privileged interests, that I am opposed to our government throwing itself into the arms of an imperialistic policy.

III

Imperialism again is identified with dollar or private diplomacy, with the use of the state department and foreign offices in the interest of those special classes concerned in financial imperialism. In such a game the people are compelled to act in the dark; democracy plays with stacked cards. It has to adopt the rules of diplomacy established by older nations, and these are the rules of aristocracy rather than democracy. The diplomacy of Europe is still the diplomacy of the eighteenth century. It is controlled by the aristocracy. It does not think in terms of the people; it thinks in terms of its

own narrow interests. This is not only true of Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany; it is true of England as well. In some degree it is true of France and Italy, in which democratic countries the financiers have identified themselves with the diplomatic service and made it an agency of their will.

Diplomacy is secret. It does not trust the people. It never takes the people into its confidence. There is scarcely a European war in the last sixty years in which the diplomats did not figure to the disaster or detriment of their people. Even in the United States diplomacy partakes of the aristocratic flavor of Europe. There are only two great examplars of democratic diplomacy in this country, and they were Jefferson and Franklin, who a century ago left an imprint upon the world because they refused to follow the traditional rules of the diplomatic game, and looked upon themselves as representatives of the people of the United States to other peoples. Even today diplomacy in the United States is for the most part open only to the well-to-do. We do not pay our diplomats sufficiently to open the service to any but the rich. And our own diplomats, because of their detachment from the people, their interest in privileged things, are likely to think not in terms of humanity or of democracy, but of the classes or groups and the interests with which they are identified. Imperialism and the new internationalism means the identification of diplomacy and the state department with overseas interests; and when diplomacy and the state department are interested in dollar diplomacy, the promotion of industrial and financial interests, the nation itself is made to serve the will of a small but interested class.

IV

Imperialism today includes war as one of the means of settling the disputes of concession hunters and private interests. And if we knew all the facts we would see that most of the wars of the last thirty years have been the result of the activities of overseas financiers, concession seekers, and those interested in obtaining spheres of influence for loans, mines, railroads, oil wells and other privileged grants. When these concessions, loans and privileges were granted by weak or revolutionary peoples, the concessionaires identified their foreign office with their interests to enforce their claims, even when it was necessary to dispatch the navy and the army against a

weaker nation to validate them. The present cataclysm in Europe is partly, probably largely, the result of a generation of conflict on the part of the big financial and industrial interests of Europe which, when diplomacy failed, insensibly perhaps but none the less inevitably, threw their nations into conflict. The old type of wars came to an end with the Franco-Prussian War. That was the last war of the old feudal nationalistic type. Subsequent wars are of a different kind. The world changed in character about 1890.

Wars and preparation for wars of the last generation have had their origin in the overseas activities of special interests within the greater powers. These activities sprang primarily from surplus wealth seeking investment which the investing classes of England, France and Germany placed in the weaker countries of the world. The sums so invested are colossal. They amount in the aggregate to nearly \$40,000,000,000. Along with loans, financial groups have sought concessions, spheres of influence, opportunities to exploit weaker peoples. The financiers have been identified with the foreign office and the diplomatic service, and when conflicts arose between the financiers the nations have been lured into the contest for the protection of their investments. This has led to friction, irritation, and on a number of occasions Europe was on the verge of war because of the conflict of financial groups which had identified the home government with their overseas interests.

The new imperialism of finance began with the purchase of the shares of the Suez Canal in 1876 by Great Britain. English capital flowed into Egypt. In a few years' time they had loaned the Khedive \$400,000,000 on usurious terms. The treasury of Egypt received only \$100,000,000 of this colossal sum; the bankers retained the rest as commissions and underwriting profits. The interest on these loans could not be met. There was fear of revolution. Alexandria was bombarded and Egypt occupied by Great Britain, from which, despite her assurances, she has never been willing to withdraw. France was crowded out of Egypt. She centered her interests in Tunis and Morocco. These countries, like Egypt, soon lost their independence. European bankers increased the indebtedness of Morocco from \$4,000,000 to \$32,000,000 in six years' time. French, German and British interests came into conflict over spheres of influence and the rights of the various concessionaires. The press of France was controlled by the bankers. It promoted war scares

and induced France to send an army of occupation into Morocco. This led to conflict with Germany which nearly precipitated war in 1911.

The same story was repeated in Persia, where Russian and English interests crowded out Germany. Persia was strangled. It was divided into two spheres of influence. Debts were made by English and Russian bankers, and ultimately Persia lost her independence.

Germany has sent her financial diplomats all over the world. She has penetrated into most of the countries of South America. Crowded out of Morocco and Persia, she centered her interests in Turkey and Asia Minor. The Deutsche Bank received most valuable concessions for the Bagdad Railroad. Along with this were other concessions for mines, lands, harbors and private companies. The German bankers made colossal profits on the Bagdad Railroad, which were, however, charged to Turkey. In this process of financial subjection Turkey became subject to the Deutsche Bank. Financial interests led to political intervention. The Kaiser followed the bankers. Finally Great Britain and the allies were crowded out of Turkey and Asia Minor as a sphere of influence.

Financial imperialism lay back of the Boer War. British financiers were interested in valuable mining rights. Similar interests lay back of the war between Russia and Japan. Russian court financiers owned valuable timber and mining concessions which Russia refused to evacuate, despite her assurances to do so.

The Chinese five power loan is another instance of financial imperialism which nearly embroiled the United States. China wanted to borrow \$30,000,000. The banking interests of the great powers entered into a combination. They refused to loan her the small sum she needed and insisted on her taking a larger sum, to wit, \$300,000,000, which was finally, however, reduced to \$125,000,000. The condition of the loan was that China should be saddled with foreign advisers to control her financial policy. Bankers in the United States were identified with the six power group. They, too, desired the state department and diplomacy as an aid to their transactions. One of the most distinguished services which President Wilson has rendered this country was his veto of dollar diplomacy in China and the identification of the United States government with the program of financial imperialism and the parceling out of

China into spheres of influence among the greater powers. President Wilson said that the whole project threatened the integrity of China, and that the United States government should not participate in such a project. The Chinese loan was not dissimilar from those made to Egypt, Tunis, Morocco, Persia, Turkey, in fact to all of the weaker powers which have ultimately fallen into the subjugation of the great powers of Europe.

Similar interests are active in Mexico today. They have acquired concessions, privileges, monopolies valued at hundreds of millions of dollars. It is said that American claims in Mexico alone are worth twice as much as the total property holdings of the Mexicans themselves. The interests of England, Germany and France are equally large, and the financiers of the United States as well as of Europe are actively interested in intervention in order to validate and make secure their concessions, many of which strike at the government of the country. And back of the clamor for intervention in Mexico is the insistence of financiers and privileged interests that their interests be validated by the action of the United States government.

And today there is a group of men in New York who are attacking the present administration for its refusal to lend the support of the state department to their dreams of financial imperialism all over the world. They are frankly appealing for dollar diplomacy, which means that the young men of America shall be sent out to collect or validate debts and make good usurious contracts. They want the United States to act as an insurance agency in their questionable overseas financial activities.

V

Closely identified with the financiers of all the great powers are the munition makers. They sell munitions to revolutionary groups, to weak nations. They finance weak countries, and when trouble comes they call upon the stronger powers to suppress the revolutions and disturbances which their own commercial greed have made possible. One of the great agencies for promoting militarism all over the world are the Krupps, the Maxims, the Schneiders and the munition makers in the United States whose profits and securities rise or fall with the appropriations for the army and the navy. These and the financiers are the great promoters of imperialism. They see

in it the conversion of the nation itself into an insurance agency to fill their plants with orders on the one hand and validate their debts with weaker peoples on the other.

It is not possible to attribute such criminal ambitions to any individual man. Financial imperialism is not personal. You could not find anyone in the United States who was willing to admit that his actions were urging the country into war. Nor could you find anyone in the European countries who was willing to make that admission. Yet all these agencies together,—the foreign offices, diplomats, financiers, concession hunters, the munition makers,—form in effect a ruling class. They own or control the press; they make public opinion. It is they who talk loudest of the dignity of the country, of the necessity for a great navy to send the flag into distant parts. And as a result of their activities and their public opinion, petty personal quarrels are magnified into international issues which ripen into causes for international conflict.

It is just such conflicts as these that brought Europe to the verge of civil war on several occasions. It was the accumulation of such conflicts covering a generation's time that lies back of the present war.

VI

It is for these reasons that I believe in a continuation of the policy which has served America so well for over a century. Imperialism and overseas expansion are an expression of the activities and ambitions of classes interested in things dangerous to the peace and well-being of the state. It means a great navy, the utilization of the foreign office and diplomacy for private ends, and endless conflicts with the privileged interests of other nations in the exploitation of the world. Imperialism has always been a menace to democracy; and at the present time with colossal aggregations of wealth, the close control of banking and credit and the identification of these interests and munition makers with the governments of Europe, there is constant danger of conflict and war to any nation, no matter how democratic it may be, that enters the lists.

A study of the war budgets of Europe shows that the expenditure for navies is in almost direct proportion to the extent of overseas investments and Colonial expansion. Navalism is a product of imperialism, and those who are loudest in demanding a great navy

for the United States are those who are most interested in overseas investments and concessions. It is these interests that promote war scares; that arouse people to fancied dangers and sweep them into a hot competition for armies. To play this game means that America must adopt the methods of the feudal powers of Europe; it means that our diplomacy must be like their diplomacy; and that the army and navy departments shall be ready to back the claims of the state department all over the world.

An examination of the economic conditions in America explains the rise of this demand for imperialism. Surplus wealth has appeared. It cannot be invested at home at high rates of interest. The resources of the country have been appropriated. The railroads and mines have been monopolized. Most of the great industries have been consolidated into great trusts. The opportunities for investment are not as alluring as they were a generation ago, and the profits to be obtained in the weaker countries are very much greater than those which may be obtained at home. To obtain profitable investments in foreign countries it is necessary to secure concessions, spheres of influence, and other privileges in conflict with other powers. Otherwise the loans and investments cannot be made. And when these concessions are interfered with, or when a revolution jeopardizes the investments in a weaker state, then the clamor is raised for intervention, for a vigorous foreign policy, for the dispatch of ships to protect American interests.

Democracy is so much dearer than any possible gains from imperialism that every precaution should be taken to protect it. And democracy today is menaced more by the movement for overseas imperialism and all that that implies than by any other force. If the experience of Europe teaches anything it is that influences within the state are as dangerous to its peace as are armed nations without the state; and with this experience before us it is our duty to safeguard the nation from the creation of new dangers, which under the patriotic disguise of national dignity are merely agencies of the privileged and trading and financial classes.

BOOK DEPARTMENT

GENERAL WORKS IN ECONOMICS

BRISCO, NORRIS A. *Economics of Efficiency*. Pp. xv, 385. Price, \$1.50. New York: The Macmillan Company.

INGRAM, JOHN KELLS. *A History of Political Economy* (New and Enlarged Edition). Pp. xix, 315. Price, \$1.75. New York: The Macmillan Company, Agents, 1915.

Ingram's *History of Political Economy* first appeared in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* in 1885, and in revised form was published as a book in 1888. It has wielded a wide influence in economic study. The present edition is a reprint with an illuminating introduction by Professor Ely and a long, supplementary chapter by Professor Scott, reviewing the doctrines of the Austrian School as well as more recent developments in economic philosophy in Europe and the United States. Despite the handicaps incident to unavoidable proximities, personal and temporal, Professor Scott has sketched contemporary American thought with fairness and insight.

R. C. McC.

GEOGRAPHY

McFARLANE, JOHN. *Economic Geography*. Pp. viii, 560. Price, \$2.25. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915.

This book, written by the Lecturer in Geography in the University of Manchester, England, aims to give a geographic explanation of the economic resources and industries of the countries of the world. The method of treatment combines the division of the earth into natural regions and the use of political divisions. That is, each country is treated as a unit, but for purposes of description that country is divided into natural regions, each possessing geographic unity. The chapter on France illustrates the method employed for each country of the world. The opening paragraphs give the general geographic and climatic setting of France and its significance. The country is then described under eight headings: (1) the Central Massif, (2) the American Massif, (3) Aquitaine, (4) the Mediterranean Region and the Rhone Valley, (5) the Eastern Border, (6) the Basin of Paris, (7) Communications, (8) Commerce. A diagram of France showing the natural regions is inserted, which, in connection with a rainfall map of Europe, gives graphic aid to the text. For gaining an accurate, understandable picture of agricultural and industrial France, this account of less than fourteen pages does as much as some volumes.

It is unfortunate that so many technical geologic terms are used in the physical descriptions. The fully trained economic geographer will have little difficulty in following the text, but for one not so trained the physical descriptions will not be readily understood. The geologic ideas are basal, but technical geologic terms, many American geographers, at least, believe should be sparingly used in

a work in economic geography whose readers may be economists, historians or business men. The "American massif," for example, has little significance for the man untrained in technical physiography and the use of "primary rocks," "pre-Cambrian age," etc., in its description, is forbidding to the general reader and not essential to the trained geographer's appreciation of the surface features of the region.

G. B. ROORBACH.

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AGRICULTURE, MINING, FORESTRY AND FISHERIES

HUEBNER, GROVER G. *Agricultural Commerce*. Pp. xiv, 406. Price, \$2.00. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1915.

A subtitle reads *The Organization of American Commerce in Agricultural Commodities*, and this is a good general description of the contents. Over half of the book is taken up with descriptions of the trade in specific commodities, viz., grain, cotton, live stock, wool, tobacco, and fruit. It will be noticed that fruit, the treatment of which is very general, is the only one of these commodities which goes through to the consumer without an intervening manufacturing process. No attention is paid to butter, eggs, poultry, or vegetables, except that we are told that the trade in vegetables is similar to that in fruit. There are also chapters on speculation, inspection and grading, collection and dissemination of crop reports, insurance, financing, prices, and foreign trade.

In describing the trade organization and marketing practices for different commodities, well selected statistics are introduced to show the location of production areas, the volume marketed, and the quantities exported and imported. The methods of marketing at local points and in central wholesale markets are then discussed, and good accounts of the functions of certain middlemen are given.

The author has apparently done little or no first-hand investigating of marketing practices in order to procure information that had not already found its way into print, but the book is valuable and serviceable in that it brings together in convenient form a collection of facts from scattered sources. There is very little discussion of fundamental problems of market distribution; and controversial matters, such as the number of middlemen, the value of public markets and direct marketing, etc., are not touched on.

There is very little in the book with which one can take issue. Line elevators in the grain trade (p. 40) were in operation before 1889; the "on track" sale in this trade (p. 86) usually refers to sales on track at country points rather than in primary markets; the auction companies in the fruit trade (p. 252) rarely receive consignments direct from growers, and many of the largest ones absolutely refuse to do so. The description of the various middlemen in the wholesale fruit and vegetable trade is inadequate, in view of the importance of this branch of the marketing machinery. But these are minor matters. Considering the main purpose of the book—a description of the commerce in important agricultural staples which are principally raw materials for manufacturing industries—the work is valuable and well executed.

L. D. H. WELD.

Sheffield Scientific School, Yale University.

COMMERCE AND TRANSPORTATION

HESS, RALPH H. and WHALING, HEISKELL B. *Outlines of American Railway Transportation*. Pp. 208. Price, \$1.00. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1915.

A detailed synopsis, with reading references, of the course on American Railway Transportation as given at the University of Wisconsin. The outline is exceptionally comprehensive and can be used to advantage by those who are studying transportation outside of the class room as well as by the students at the University of Wisconsin.

E. R. J.

MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCE

HUNTINGTON, CHARLES CLIFFORD. *A History of Banking and Currency in Ohio Before the Civil War*. Pp. 312. Price, \$1.50. Columbus: The F. J. Heer Printing Company, 1915.

Professor Huntington divides his study into two parts. The first covers the period from 1803 to 1843 when the banks operated under special charters. The second period, during which general banking laws were in force, extended to 1863 at which date the narrative ends. The volume is clearly the result of painstaking research and is well arranged. The conclusions reached are generally favorable to the Ohio banks including the State Bank of Ohio, but are carefully and moderately stated.

E. M. P.

PLEHN, CARL C. *Government Finance in the United States*. Pp. 166. Price, 50 cents. Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Company, 1915.

This brief volume treats almost entirely of the expenditures of federal, state, county, town and city governments in the United States, referring only in an incidental way to debts, revenues and financial administration. Needless to say such a work has been needed and for a brief popular survey has been admirably done.

Among the interesting points emphasized by the author are his words of caution against the acquisition by governments of utility properties that may soon become antiquated because of the introduction of new forms of public service. "The greatest growth of government expenditures is coming in the field of state finance." New sources of revenue must be found and the only effective source in the long run is the income tax.

E. M. P.

SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEMS

BRISTOL, LUCIUS MOODY. *Social Adaptation*. Pp. xii, 356. Price, \$2.00. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915.

The subtitle of this volume indicates its purpose and content: *A Study in the Development of the Doctrine of Adaptation as a Theory of Social Progress*. The author has given us a timely and valuable résumé of the ideas of the more promi-

nent students of the last century. I do not know of another book in which one may find such an accurate and readable digest. Moreover, Professor Moody has commented critically upon the views presented and thereby added much to the worth of his book.

The study is divided into four parts. Part I, Introduction, includes a sketch of the Positive Philosophy of Comte, one of the first men to see that there might be a science of society. This is followed by a discussion of Herbert Spencer, the first to catch the glimpse of cosmic evolution and its application to society. The introduction is closed by an outline of the methods of social study suggested by Quêtelet (statistics), Lilienfeld (analogy), and DeGreef (classification).

Passive Physical and Physio-Social Adaptation is the subject of Part II. This includes three chapters. The first deals with Biological Evolution, as outlined by Lamarck, Darwin, Weismann, de Vries, and Mendel; the second is on Neo-Darwinian sociologists (Nietzsche, Kidd, Galton, Pearson, and Lapouge); the third deals with the Environmental School of Sociologists (Marx, Buckle, Ratzel, Ripley).

Part III, Passive Spiritual Adaptation, contains five chapters. The first, Development of the Concept of Society as an Organism, contains a review of Schaeffle, Mackenzie, LeBon, Durkheim, with a few comments on other writers. Sumner, Boas, Westermarck, Hobbhouse and Thomas are the anthropological sociologists mentioned in the next chapter. Gumplowicz, Ratzel and Bagehot are the historical sociologists of the third chapter, and Smith, Tarde, Baldwin, Drummond and Giddings are treated in the fourth chapter under the title, Sociologists Emphasizing One All-Important Formula or Principle. The last chapter discusses the transition from the concept of adaptation as passive to the active concept and considers the question of free-will.

Part IV, Active Material Adaptation, under the subtitle of Invention and Production analyzes the work of Ward, Patten and Carver.

Part V deals with Active Spiritual Adaptation. Here we find under the subtitle, Active Social Adaptation, Novicow (social progress by cultural attraction and expansion), Carlyle (the rôle of great men), James (the energies of men), and Ross (the psychology of social control). Under the title of Idealization and Religion the ideas of Comte, Ross and Baldwin are briefly treated.

In the closing chapter, Summary and Conclusion, the author glances over the field covered and indicates his own position. "As applied to social problems and conditions, the theory of adaptation and the philosophy of social-personalism would seem to call for emphasis on the following factors in associational life:

"I. Production of material goods as the basis of life, growth and cultural development;

"II. The elimination of waste land, waste labor and the waste of natural resources;

"III. Efficient consumption,—interpreted in terms of production (Carver), of surplus energy (Patten), or of social well-being;

"IV. Education for social efficiency ;

"V. Social Control

(a) to secure efficient race stock and to regulate population;

(b) to deal with the anti-social and the social laggards;

(c) to prevent that competition which experience shows to be uneconomic or detrimental to well-being;

(d) to encourage such coöperation as promises to be socially advantageous, and

(e) to secure a more just distribution of wealth."

I am greatly pleased with the quality of the volume. Students will find it helpful and suggestive. I am a bit surprised that no mention is made of such works as Ammon *Die natuerliche Auslese beim Menschen*; Hildebrand, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*; or the writings of Schallmeyer, Reibmayr, Hayeraft, Ritchie, or the last book of A. R. Wallace, *Social Environment and Moral Progress*. No reference is made to these, even in the very excellent bibliography.

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University of Pennsylvania.

DURKHEIM, EMILE. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Pp. xi, 456. Price, \$4.00. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915.

The author presents in this volume one of the most profound social studies of modern times. Because of its breadth and comprehensiveness, its thoroughgoing research, and its positive conclusions, it is destined to become a classic. Whether its theories are sound or not, it is a book to be reckoned with in all future discussions of this subject.

Two assumptions constitute the thesis of the work, viz.: First, Religion is founded in the nature of things. Were this not the case it would have encountered resistance over which it never could have triumphed. Second, Religion is something essentially social. "Religious representations are collective representations which express collective realities."

Part I is devoted to the statement of the problem and to an analysis of animism and naturism in which the author finds that these are not elementary but derivative forms of religious belief. Part II comprising nine chapters is entitled *The Elementary Beliefs*. This is a study of totemism. After an elaborate analysis of the forms and expressions of totemism, studied primarily among the Australian tribes but supplemented by a wider range of studies, and after a careful criticism of the theories of Frazier and others, he passes to an investigation of the origins of these beliefs. Here conclusion is reached that "the believer is not deceived when he believes in the existence of a moral power upon which he depends and from which he receives all that is best in himself." This power exists, it is society. "Since religious force is nothing other than the collective force of the clan, and since this can be represented in the mind only in the form of the totem, the totemic emblem is like the visible body of the God." Society is the existence outside ourselves, greater than ourselves, and into which we enter into communion. It is symbolized in the totem. Book III develops the principal ritual attitudes growing out and reacting upon these primitive beliefs. This is essentially a confirmation of the philosophic interpretation of the origin and development of religious beliefs on a social basis. It is an induction which sets a task for future investigators. It may be proved or disproved, but it cannot be ignored.

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University of Pennsylvania.

HILL, HIBBERT WINSLOW. *The New Public Health*. Pp. 206. Price, \$1.25. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916.

A remarkably fresh, racy and stimulating discussion of one of the most important questions of the time will be found in this little volume. By the use of satire, ridicule and humor the author takes the public to task for its failure to protect its health and for its dependence on old superstitions rather than technical knowledge. The foibles of the medical men are not slighted, but the result is a book which must be read to be appreciated.

The volume is intended to be an exposition of the sphere of the trained public health man in protecting the community, in which work the author has had personal experience. He shows us that the source of danger in disease is the sick person and that the attempt to stamp out disease by municipal house-cleaning is barren of results. It is not the quantity of the dirt, but the quality that is important.

The common public highways for the spread of disease are via water, milk, food, flies. The great private road is contact. When once we realize that the danger comes through the sick individual and organize our forces to care for him and to prevent the spread of germs from him we shall be able to stamp out infectious disease. How the problem was tackled by the older methods and why they failed is clearly shown. What present knowledge demands also is set forth.

The volume will be of immense value to the layman as well as to the administrative officials of schools or towns.

C. K.

LEPRINCE, JOS. A. and ORENSTEIN, A. J. *Mosquito Control in Panama*. Pp. xvii, 335. Price, \$2.50. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916.

It is now well-recognized that the construction of the Panama Canal depended in large measure upon the ability of those in charge to control malaria and yellow fever. Two of the men actually engaged in this work have written in most interesting fashion of their task, the methods and results. The story is told in non-technical terms, and is made clearer by the liberal use of illustrations and charts. It will be of great interest to anyone who wishes to know the actual problems encountered in the canal zone as well as to the medical student or to the contractor who may be considering extensive works in tropical regions. It is a record of work well done.

C. K.

MACY, JOHN. *Socialism in America*. Pp. x, 249. Price, \$1.00. New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1916.

The author states in his preface that this book is "intended for readers who know little about the subject." It will probably not reach this class because it presupposes throughout an acquaintance with the terminology of socialism and with the history of the labor movement that the average reader unfortunately does not possess. It should, however, serve an equally valuable end. It should clarify the thinking of many radicals and cause the various groups to draw sharper lines of demarcation. A chapter analyzing the older trade unions and another

criticizing and explaining the platform of the Socialist Party, clause by clause, are particularly suggestive and helpful.

A. F.

Papers and Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society held at Washington, D. C., Dec. 28-31, 1915. War and Militarism in their Sociological Aspects. Pp. 166. Price, \$1.00. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1916.

PARSONS, ELSIE CLEWS. *Social Freedom: A Study of the Conflicts between Social Classification and Personality.* Pp. 106. Price, \$1.00. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915.

An exceedingly keen analysis of the reaction of developing personality against the psychic and social barriers created by age, sex, kin, caste and place classifications. Old struggles between individual and group consciousness are presented in a new light. Emancipated society will witness the freest possible contact among personalities regardless of the old categories.

J. P. L.

SCOTT, H. PERCY. *The New Slavery.* Pp. 187. Price, \$1.00. Toronto: William Briggs.

The author senses the severe pressure that the modern consumer is feeling, due to the general rise in the costs of living. A third of his book consists of selections gleaned from current newspapers, lectures and magazines to show that the consumer's trouble is widespread—ever breeding discontent and lawlessness. It is the new slavery of the common people.

A search for causes is made. The roots of the problem reach back into the reign of gigantic industrial combinations and trusts, which, in addition to controlling the commodities of living, have taken into their keeping the monetary and banking systems. In the way of solution he sees "The New Era" in which a consumer's guild is to obtain control of the situation. Quoting the power that should be wielded upon the trusts, he says: "The government should allow the corporation enough of its earnings to pay a good working dividend, say six or eight per cent. Then all the surpluses should be pooled, and the price of commodity—coal, meat, sugar, or what not—fixed for the consumer accordingly."

Nothing fundamentally new is found in the book, but one appreciates the outlining of necessary organization to be carried on by the consumers in order to obtain a more effective social control.

C. R.

SLINGERLAND, WILLIAM H. (Ed.) *Child Welfare Work in Pennsylvania.* Pp. xviii, 352. *A Child Welfare Symposium.* Pp. viii, 138. Price, \$2.00. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1915.

Child Welfare Work in Pennsylvania is an intensive analysis of the institutions for children, and of the general methods of child care in one state. Dr. Hastings H. Hart, Russell Sage Director of the Department of Child-Helping, has provided the introduction. The material for the book was collected in a series of first

hand investigations. The second part of the book deals with miscellaneous institutions for children. The third part deals with child caring generally, and the fourth part with the private institutions for dependent children. Statistical tables present the facts in great detail, and there are many excellent illustrations scattered through the book. The system of state subsidy to private philanthropic organizations furnishes an excellent reason for the Pennsylvania study. Otherwise a state study would be less effective than a study localized in cities or in rural communities.

The *Child Welfare Symposium*, edited by Mr. Slingerland, goes into some detail regarding the causes that put children in the institutions. The inevitable overlapping that comes with symposium writing does not seriously detract from the excellent body of material which these twenty-five special papers furnish regarding the work for children in the State of Pennsylvania.

S. N.

TOWNS, CHARLES B. *Habits that Handicap*. Pp. xiv, 289. Price, \$1.20. New York: The Century Company, 1915.

When a physician like Dr. Richard C. Cabot says of the author: "I do not hesitate to say that he knows more about the alleviation and cure of drug addictions than any doctor that I have ever seen," the reader expects an unusual discussion. In this case he is not disappointed. The writer of this note is inclined to consider this book the strongest presentation he has ever seen of the "menace of opium, alcohol and tobacco." Its great strength lies in the personal, human side; in the tracing of the growth of the habits and the psychology of the victims. Little attempt is made to analyze the economic aspects of the problems. The greatest weakness of the book is the enormous amount of repetition of ideas and expressions which decidedly reduces the effectiveness of the author's argument. From the standpoint of the reader there is certain to be regret that the author gives no suggestion of the nature of the treatment which he has made so successful and which he has given to the medical press. For such omission there may be good reason.

C. K.

WALLIS, LOUIS. *The Struggle for Justice*. Pp. v, 57. Price, 25 cents. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916.

This little monograph is a condensed statement of the social philosophy underlying the religious revolution of the present—a brief survey of the evolution of religion through the stage of conflict between the one God and the gods of greed and graft as represented in Baal, through the strife as to how God is to be worshiped, whether by dogma or ritual or by righteousness, to the present struggle over the question of the individual or social interpretation of righteousness. It is his larger work on *The Sociological Study of the Bible* epitomized.

J. P. L.

WORTHINGTON, MARY GRACE. *Fifty Benevolent and Social Institutions In and Near New York*. Pp. 100. Price, 25 cents. New York: School of Philanthropy, 1915.

POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS

BARNETT, JAMES D. *The Operation of the Initiative, Referendum and Recall in Oregon*. Pp. xi, 295. Price, \$2.00. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915.

This is an inclusive and thorough study of the operation of the state-wide initiative and referendum and recall in Oregon. It does not include a study of the use of the referendum in local affairs. In the appendix are given a good bibliography of constitutional and statutory provisions relating to these matters, the vote on matters initiated and referred, examples of the arguments for a measure on an initiative petition, newspaper advice on direct legislation, recommendations of the Taxpayers' League, a sample of advertisements, a recall petition and a recall ballot.

He who would like to get at the facts and the underlying sentiments upon which these so-called agencies of democracy are based can find them in no other book so ably and completely expressed as in this book by Dr. Barnett. Every phase of the subjects is discussed, such as the actual author of the proposed legislation, motives in legislation, the preparation of measures, the substance and form of measures, the making of petitions, the multiplicity of measures, campaign organization, organization of the vote, the relation of direct legislation to the executive and legislature, checks of the assembly upon direct legislation, the relation of direct legislation to the courts, to political parties and to stability in government. Such interesting matters are discussed in detail as the extent to which voters vote by title; the extent to which they tend to vote "no" on all measures when there are certain measures to which they are opposed; the extent to which votes are cast without an evident reading of the measure; the soundness and wholesomeness of direct legislation and the recall as agencies for securing responsiveness in government.

The author points out that "all the most radical measures were rejected by the voters" but concludes that "on the whole it appears that the voters have shown a decidedly progressive attitude in direct legislation." He believes that "the results of direct legislation at least compare favorably with those of representative legislation." The work is a highly creditable piece of research on a current topic.

CLYDE LYNDON KING.

University of Pennsylvania.

ELLIOTT, EDWARD. *American Government and Majority Rule*. Pp. vii, 175. Price, \$1.25. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1916.

The people of the United States have been hindered in the attainment of democracy by the form of government through which they have been compelled to act. This form is primarily a multiplicity of offices as represented in the long ballot, and in the check and balance system. Historical conditions and developments are submitted in order to sustain these principles.

Simplification of government is based on the twentieth century belief that there is no fear of government, and that democracy is not desirous of limiting the

sphere of governmental action. The changes needed in order to simplify our government are: (1) centralization of even greater powers, particularly in the state executives, including power to introduce and advocate bills in the legislature; (2) the present statutory and constitutional provisions requiring that a representative of the legislative body must reside in the district which he represents should be changed and a representative be allowed to stand for election in any district regardless of residence. "With law and custom changed so that a man might represent any district . . . the pork barrel as an institution of our political life would disappear; the representative would have more than local outlook and yet his sense of responsibility to the people would be enhanced." (3) The theory that election is sufficient to secure responsibility should be discarded and the short ballot for responsible executives with large powers substituted in its place. (4) These few high executive officials should have the power to make all appointments in the civil service, including the appointment of judges.

A number of chapters are devoted to historical developments. The book presents in a readable style old facts under new tendencies.

C. L. K.

GIDDINGS, FRANKLIN H.; HART, ALBERT BUSHNELL; JOHNSON, EMORY R.; SELIGMAN, EDWIN R. A.; WILSON, GEORGE S.; WILLOUGHBY, W. W.; GOODRICH, CASPAR F. *Problems of Readjustment after the War*. Pp. vi, 185. Price, \$1.00. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1915.

HENRY, H. M. *The Police Control of the Slave in South Carolina*. Pp. x, 216. Price, \$1.00. Emory, Va.: Published by the Author.

Dr. Henry has examined with manifest care and industry the statutes, newspapers and many manuscript county records of anti-bellum South Carolina, and has constructed a readable and interesting account of the system of slavery as it existed in that state. A liberal use is made of the method of incorporating frequent and extensive quotations from the sources into the body of his text. South Carolina seems to have evolved no emancipation sentiment and her treatment of the slave appears harsher than that of the states of the Upper South. Though a logical connection between the nineteen chapters, or topics, under which the subject is considered is not always clear, the work is a welcome addition to the contributions of General McCready on the early history of the institution of slavery in South Carolina.

J. C. B.

MAITLAND, FREDERIC W. and MONTAGUE, FRANCIS C. *A Sketch of English Legal History*. Pp. x, 229. Price, \$1.50. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915.

This is a reprint of the well-known articles contributed to Traill's *Social England* by Maitland and Montague on the history of the law. Their publication in the present form renders them more accessible and should ensure for them a wider circle of readers. The editor, James F. Colby, who is Parker Professor of Law in Dartmouth College, has added a few brief extracts from other sources, such as Pollock and Maitland's *History of English Law* and Jenks' *Short History of*

English Law, some as insertions in the text and others as notes or appendices. He has also explained in the notes a few of the technical terms employed in the narrative and he has appended to each chapter a list of "recommended readings" on the topics there treated. The book should be of service to those who wish to make their first acquaintance with English constitutional or legal history and of special convenience for use by classes engaged in the introductory study of either subject.

The work of the editor has been confined within such narrow limits that it calls for little comment. His choice of extracts to supplement the text appears to be based generally on a sound judgment of historical values and his numerous references to books for more extensive reading display a wide knowledge of the literature of the subject. Yet many good authorities are omitted and poor ones are sometimes included. Citations from the Anglo-Saxon laws, for example, are made from Thorpe's translation and not from Liebermann's; Taswell-Langmead's text-book is recommended frequently for reading on the mediaeval period, while White's excellent volume is not mentioned. His text, with the exception of a few typographical errors of minor importance, is an accurate reproduction, though the same may not be said of the quotations in the foot-notes (e.g., pp. 17, 22).

W. E. LUNT.

MICHELS, ROBERT. *Political Parties*. (Trans. by Eden and Cedar Paul.) Pp. ix, 416. Price, \$3.50. New York: Hearst's International Library Company, 1915.

Political Parties is the title and *A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Democracy* the subtitle of a rather informing book by Robert Michels, Professor of Political Economy and Statistics of the University of Basle. The professor clearly has a thesis to prove and marshals his facts to prove it. This thesis is, as indicated in the subtitle, that the tendencies of democracy are toward oligarchy; or, to put it more concretely, that not only is socialism impossible, but that even a socialistic policy is impossible. The facts, arguments, and ideas that the author brings to his work are significant whether or not mistaken.

The major premises in his argument are that leaders are indispensable in democracies and in all democratic organizations as in social life itself, and that the inevitable tendency is for all leaders to assert autocratic control. As a corollary of these main premises is the doctrine that "organization, based as it is upon the principle of least effort, that is to say upon the greatest possible economy of energy, is the weapon of the strong." Organization means oligarchy whether it be the oligarchy of popularly chosen leaders or the oligarchy of a politically dominant minority. From out of this inevitable oligarchy come the decisions we erroneously refer to, according to our author, as the judgments of the masses, public opinion, or the will of the state.

"The modern party," he says, "is a fighting organization in the political sense of the term, and must as such conform to the laws of tactics. Now the first article of these laws is facility of mobilization." Centralization guarantees results.

"Reduced to its most concise expression, the fundamental sociological law of political parties (the term "political" being here used in its most comprehensive significance) may be formulated in the following terms: 'It is an organization

which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy.'"

It is worthy of note, however, that many of the same arguments used by Professor Michels can be used just as effectively to prove the possibility of efficient democracy. The corner-stone of any democracy must be the ascendancy of leaders—leaders, to be sure, in whom the respective groups have confidence. Through such choice of leaders, democracy is transferred into a government by the best, intellectually and morally.

The four hundred pages of the book are closely crowded with many social facts, pertaining to the actual working out of such democratic organizations as the labor unions and socialist parties of the Continent, particularly of Germany, Italy and France. All his laboratory material the author draws from these labor and socialistic organizations. Indeed, the book as a whole may be considered as an attempt to make a cross-section study of the actual social forces at work in the organization, three million strong, of the socialist party of Germany. The author makes his study from a hypercritical point of view, and the spirit of his book is invidious. This is its chief defect. But students of social psychology or students of the forces really at work in actual government will find the volume illuminating and charged in every page with human interest and informing facts.

CLYDE LYNDON KING.

University of Pennsylvania.

NOLEN, JOHN (Ed. by). *City Planning*. Pp. xxvi, 447. Price, \$2.00. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1916.

The literature dealing with city planning has been accumulating rapidly in this country. The present book contains chapters written by some of the best known and most experienced city planners and is a sort of a synthetic presentation of the experience and current opinion on the subject that has gained the widest acceptance in recent years. While as a text-book for classroom use it lacks orderliness and clear-cut segregation of subjects, each author has dealt with his subject in a manner that cannot fail to give to the most uninitiated a clear conception of the meaning and function of city planning.

Considering the difficulties in the way of securing a consistent whole in so composite a work as *City Planning* is, remarkable unity and uniformity have been attained. The bibliographies at the end of each chapter and the general bibliography at the end of the book deserve special attention, as they include the most recent and best publications available in this country. References to the best foreign literature, however, are almost wholly lacking.

C. A.

ORTH, SAMUEL P. *Readings on the Relation of Government to Property and Industry*. Pp. viii, 664. Price, \$2.25. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1915.

These readings are grouped in such a way as to show the trend of opinion, both scientific and popular, on such questions as the police power and its gradual expansion, the control over corporations, the regulation of property by commis-

sions and boards, the regulation of the labor contract, the gradual extension of federal control over industry and trade and a series of excerpts from the testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee in 1912 on the revision of the Anti-Trust laws. The material thus gathered together is intended to be useful for classes studying the relations of government to industry, and it admirably fulfills that purpose.

The articles are well chosen from writers representing a broad diversity of views including manufacturers, publicists, teachers of political science, lawyers, labor leaders, corporation directors and public officials.

J. T. Y.

ZUEBLIN, CHARLES. *American Municipal Progress*. (New and Revised Edition.) Pp. xiv, 522. Price, \$2.00. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916.

This is an account of recent municipal progress in the United States—a revised and enlarged edition of the author's former work on the same subject, published in 1902.

The purpose of *American Municipal Progress* is to instruct in the functions of American city governments, and to catalogue, comparatively, their accomplishments and delinquencies. The structure of the government of our cities, either in its theoretical or practical aspects, is alluded to only incidentally. In the chapter on Municipal Administration (Chapter XIX) the author discusses very tersely, allowing all the space the subject deserves, the bicameral system of city government as exemplified by Philadelphia.

The key-note of the book is municipal ownership. Probably the baldest claim for this theory occurs in the chapter dealing with the efficiency of the municipality, in which the author states: (p. 395) "There can be no municipal efficiency while public utilities are in private hands."

The book offers an invaluable aid as supplemental reading for the usual courses in municipal government. It makes possible a dovetailing of the actual results of the administration of the city with the theoretical possibilities of its structure. The comparative study of accomplishments breathes the zest of life into the study of the lifeless form. As the author notes in his preface, the "book is designed primarily to indicate to civic and social workers, public officials, and intelligent citizens the vast scope of municipal activity today." The difficult task of presenting a mass of timely facts in an interesting and entertaining way has been accomplished most creditably. A very unusual style is partly responsible for this result.

The forty-seven half-tones are up-to-date illustrations of the subjects they are intended to visualize. A sixty-five page bibliography, listed under the various chapter titles, is a particularly valuable guide to those working in this field. The appendix, also divided in accordance with the plan of the text itself, contains about twenty-five pages of material, mainly statistical.

H. G. H.

INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

ALLEN, GEORGE H., WHITEHEAD, HENRY C., and CHADWICK, F. E. *The Great War*. (1st vol., 2d Ed., revised.) Pp. xxx, 377. Philadelphia: George Barrie's Sons, 1915.

The present work, written by George H. Allen, forms the first of a series of volumes intended by the publishers to cover the history of the war in an unbiased and non-partisan manner, and to present as scholarly an account of the crisis as is possible with the sources of information at our disposal. An introduction by ex-President Taft furnishes a brief summary of the international situation and a discussion of the position of the United States in regard to it, particularly in view of the *Lusitania* case. Of the other volumes under preparation, the second will be devoted to a review of the moral or spiritual forces which prepared the minds of the nations for war, and of the physical resources of the nations and their mobilization, while the third will contain a full record of the outbreak of hostilities and of the military operations in the opening months of the war. The design of the publishers is evidently that the volumes shall make their appeal to the public not only as a written record and discussion of events, but as a collection of illustrations of persons and places which will give vividness to the narrative and a greater sense of intimacy with the motive forces controlling the progress of events. These illustrations, to the number of nearly one hundred, including a number of maps, have been chosen with excellent judgment, while the bookmaking in general is worthy of a firm with a reputation.

Dr. Allen devotes the larger part of the volume to the historical background of the war, and this is followed by a very satisfactory analysis of the negotiations immediately leading up to it. He makes a distinction between the "potential causes" and the "positive causes" of the war, the former being found in the conflict between artificial state lines and the boundaries of nationalities, and in commercial rivalries, false biological theories of national development and the quest for exclusive foreign markets; and the latter being found in the conflict between the Teutonic powers and Russia in the Balkans with Constantinople as the pivotal point. It is interesting to note that in his judgment the commercial rivalry between Great Britain and Germany, which has been so much stressed by German writers as determining the attitude of Great Britain, may be relegated "to a remote place among the potential causes." On the other hand, the growth of German sea power figures prominently among the potential causes. Dr. Allen concedes that Russia's general mobilization was premature, but explains it on the ground of Austria's uncompromising attitude. He is frank to admit that the violation of the neutrality of Belgium was not the dominating motive which led Great Britain to enter the war, but rather an occasion which the British government made use of to obtain the support of the people for what was in the ultimate issue a war of self-preservation. His remarks upon the dangerous influence of the militaristic spirit upon political policies are particularly in point. On the whole Dr. Allen has shown that modern scholarship is capable of presenting an historical narrative which is at once popular in form and yet thoroughly accurate and well balanced.

C. G. FENWICK.

Bryn Mawr College.

HYDE, H. E. *The Two Roads: International Government or Militarism*. Pp. xi, 155. Price 1s. 3d. London: P. S. King and Son, Ltd., 1916.

The scheme presented in this suggestive little volume was first published in New Zealand shortly after the outbreak of the present war. Whether the thinking of the British public is yet prepared for it remains to be seen. The author frankly abandons the doctrine of Nationalism and its consequences of force, also any attempt to secure lasting peace, through a "league of nations" by treaties, coalitions, or any policy of limitation of armaments, or through adoption of militarism to offset militarism in other nations with its resultant unstable equilibrium. He sees the way out through international government, and in thirty-three propositions he outlines a constitution for a government of nations by nations, somewhat as a federation governs its units. He calls on England to lead the way which Germany, if consistent with her declared objective in the war, must follow.

J. C. B.

LÜTZOW, THE COUNT. *The Hussite Wars*. Pp. xiv, 384. Price, \$4.50. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company.

"All writers on the Hussite wars agree that these wars were the result of three causes, the antagonism of the Bohemians to the Church of Rome, the revival of the Slavic national feeling, and the rise of the democratic spirit which is, to a greater or lesser extent, evident in many European countries at the beginning of the fifteenth century" (p. 1).

"In spite of the bitter invectives of the enemies of Bohemia, and in spite also of the perhaps more harmful writings of indiscriminate praisers of Hussitism, the period of the Hussite war will always appear to a Bohemian as the most glorious epoch in the annals of his country" (p. 363).

These words, which respectively open and close *The Hussite Wars*, will suggest to the informed reader the problems which the author handles and the spirit in which he works them out. The book covers the years 1420-36 and presupposes, for its adequate understanding, familiarity with the history of Hus and his movement. This may well be secured in the author's *The Life and Times of Master John Hus* (New York, 1909).

The exposition of the Hussite art of war is clear in essentials and most interesting, particular attention being paid to Žižka's use of ironclad wagons carrying field-pieces and serving as a defence for his warriors. Žižka's character is presented in an attractive light, and Prokop fares almost, though in the nature of the case not quite, as well.

Hussite theologies and disputations receive much attention, and the author again discriminates between the views of Wycliffe and Hus, and also declares that "even the Táborist, the most advanced party in the Bohemian Church, approached far less closely to moderate Protestantism than has often been stated" (p. 247).

The learned author seems to have utilized effectively the writings of other masters of special aspects of his complex subject, and his book is easily the best treatment of the whole matter that we have in English. He displays breadth, tolerance, and freedom from racial or religious bitterness, and the perusal of his

book will lead even the reluctant to concede his right to pride in the achievements of his people.

G. C. SELLERY.

University of Wisconsin.

MISCELLANEOUS

BOLTON, HERBERT EUGENE. *Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century*. Pp. x, 501. Price, \$3.25, paper; \$3.50, cloth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1915.

Dr. Bolton has brought together the results of many years of investigation in the archives of Texas, Mexico and Spain, and has thrown great light upon this important but hitherto practically unknown period of Texas history. For instance, he has shown that since Texas was first a buffer province against the encroachments of France and then an important district for the working out of the changes made necessary by the transfer of Louisiana to Spain, the years 1731-1788 were not uneventful, as has been supposed, but were filled with numerous expansive and defensive projects. These facts are established by a series of studies in Spanish colonial and administrative history hitherto published as separate articles in the Texas State Historical Association *Quarterly* and in the *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, under the following titles: The San Xavier Missions, 1745-1758, The Reorganization of the Lower Gulf Coast, 1746-1768, Spanish Activities on the Lower Trinity River, 1746-1771, and The Removal From and the Reoccupation of Eastern Texas, 1773-1779. To these studies there has been prefixed a valuable and interesting introduction tracing the expansive movements in four directions—in central Texas, along the coast about Matagorda Bay, on the Trinity River, and at Nacogdoches on the extreme north-eastern frontier.

M. A. H.

CLARK, FLOYD BARZILIA. *The Constitutional Doctrines of Justice Harlan*. Pp. vii, 208. Price, \$1.00. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1915.

We are coming to recognize that judge-made law is in reality judge-made law and that the judicial product is dependent upon the temperament and the social philosophy, as well as the logical faculties, of the wielders of judicial power. The opinions of individual judges present, therefore, important subjects for isolated treatment. It is to be hoped that Dr. Clark's study is the forerunner of similar discussions of the doctrines of other jurists. Professor Clark has done an important service in calling attention to the need for this method of approaching the study of constitutional law. His treatment of his subject, however, does not furnish a desirable model for future work in similar fields. Under appropriate heads he collects the cases in which Mr. Justice Harlan wrote opinions, presenting by abstracts and quotations the views of the jurist and comparing them with the opposing views when there was a divided court. The material from the reports is well gleaned and clearly exhibited. But there is little more. We do not see the striking personality behind these opinions any more clearly than we can see

it by reading the official reports. The social and economic tenets of Mr. Justice Harlan are not brought into clear relief, nor are his characteristic habits of reasoning well disclosed. There are photographs from different angles but we look in vain for a real portrait. We are not told why Mr. Justice Harlan was so often in the minority, nor given an estimate of the degree to which our law would have been better or worse if his views had uniformly commended themselves to his colleagues. Dr. Clark has done so well in what he has undertaken, that it seems ungracious to criticise him for not undertaking more. But the work which he has left undone is of such importance that it is sincerely to be hoped that future scholars will not be satisfied to leave similar omissions in their presentations of the constitutional doctrines of other jurists.

T. R. P.

CODY, SHERWIN. *How to Deal With Human Nature in Business*. Pp. xx, 488. Price, \$2.00. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1915.

This book is an attempt at a unification of the various factors involved in the ever widening selling field. The abrupt turning from generalization to the concrete rather startles at first, but withal the author shows clearly the relation between individual efficiency and the specific problems involved in business correspondence, advertising and salesmanship. The general spirit of the text should prove exceedingly suggestive to the selling executive, for the author succeeds at times in getting at the fundamentals involved in directing and determining the soul movement of a business. The chief criticism consists in a feeling that the author could have written two books with the material on hand rather than one. In other words, he aims to instruct too many selling types at one time. However, it will prove a most suggestive and helpful exposition for those involved in the complicated problem of selling.

H. W. H.

D'OLIVET, FABRE. (Trans. by Nayán Louise Redfield.) *Hermeneutic Interpretation of the Origin of the Social State of Man and of the Destiny of the Adamic Race*. Pp. lix, 548. Price, \$3.50. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915.

This is a translation of a metaphysical philosophy written in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. The author takes as his fundamental principle the theory that the three great powers of the universe are Providence, Destiny, and the Will of Man. He interprets all human development and history as the result of the occult interplay of these forces. The interpretation is speculative, metaphysical, and unscientific in the extreme. The work can be of value only as a contribution to the history of philosophy.

W. L. A.

MARSHALL, THOMAS MAITLAND. *A History of the Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase 1819-1841*. Pp. xiii, 266. Price, \$1.75, paper; \$2.00, cloth. Berkeley: University of California Press.

POLLAK, GUSTAV. *Fifty Years of American Idealism*. Pp. ix, 468. Price, \$2.50. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1915.

SCHROEDER, THEODORE. *Free Speech for Radicals* (Enlarged Edition). Pp. viii, 206. Price, \$1.50. New York: Free Speech League, 56 E. 59th Street, 1916.

TEELE, RAY PALMER. *Irrigation in the United States*. Pp. 252. Price, \$1.50. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1915.

A book with such an inclusive title, written by one who for sixteen years has been engaged in the study of irrigation for the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of the Census, might well present more than "a general view of irrigation in the United States" in a "popular and non-technical way." Eight pages are devoted to the field for irrigation; five pages to its history; six pages to climatic conditions; eleven pages to water supply; twenty-three pages to crops; forty-five pages to legislation; ninety-one pages to irrigation investments; and twenty-six pages to the present and future of irrigation. As the titles of the chapters suggest, some important aspects of irrigation are omitted, and there is lack of proportion between others. The outline followed leads to needless repetition, and the evident desire for brevity apparently is responsible for certain incomplete statements. The data are taken largely from the thirteenth census, but, wherever possible, the statistics have been brought up to 1914. On the whole, the book is a review of the subject, valuable for reference, rather than a contribution to existing knowledge. The author's conservative and almost pessimistic view of the immediate future of irrigation and his proposal for publicly subsidizing irrigation works are interesting features of the book.

T. R. T.

WHITAKER, C. W. (Ed.) *The American Whitaker Almanac and Encyclopedia for 1916*. Pp. xlviii, 552. Price, \$1.00. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916.

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